United Black Untouchables worldwide

Single European Act of 1986

]

The fragmented nature of EU institutional structure provides multiple channels through which organized interests may seek to influence policy-making. Lobbying takes place at the European level itself and within the existing national states. The most important institutional targets are the

Commission

, the Council, and the European Parliament.

[19]

The Commission has a monopoly on the initiative in Community decision-making. Since it has the power to draft initiatives, it makes it ideally suited as an arena for interest representation.

There are three main channels of indirect lobbying of the Council. First,

lobbying groups

routinely lobby the national delegations in Brussels. The second indirect means of lobbying the Council is for interest groups to lobby members of the many Council-working groups. The third means of influencing the Council is directly via national governments. As a consequence of the co-decision procedures, the European Parliament attracts attention from lobbyists who target the

rapporteur

and the chairman of the committee. The rapporteurs are

MEPs

appointed by Committees to prepare the parliament's response to the Commission's proposal and to those measures taken by the Parliament itself.

Lobbying in

Brussels

was born only in the late 1970s. Up to that time, "diplomatic lobbying" at the highest levels remained the rule. There were few lobbyists involved in the system and except for some business associations, representative offices were rarely used. The event that sparked the explosion of lobbying was the first direct election of the

European Parliament

1979

. Up until then the Parliament consisted of a complex, and companies increasingly felt the need of an expert local presence to find out what was going on in Brussels. The foundation of lobbying was therefore the need to provide information. From that developed the need to influence the process actively and effectively. The next important step in lobbying development was the

, which both created the

qualified majority

vote for taking decisions in the

Council

and enhanced the role of the Parliament, again making EU legislation more complex and lobbying further more important and attractive for stakeholders.

In the wake of the

Abramoff scandal

in Washington and the massive impact that this had on the lobbying scene in the

United States

, the rules for lobbying in the EU—which until now consist of only a non-binding code of conduct-—may also be tightened.

[20]

[edit]France

France

, the political system does not integrate the lobbying practice. Much French republican thought has been suspicious of the claims of "particular interests," which are often contrasted with the "general interest" of the nation. This is one interpretation of Rousseau's

Social Contract

, for example. So while lobbying has always been practiced in France, organized lobbying made a significant appearance in France only in the early 1980s. Since then, it has steadily grown; many interest groups routinely seek to influence the French institutions as the Government and the French Parliament ("National Assembly" and "Senate"). To make up the lost time, more and more French enterprises try to organize their own lobbies by creating their own public affairs department. In recent years, growing numbers of

grassroots

and grasstop lobbies have been organized by citizen groups, representing interests such as genetically modified organisms and software piracy.

But there is currently no regulation at all for lobbying activities in France and, as a consequence, this practice suffers from a lack of transparency. There is no regulated access to the French institutions and no register. For example, the internal rule of the National Assembly (art. 23 and 79) forbid to members of Parliament to be linked with a particular interest. However, MPs don't have to declare their interest and the list of MPs' assistants is not public. At last, there is no rule at all for consultation of interest groups by the Parliament and the Government. Nevertheless, a recent parliamentary initiative (motion for a resolution)

[21]

has been launched by several MPs so as to establish a register for representatives of interest groups and lobbyists who intend to lobby the MPs. The purpose of this initiative is to introduce standards of conduct and access to the National Assembly. Through the use of a register, these standards of conduct and access will enable the Assembly to identify and maintain a list of the representatives of interest groups who follow legislative activity and to supervise fully the access of those representatives to the National Assembly. This motion has not been adopted yet.

[edit]Other countries

Only countries where lobbying is regulated in parliament bills include:

Georgia (1998)[22]
Hungary (2006).[22]
Lithuania (2001)[22]
Poland (2005)[22]
Israel (1994)[23]
Italy (Regional Level, 2002 - cfr. P.L. Petrillo, "I gruppi di pressione nella Regione Toscana", in www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it)

[edit]See also

Main article:

List of basic public affairs topics

[edit]References

^ BBC Definition of "lobbying"
^ NPR - A Lobbyist by Any Other Name? - NPR discussion of Ulysses Grant and origins of the term lobbyist.
^ Deanna Gelak (previous president of the American League of Lobbyists) mentioned this in her book Lobbying and Advocacy: Winning Strategies, Resources, Recommendations, Ethics and Ongoing Compliance for Lobbyists and Washington Advocates, TheCapitol.Net, 2008, LobbyingAndAdvocacy.com
^ "lobbying". Merriam-Webster Dictionary.Com.
^ "lobbying". BBC News (London). 1 October 2008. Retrieved 24 March 2010.
^ "lobbist". Random House Unabridged Dictionary. 2006.
^ Non-Profit Action description of "Lobbying Versus Advocacy: Legal Definitions".
^ U.S. Senate definition of Lobbying.
^ Andrew Bounds and Marine Formentinie in Brussels, EU Lobbyists Face Tougher Regulation, Financial Times, August 16, 2007.
^ [1]
^ Bowell, Thomas. Knowledge and Decisions
^ Public Administration Select Committee (5 January 2009)."Lobbying: Access and influence in Whitehall" (pdf). Retrieved 5 January 2009.
^ Public Administration Select Committee (5 January 2009). "PASC calls for a register of lobbying activity". Retrieved 5 January 2009.
^ "Government rejects call for lobbying register". Civil Society. Retrieved 2010-03-03.
^ Porter, Andrew (8 February 2010). "David Cameron warns lobbying is next political scandal". The Daily Telegraph(London). Retrieved 2010-03-03.
^ "The Right to Petition". Illinois First Amendment Center.
^ http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/ethics/ Ethics
^ "Lobbying Versus Advocacy: Legal Definitions". NP Action. Retrieved 2010-03-02.
^ Kierkegaard, Sylvia (2005) How the Cookie (almost crumbled). Computer Law and Security Report Vol.21 Issue 4
^ Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative European Commission, 2006. Retrieved September 20, 2009
^ French National Assembly : Motion for a Resolution on Lobbying (21 November 2006)
^ a b c d GLOSSARY - Alphabetical list of terms associated with the Lobbying industry.
^ http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/lobby_eng.htm

[edit]Bibliography

Geiger, Andreas: EU Lobbying handbook, A guide to modern participation in Brussels, 244 pages, ISBN 3-9811316-0-6, Helios Media GmbH, 2006
GLOSSARY - Alphabetical list of terms associated with the Lobbying industry.
The Bulletin, 16 March 2006, p. 14, Lobbying Europe: facts and fiction
The European Lawyer, December 2005/January 2006, p. 9, The lobbyists have landed
Financial Times, 3 October 2005, p. 8, Brussels braces for a U.S. lobbying invasion
Public Affairs News, November 2004, p. 34, Judgement Call
The European Lawyer, December 2004/January 2005, p. 26, Lifting the lid on lobbying
Pier Luigi Petrillo, Democracies under Pressures. Lobbies and Parliaments in a comparative public law, Giuffrè 2011 (www.giuffre.it)
Pietro Semeraro, Trading in Influence and Lobbying in the Spanish Criminal Code, [2]
Wiszowaty, Marcin: Legal Regulation of Lobbying in New Members States of the European Union, Arbeitspapiere und Materialien - Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universitat Bremen, No. 74: Heiko Pleines (ed.): Participation of Civil Society in New Modes of Governance. The Case of the New Member States. Part 2: Questions of Accountability. February 2006 (PDF).
Heiko Kretschmer/ Hans-Jörg Schmedes: Enhancing Transparency in EU Lobbying? How the European Commission's Lack of Courage and Determination Impedes Substantial Progress, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 1/ 2010, S. 112-122.
"Lobbying" (Web). BBC News: Politics (London: BBC). 22 December 2005. Retrieved 2007-01-30.
"Police loans inquiry is widenened" (Web). BBC News: Politics (London: BBC). 30 March 2006. Retrieved 2007-01-30.

[edit]External links

*	Look up Lobby in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

[edit]United States

Lobbyists.info - The largest, comprehensive database of 22,000 registered lobbyists. Contains searchable profiles of lobbyists and government relations professionals, their clients and issues.
LobbyistFinder.com - Searchable & editable database of 34,000 registered state lobbyists.
Top 25 Lobbying Groups - Fortune lists the top 25 lobbying groups as of 1999.
LobbyWatch - a project of the Center for Public Integrity with reports on lobbyists and lobbying efforts as well as a searchable database
OpenSecrets.org
NoLobby.com - Capitalism Magazine mini-site. Opposes lobbing restrictions on free speech grounds.
Lobbyists and Lawyers, Barnacles and Leeches, Selfishness and Corporatism - The truth about lobbyists and their affect on public policy and legislation.
The Citizen's Guide to the U.S. Government - an online tutorial containing information for individuals who wish to address issues with their elected officials
Free Speech National Right to Life page containing documents opposing excessive regulation of "lobbying" as infringement on "right to petition" guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Public Affairs Links
First Street Research Group - The First Street Research Group publishes free research reports on the lobbying industry.

[edit]Europe

Free market

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For free-market economy, see

Market economy

Part of a series on

Liberalism

Development[show]

Ideas[show]

Schools[show]

People[show]

Regional variants[show]

Religious liberalism [show]

Organizations[show]

* Liberalism portal

v · d · e

Part of a series on

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[edit]Supply and demand

Main article:

Supply and demand

Supply and demand are always equal as they are the two sides of the same set of transactions, and discussions of "imbalances" are a muddled and indirect way of referring to price.

[3]

However, in an unmeasurable qualitative sense, demand for an item (such as goods or services) refers to the market pressure from people trying to buy it. They will "bid" money for the item, while in return sellers offer the item for money. When the bid matches the offer, a transaction can easily occur (even automatically, as in a typical

stock market

). In Western society, most shops and markets do not resemble the stock market, and there are significant costs and barriers to "shopping around" (comparison shopping).

The model is commonly applied to wages, in the market for labor. The typical roles of supplier and consumer are reversed. The suppliers are individuals, who try to sell (supply) their labor for the highest price. The consumers of labors are businesses, which try to buy (demand) the type of labor they need at the lowest price. As populations increase wages fall for any given unskilled or skilled labor supply. Conversely, wages tend to go up with a decrease in population.

When demand exceeds supply, suppliers can raise the price, but when supply exceeds demand, suppliers will have to decrease the price in order to make sales. Consumers who can afford the higher prices may still buy, but others may forgo the purchase altogether, demand a better price, buy a similar item, or shop elsewhere. As the price rises, suppliers may also choose to increase production, or more suppliers may enter the business.

[edit]Spontaneous order or "invisible hand"

Main articles:

Invisible hand

and

Spontaneous order

Friedrich Hayek

argues for the classical liberal view that market economies allow

spontaneous order

; that is, "a more efficient allocation of societal resources than any design could achieve."

[4]

According to this view, in market economies sophisticated business networks are formed which produce and distribute goods and services throughout the economy. This network was not designed, but

emerged

as a result of decentralized individual economic decisions. Supporters of the idea of spontaneous order trace their views to the concept of the

invisible hand

proposed by

General equilibrium theory

The Wealth of Nations

who said that the individual who:

"By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest [an individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the [common] good." (

Wealth of Nations

)

Smith pointed out that one does not get one's dinner by appealing to the brother-love of the butcher, the farmer or the baker. Rather one appeals to their self interest, and pays them for their labor.

"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages."

[5]

Supporters of this view claim that spontaneous order is superior to any order that does not allow individuals to make their own choices of what to produce, what to buy, what to sell, and at what prices, due to the number and complexity of the factors involved. They further believe that any attempt to implement central planning will result in more disorder, or a less efficient production and distribution of goods and services.

[edit]Economic equilibrium

Main article:

Economic equilibrium

has demonstrated, with varying degrees of mathematical rigor over time, that under certain conditions of

competition

, the law of

Supply and Demand

predominates in this ideal free and competitive market, influencing prices toward an

equilibrium

that balances the demands for the products against the supplies.

[6]

[7]

At these equilibrium prices, the market distributes the products to the purchasers according to each purchaser's preference (or utility) for each product and within the relative limits of each buyer's

purchasing power

. This result is described as market efficiency, or more specifically a

Pareto optimum

This equilibrating behavior of free markets requires certain assumptions about their agents, collectively known as

Perfect Competition

, which therefore cannot be results of the market that they create. Among these assumptions are complete information, interchangeable goods and services, and lack of market power, that obviously cannot be fully achieved. The question then is what approximations of these conditions guarantee approximations of market efficiency, and which failures in competition generate overall market failures. Several Nobel Prizes in Economics have been awarded for analyses of market failures due to

asymmetric information

Some models in

econophysics

have shown that when agents are allowed to interact locally in a free market (i.e. their decisions depend not only on utility and purchasing power, but also on their peers' decisions), prices can become unstable and diverge from the equilibrium, often in an abrupt manner. The behavior of the free market is thus said to be non-linear (a pair of agents bargaining for a purchase will agree on a different price than 100 identical pairs of agents doing the identical purchase).

Speculation bubbles

and the type of

herd

behavior often observed in stock markets are quoted as real life examples of non-equilibrium price trends. Some laissez-faire free-market advocates, like Chicago school economists, often dismiss this endogenous theory, and blame external influences, such as weather, commodity prices, technological developments, and government meddling for non-equilibrium prices.

[edit]Distribution of wealth

Main article:

Distribution of wealth

The distribution of purchasing power in an economy depends to a large extent on the nature of government intervention,

social class

labor

and

financial markets

, but also on other, lesser factors such as family relationships,

inheritance

gifts

and so on. Many theories describing the operation of a free market focus primarily on the markets for consumer products, and their description of the labor market or financial markets tends to be more complicated and controversial.

Joshua Epstein

and

Robert Axtell

have attempted to predict the properties of free markets empirically in the agent-based computer simulation "

Sugarscape

". They came to the conclusion that, under idealized conditions, free markets lead to a

Pareto distribution

of wealth.

government-granted monopolies

[edit]Laissez-faire economics

Main article:

Laissez-faire economics

The necessary components for the functioning of an idealized free market include the complete absence of artificial price pressures from taxes, subsidies,

tariffs

, or government regulation (other than protection from coercion and theft), and no

(usually classified as

coercive monopoly

by free-market advocates) like the

United States Post Office

Amtrak

patents

, etc.

[edit]Deregulation

Main article:

Deregulation

In an absolutely

free-market economy

, all capital, goods, services, and money flow transfers are unregulated by the government except to stop collusion or fraud that may take place among market participants.[

] As this protection must be funded, such a government taxes only to the extent necessary to perform this function, if at all. This state of affairs is also known as

laissez-faire

Internationally, free markets are advocated by proponents of

economic liberalism

; in Europe this is usually simply called

liberalism

. In the

United States

, support for free market is associated most with

libertarianism

. Since the 1970s, promotion of a global free-market economy,

deregulation

and

privatization

, is often described as

neoliberalism

The term

free-market economy

is sometimes used to describe some economies that exist today (such as

Hong Kong

), but pro-market groups would only accept that description if the government practices

laissez-faire

policies, rather than state intervention in the economy.[

specify

] An economy that contains significant

economic interventionism

by government, while still retaining some characteristics found in a free market is often called a

mixed economy

[edit]Low barriers to entry

A free market does not require the existence of competition, however it does require that there are no barriers to new market entrants. Hence, in the lack of coercive barriers it is generally understood that competition flourishes in a free-market environment. It often suggests the presence of the

profit motive

, although neither a profit motive or profit itself are necessary for a free market. All modern free markets are understood to include

entrepreneurs

, both individuals and

businesses

. Typically, a modern free market economy would include other features, such as a

stock exchange

and a

financial services

sector, but they do not define it.

[edit]Legal tender and taxes

In a free-market economy, money would not be monopolized by

legal tender

laws or by a central bank, in order to receive

taxes

from the transactions or to be able to issue

loans

Index of Economic Freedom

]

Minarchists

(advocates of minimal government) contend that the coercion of taxes is essential for the market's survival, and a market free from taxes may lead to no market at all. By definition, there is no market without private property, and private property can only exist while there is an entity that defines and defends it. Traditionally, the State defends private property and defines it by issuing ownership titles, and also nominates the central authority to print or mint currency. "Free-market anarchists" disagree with the above assessment – they maintain that private property and free markets can be protected by voluntarily-funded services under the concept of

individualist anarchism

and

anarcho-capitalism

[9]

[10]

A free market could be defined alternatively as a tax-free market, independent of any central authority, which uses a medium of exchange such as money, even in the absence of the State. It is disputed, however, whether this hypothetical stateless market could function.

[edit]Index of economic freedom

The

Heritage Foundation

, a

conservative

think tank

, tried to identify the key factors necessary to measure the degree of freedom of economy of a particular country. In 1986 they introduced the

, which is based on some fifty variables. This and other similar indices do not

define

a free market, but measure the

degree

to which a modern economy is free, meaning in most cases free of state intervention. The variables are divided into the following major groups:

Trade policy,
Fiscal burden of government,
Government intervention in the economy,
Monetary policy,
Capital flows and foreign investment,
Banking and finance,
Wages and prices,
Property rights,
Regulation, and
Informal market activity.

Each group is assigned a numerical value between 1 and 5; IEF is the arithmetical mean of the values, rounded to the hundredth. Initially, countries which were traditionally considered capitalistic received high ratings, but the method improved over time. Some economists, like

Milton Friedman

and other

Laissez-faire economists

have argued that there is a direct relationship between economic growth and economic freedom, but this assertion has not been proven yet, both theoretically and empirically. Continuous debates among scholars on methodological issues in empirical studies of the connection between economic freedom and economic growth still try to find out what is the relationship, if any.

[edit]History and ideology

The meaning of "free" market has varied over time and between economists, the ambiguous term "free" facilitating reuse. To illustrate the ambiguity:

classical economists

such as

believed that an economy should be free of monopoly rents, while proponents of laissez faire believe that people should be free to form monopolies. In this article "free market" is largely identified with laissez faire, though alternative senses are discussed in this section and in

criticism

. The identification of the "free market" with "laissez faire" was notably used in the 1962

Capitalism and Freedom

by economist

Milton Friedman

, which is credited with popularizing this usage.

[15]

Some theorists might argue that a free market is a natural form of social organization, and that a free market will arise in any society where it is not obstructed (i.e.

Ludwig von Mises

Hayek

). The consensus among

economic historians

is that the free market economy is a specific historic phenomenon, and that it emerged in late medieval and early-modern Europe.[

] Other economic historians see elements of the free market in the economic systems of

Classical Antiquity

] and in some non-western societies.[

] By the 19th century the market certainly had organized political support, in the form of

laissez-faire liberalism

. However, it is not clear if the support preceded the emergence of the market or followed it. Some historians see it as the result of the success of early liberal

ideology

, combined with the specific interests of the

entrepreneur

Support for the free market as an ordering principle of society is above all associated with

liberalism

, especially during the 19th century. (In Europe, the term 'liberalism' retains its

connotation

as the ideology of the free market, but in American and Canadian usage it came to be associated with government intervention, and acquired a

pejorative

meaning for supporters of the free market.) Later ideological developments, such as

minarchism

libertarianism

and

Objectivism

also support the free market, and insist on its pure form. Although the

Western world

shares a generally similar form of economy, usage in the United States and Canada is to refer to this as

, while in Europe 'free market' is the preferred neutral term.

Modern liberalism

(American and Canadian usage), and in Europe

social democracy

, seek only to mitigate the problems of an unrestrained free market, and accept its existence as such.

[edit]Classical economics

In the

classical economics

of such figures as

and

David Ricardo

, "free markets" meant "free of unnecessary charges"

[16]

and a "market free from monopoly power, business fraud, political insider dealing and special privileges for vested interests".

[17]

A "free market" particularly meant one free of

foreign debt

;

[18]

as discussed in

The Wealth of Nations

[19]

Alternatively, stated, it was a market freed from

Feudalism

and

serfdom

, or more formally, one free of

economic rent

, in the formulation by David Ricardo of the

Law of Rent

[edit]Marxism

Marxist

theory, the idea of the free market simply expresses the underlying long-term transition from

feudalism

. Note that the views on this issue – emergence or implementation – do not necessarily correspond to pro-market and anti-market positions.

Libertarians

would dispute that the market was enforced through government policy, since they believe it is a

spontaneous order

and

Marxists

agree with them because they as well believe it is evolutionary, although with a different end.

[edit]Liberalism

Support for the free market as an ordering principle of society is above all associated with

liberalism

, especially during the 19th century. (In Europe, the term 'liberalism' retains its

connotation

as the ideology of the free market, but in American and Canadian usage it came to be associated with government intervention, and acquired a

pejorative

meaning for supporters of the free market.) Later ideological developments, such as

minarchism

libertarianism

and

Objectivism

also support the free market, and insist on its pure form. Although the

Western world

shares a generally similar form of economy, usage in the United States and Canada is to refer to this as

, while in Europe 'free market' is the preferred neutral term. The advocates of

modern liberalism

(American and Canadian usage), and in Europe those of

social democracy

, seek ostensibly only to mitigate what they see as the problems of an unrestrained free market, and accept the existence of markets as such.

To most

libertarians

, there is simply no free market yet, given the degree of state intervention in even the most 'capitalist' of countries. From their perspective, those who say they favor a "free market" are speaking in a relative, rather than an absolute, sense — meaning (in libertarian terms) they wish that

coercion

be kept to the minimum that is necessary to maximize economic freedom (such necessary coercion would be taxation, for example) and to maximize market efficiency by lowering trade barriers, making the tax system neutral in its influence on important decisions such as how to raise capital, e.g., eliminating the

double tax

on dividends so that equity financing is not at a disadvantage vis-a-vis debt financing. However, there are some such as

anarcho-capitalists

who would not even allow for taxation and governments, instead preferring protectors of economic freedom in the form of private contractors.

[edit]Criticism

A concern has been raised that this article's Criticism section may be compromising the article's neutral point of view of the subject. Possible resolutions may be to integrate the material in the section into the article as a whole, or to rewrite the contents of the section. Please see the discussion on the talk page. (September 2010)

Critics dispute the claim that in practice free markets create

perfect competition

, or even increase

market competition

over the

long run

. Whether the marketplace

should be

free is disputed; many assert that government intervention is necessary to remedy

that is held to be an inevitable result of absolute adherence to free market principles. These failures range from

military

services to

roads

, and some would argue, to health care. This is the central argument of those who argue for a mixed market, free at the base, but with government oversight to control social problems.

Another criticism is definitional, in that far-ranging governmental actions such as the creation of corporate personhood or more broadly, the governmental actions behind the very creation of artificial legal entities called corporations, are not considered "intervention" within mainstream economic schools. This inherent definitional bias allows many to advocate strong governmental actions that promote corporate power, while advocating against government actions limiting it, while putting these dual positions under the umbrella of "pro free markets" or "anti-intervention."

Two prominent Canadian authors (both very hostile to the "Chicago School" philosophy) argue that government at times has to intervene to ensure competition in large and important industries.

Naomi Klein

illustrates this roughly in her work

The Shock Doctrine

and

John Ralston Saul

more humorously illustrates this through various examples in

The Collapse of Globalism and the Reinvention of the World

[20]

While its supporters argue that only a free market can create healthy competition and therefore more business and reasonable prices, opponents say that a free market in its purest form may result in the opposite. According to Klein and Ralston, the merging of companies into giant corporations or the privatization of government-run industry and national assets often result in monopolies (or oligopolies) requiring government intervention to force competition and reasonable prices.

[20]

Critics of laissez-faire since

[21]

variously see the unregulated market as an impractical ideal or as a

rhetorical device

that puts the concepts of freedom and anti-

protectionism

at the service of vested wealthy interests, allowing them to attack

labor laws

and other protections of the

working classes

[22]

Because no national economy in existence fully manifests the ideal of a free market as theorized by economists, some critics of the concept consider it to be a fantasy – outside of the bounds of reality in a complex system with opposing interests and different distributions of wealth.

These critics range from those who reject markets entirely, in favour of a

planned economy

or a communal economy, such as that advocated by

Marxism

, to those who merely wish to see

market failures

regulated to various degrees or supplemented by certain government interventions. For example,

Keynesians

recognize a role for government in providing corrective measures, such as use of fiscal policy for economy stimulus, when decisions in the private sector lead to suboptimal economic outcomes, such as

depression

recession

, which manifest in widespread hardship. Business cycle theory is used by Keynes to explain '

liquidity traps

' by which underconsumption occurs, in order to argue for government intervention with central banking. Free market economists consider this credit-expansion as the cause of the business cycle in refutation of this Keynesian criticism.

[edit]Externalities

One practical objection is the claim that markets do not take into account

externalities

Some proponents of market economies believe that governments should not diminish market freedom because they disagree on what is a market externality and what are government-created externalities, and disagree over what the appropriate level of intervention is necessary to solve market-created externalities. Others believe that government should intervene to prevent

while preserving the general character of a market economy. In the model of a

social market economy

the state intervenes where the market does not meet political demands.

John Rawls

was a prominent proponent of this idea.

[edit]Differing ideas

Some advocates of free market ideologies have criticized mainstream conceptions of the free market, arguing that a truly free market would not resemble the modern-day capitalist economy. For example, contemporary

mutualist

Kevin Carson

argues in favor of "free market anti-capitalism." Carson has stated that "From Smith to Ricardo and Mill, classical liberalism was a revolutionary doctrine that attacked the privileges of the great landlords and the mercantile interests. Today, we see vulgar libertarians perverting "free market" rhetoric to defend the contemporary institution that most closely resembles, in terms of power and privilege, the landed oligarchies and mercantilists of the Old Regime: the giant corporation."

[23]

Carson believes that a true free market society would be "[a] world in which... land and property [is] widely distributed, capital [is] freely available to laborers through mutual banks, productive technology [is] freely available in every country without patents, and every people [is] free to develop locally without colonial robbery..."

[24]

[edit]Simulation of biological laws

[edit]Martin J. Whitman

*	An editor has expressed a concern that this section lends undue weight to certain ideas relative to the article as a whole. Please help to discuss and resolve the dispute before removing this message. (August 2011)

Not all advocates of

The Tradition of Spontaneous Order,

consider free markets to be practical. For example,

Martin J. Whitman

has written, in a discussion of

Keynes

Friedman

and

Hayek

, that these "…great economists…missed a lot of details that are part and parcel of every

value investor

's daily life." While calling Hayek "100% right" in his critique of the pure command economy, he writes "However, in no way does it follow, as many Hayek disciples seem to believe, that government is

per se

bad and unproductive while the private sector is,

per se

good and productive. In well-run industrial economies, there is a marriage between government and the private sector, each benefiting from the other." As illustrations of this, he points at "

after

and the other

and

." The notable exception is

Hong Kong

which found prosperity on an extremely austere free market concept.

He argues, in particular, for the value of government-provided credit and of carefully crafted tax laws.

[26]

Further, Whitman argues (explicitly against Hayek) that "a free market situation is probably also doomed to failure if there exist control persons who are not subject to external disciplines imposed by various forces over and above competition." The lack of these disciplines, says Whitman, lead to "1. Very exorbitant levels of

executive compensation

… 2. Poorly financed businesses with strong prospects for money defaults on credit instruments… 3. Speculative

bubbles

… 4. Tendency for industry competition to evolve into

monopolies

and

oligopolies

… 5. Corruption." For all of these he provides recent examples from the U.S. economy, which he considers to be in some respects under-regulated,

[26]

although in other respects over-regulated (he is generally opposed to

Sarbanes-Oxley

[27]

He believes that an apparently "free" relationship—that between a corporation and its investors and creditors—is actually a blend of "voluntary exchanges" and "coercion". For example, there are "voluntary activities, where each individual makes his or her own decision whether to buy, sell, or hold" but there are also what he defines as "[c]oercive activities, where each individual security holder is forced to go along…provided that a requisite majority of other security holders so vote…" His examples of the latter include

proxy voting

, most merger and acquisition transactions, certain cash tender offers, and reorganization or liquidation in

bankruptcy

[28]

Whitman also states that "

Corporate America

would not work at all unless many activities continued to be coercive."

[29]

"I am one with Professor Friedman that, other things being equal, it is far preferable to conduct economic activities through voluntary exchange relying on free markets rather than through coercion. But Corporate America would not work at all unless many activities continued to be coercive."

[30]

[edit]See also

[edit]Notes

^ "Free Market." Rothbard, Murray. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics
^ Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms. Barrons, 1995
^ http://www.donsheelen.org/page14.aspx
^ Hayek cited. Petsoulas, Christian. Hayek's Liberalism and Its Origins: His Idea of Spontaneous Order and the Scottish Enlightenment. Routledge. 2001. p. 2
^ Smith, Adam, "2", Wealth of Nations, 1, London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell
^ , by Eugene Walras
^ Theory of Value, by Gerard Debreu
^ a b Critical Mass – Ball, Philip, ISBN 0-09-945786-5
^ Biography of Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995)
^ The Machinery of Freedom
^ COLE, Julio H. and LAWSON, Robert A. Handling Economic Freedom in Growth Regressions: Suggestions for Clarification. Econ Journal Watch, Volume 4, Number 1, January 2007, pp 71–78.
^ DE HAAN, Jacob and STURM, Jan-Egbert. How to Handle Economic Freedom: Reply to Lawson. Econ Journal Watch, Volume 3, Number 3, September 2006, pp 407–411.
^ DE HAAN, Jacob and STURM, Jan-Egbert. Handling Economic Freedom in Growth Regressions: A Reply to Cole and Lawson. Econ Journal Watch, Volume 4, Number 1, January 2007, pp 79–82.
^ AYAL, Eliezer B. and KARRAS, Georgios. Components of Economic Freedom and Growth. Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.32, No.3, Spring 1998, 327–338. Publisher: Western Illinois University.
^ Who Broke America's Jobs Machine? by Barry C. Lynn and Phillip Longman, the Washington Monthly
^ The Fictitious Economy, Part 1, An Interview With Dr. Michael Hudson, by Bonnie Faulkner with Michael Hudson, 15 July 2008
^ This interpretation is advanced in The Language of Looting, Michael Hudson
^ The Financial War Against Iceland, Michael Hudson
^ The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith, Book V, Chapter 3: of Public Debts
^ a b The End of Globalism. Saul, John.
^ "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."—Wealth of Nations, I.x.c.27 (Part II)
^ "Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate… [When workers combine,] masters… never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against the combinations of servants, labourers, and journeymen."—Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, I.viii.13
^ Kevin Carson, Naomi Klein: The Shock Doctrine November 7, 2007
^ Kevin Carson, The Iron Fist Behind the Invisible Hand: Corporate Capitalism as a State-Guaranteed System of Privilege
^ social Darwinism. (2009). Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica 2009 Student and Home Edition. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.
^ a b Kevin Carson, The Iron Fist Behind the Invisible Hand: Corporate Capitalism as a State-Guaranteed System of Privilege, p. 4
^ Martin J. Whitman, Third Avenue Value Fund Letters to our Shareholders July 31, 2004 (PDF), page 2.
^ Martin J. Whitman, Third Avenue Value Fund Letters to our Shareholders July 31, 2004 (PDF), page 5.
^ Martin J. Whitman, Third Avenue Value Fund letter to shareholders October 31, 2005. p.6.
^ Martin J. Whitman, Third Avenue Value Fund letter to shareholders October 31, 2005. p.5-6.

[edit]References

AYAL, Eliezer B. and KARRAS, Georgios. Components of Economic Freedom and Growth. Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.32, No.3, Spring 1998, 327–338. Publisher: Western Illinois University.
BOETTKE, Peter J. What Went Wrong with Economics?, Critical Review Vol. 11, No. 1, P. 35. p. 58
Stiglitz, Joseph. 1994. Whither Socialism? Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

[edit]External links

Free Enterprise: The Economics of Cooperation Looks at how communication, coordination and cooperation interact to make free markets work
Fair versus Free by Milton Friedman
Freedom to Work, to Earn, & to Buy by Harry Browne

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Categories: Capitalism | Classical liberalism | Libertarian theory | Economic liberalism | Free market

Market economy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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A market economy is an economy in which the prices of goods and services are determined in a free price system.[1] This is often contrasted with a state-directed or planned economy. Market economies can range from hypothetically pure laissez-faire variants to an assortment of real-world mixed economies, where the price system is under some state control or at least heavily regulated. In mixed economies, state-directed economic planning is not as extensive as in a planned economy.
In the real world, market economies do not exist in pure form, as societies and governments regulate them to varying degrees rather than allow full self-regulation by market forces.[2][3] The term free-marketeconomy is sometimes used synonymously with market economy,[4] but, as Ludwig Erhard once pointed out, this does not preclude an economy from having social attributes opposed to a laissez-faire system.
The term used by itself can be somewhat misleading. For example, the United States constitutes a mixed economy (substantial market regulation, agricultural subsidies, extensive government-funded research and development, Medicare/Medicaid), yet at the same time it is foundationally rooted in a market economy. Different perspectives exist as to how strong a role the government should have in both guiding the market economy and addressing the inequalities the market produces. This is evidenced by the current lack of consensus on issues such as central banking, and welfare.
It is also possible to envision an economic system based on independent producers, cooperative,democratic worker ownership and market allocation of final goods and services; the self-managed market economy is one of several proposed forms of market socialism.[5]

[hide]

1 Systems

1.1 Capitalism

1.2 Market socialism

1.2.1 Socialist market economy

[edit]Systems

Although no country has ever had within its border an economy in which all markets were absolutely free, the term typically is not used in an absolute sense. Many states which are said to have a market economy have a high level of market freedom, even if it is less than some parts of the population would prefer. Thus, almost all economies in the world today are mixed economies with varying degrees of free market and planned economy traits. For example, in the

United States

there are more market economy traits than in the

Western European

countries (an exception being the UK, which is considered, even by Greenspan, to be a freer market than the US).

[6]

[edit]Capitalism

Main article:

Capitalism

Capitalism generally refers to an economic system in which the means of production are all or mostly privately owned and operated for profit, and in which investments, distribution, income, and pricing of goods and services are determined through the operation of a market economy. It is usually considered to involve the right of individuals and groups of individuals acting as "legal persons" or corporations to trade capital goods, labor, land and money.

Capitalism has been dominant in the Western world since the end of

feudalism

, but most feel that the term "mixed economies" more precisely describes most contemporary economies, due to their containing both private-owned and state-owned enterprises, combining elements of

and

socialism

, or mixing the characteristics of market economies and planned economies. In capitalism, there is no central planning authority but the prices are decided by the demand-supply scale. For example, higher demand for certain goods and services lead to higher prices and lower demand for certain goods lead to lower prices.

[edit]Laissez-faire

Main article:

Laissez-faire

Laissez-faire is synonymous with what was referred to as strict capitalist free market economy during the early and mid-19th century as an ideal to achieve. It is generally understood that the necessary components for the functioning of an idealized free market include the complete absence of government regulation, subsidies, artificial price pressures and government-granted monopolies (usually classified as

coercive monopoly

by free market advocates) and no taxes or tariffs other than what is necessary for the government to provide protection from coercion and theft and maintaining peace, and property rights.

Milton Friedman

and

Friedrich Hayek

stated that

economic freedom

is a necessary condition for the creation and sustainability of

civil

and

political freedoms

. They believed that this economic freedom can only be achieved in a market-oriented economy, specifically a free market economy. They do believe, however, that sufficient economic freedom can be achieved in economies with functioning markets through price mechanisms and

private property rights

. They believe that the more economic freedom that is available, the more civil and political freedoms a society will enjoy.

Friedman states:

"Economic freedom is simply a requisite for political freedom. By enabling people to cooperate with one another without coercion or central direction it reduces the area over which political power is exercised" Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, p. 2-3
"Capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom" Capitalism and freedom

Studies by the Canadian

think tank

and the American

think tank

state that there is a relationship between economic freedom and political and civil freedoms to the extent claimed by Friedrich von Hayek. They agree with Hayek that those countries which restrict economic freedom ultimately restrict civil and political freedoms.

[7]

Generally market economies are bottom-up in decision-making as consumers convey information to producers through prices paid in market transactions. All states today have some form of control over the market that removes the free and unrestricted direction of resources from consumers and prices such as

tariffs

and corporate

subsidies

. Milton Friedman and many other microeconomists believe that these forms of intervention provide incentives for resources to be misused and wasted, producing products society may not

value

as much as a product that is valued as a result of these restrictions.

[edit]Social market economy

Main article:

Social market economy

This model was implemented by

and

after

. The social market economic model is based upon the idea to realise the benefits of a free market economy, especially on economic performance and high supply of goods, while avoiding disadvantages such as

contractionary monetary policy

, destructive competition, concentration of economic power and anti-social effects of market processes. The aim of the social market economy is to realize greatest prosperity combined with best possible social security. As a difference to the free market economy the state is not passive, but actively takes

regulative

measures.

[9]

The social policy objectives include employment, housing and education policies, as well as a socio-politically motivated balancing of the distribution of income growth. Characteristics of social market economies are a strong

competition policy

and a

. The theoretical fundament is build on

ordoliberalism

Catholic social teaching

and

Democratic Socialism

[10]

[edit]Market socialism

Main article:

Market socialism

Market socialism refers to various economic systems in which the state owns the economic institutions and major industries but operates them according to the rules of supply and demand. In a traditional market socialist economy, prices would be determined by a government planning ministry, and enterprises would either be state-owned or cooperatively-owned and managed by their employees. The distinguishing feature between non-market socialism and market socialism is the existence of a market for the means of production, and the criteria of profitability for public enterprises; which can either be used to reinvest in production or finance government and social services directly.

Libertarian socialists

and left-anarchists often promote a form of market socialism in which enterprises are owned and managed cooperatively by the workers so that the profits directly remunerate the employee-owners. These cooperative enterprises would compete with each other in the same way private companies compete in a capitalist market. An example would be

Mutualism (economic theory)

[edit]Socialist market economy

The

People's Republic of China

currently has a form of market socialism referred to as the

socialist market economy

, in which most of the industry is state-owned through a shareholder system, but prices are set by a largely free-price system. Within this model, the state-owned enterprises are free from excessive micromanagement and function more autonomously in a

decentralized

fashion than in planned economies. A similar socialist-oriented market system has been implemented in

Vietnam

following the

Doi Moi

reforms.

[edit]Criticism

Robin Hahnel

and

Michael Albert

"(...) claim that markets inherently produce

class division

" {divisions between conceptual and manual laborers, and ultimately managers and workers, and a de facto labor market for conceptual workers}. Albert says that even if everyone started out with a

balanced job complex

{doing a mix of roles of varying creativity, responsibility and empowerment} in a market economy, class divisions would arise. Without taking the argument that far, it is evident that in a market system with uneven distribution of empowering work, such as Economic Democracy {the model of market socialism

David Schweickart

has developed and refers to as "economic democracy"}, some workers will be more able than others to capture the benefits of economic gain. For example if one worker designs cars and another builds them, the designer will use his cognitive skills more frequently than the builder. In the long term, the designer will become more adept at conceptual work than the builder, giving the designer greater bargaining power in a firm over the distribution of income. A conceptual worker who is not satisfied with his income can threaten to work for a company that will pay him more (...)".

[11]

Therefore according to this critique class divisions would arise inevitably.

*	This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (May 2011)

Another practical objection is the claim that markets do not take into account

externalities

(effects of transactions that affect third parties), such as the negative effects of pollution or the positive effects of education. What exactly constitutes an externality may be up for debate, including the extent to which it changes based upon the political climate. Some proponents of market economies believe that governments should not diminish market freedom because they disagree on what is a market externality and what are government-created externalities, and disagree over what the appropriate level of intervention is necessary to solve market-created externalities. Others believe that government should intervene to prevent

The role of the government of a nation is only limited to controlling the law and order of a country and to ensure that a 'fair price' is charged by the sellers. That is to say, the government, having no role in administering the price of a commodity, has to see that the prices taken by the sellers is true and commensurate with the price determined by the forces of demand and supply.

while preserving the general character of a market economy. In the model of a

social market economy

the state intervenes where the market does not meet political demands.

John Rawls

was a prominent proponent of this idea.

[edit]See also

[edit]References

^ Altvater, E. (1993). The Future of the Market: An Essay on the Regulation of Money and Nature After the Collapse of "Actually Existing Socialism. Verso. pp. 57.
^ Altvater, E. (1993). The Future of the Market: An Essay on the Regulation of Money and Nature After the Collapse of "Actually Existing Socialism. Verso. pp. 237–238.
^ Tucker, Irvin B. p 491. Macroeconomics for Today. West Publishing. p. 491
^ "market economy", Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary
^ "What is capitalism?". World Socialist Movement.
^ McKinney, Michael L. Environmental Science: Systems and Solutions. Jones and Bartlett Publishers. 2003. p. 481
^ Heritage Foundation study
^ Economic Freedom of the World Report by the Frasier Institute
^ keyword "social market economy" = "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" Duden Wirtschaft von A bis Z. Grundlagenwissen für Schule und Studium, Beruf und Alltag. 2. Aufl. Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut & F.A. Brockhaus 2004. Lizenzausgabe Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2004.
^ Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon: Eintrag: keyword "social market economy" = Soziale Marktwirtschaft
^ Weiss, Adam (2005-05-04). "A Comparison of Economic Democracy and Participatory Economics". ZMag. Retrieved 2008-06-26.

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Free Market Economy

The term free market economy primarily means a system where the buyers and sellers are solely responsible for the choices they make. In a way, free market gives the absolute power to prices to determine the allocation and distribution of goods and services. These prices, in turn, are fixed by the forces of supply and demand of a respective commodity. In cases of demand falling short of the supply of a respective commodity, the price will fall as opposed to a price rise when the supply is inadequate to meet the growing demand of a good or service. Free market economy is also characterized by free trade without any tariffs or subsidies imposed by the government.

The basic feature of the free market economy is that only people with sufficient control over resources, and wealth, in particular have the privilege to purchase goods and services, often priced very highly in a free economy. Prices, which are the only allocating and distributing factor in a free market economy, place the poor in an unenviable situation who are gradually thrown out of the system without any access to wealth and the basic needs of subsistence.

Thus it deems absolutely imperative that a country like India and a few Latin American countries like Brazil, Peru and Nicaragua having a large number of poor have a public distribution system in place with subsidized prices being fixed by the government to protect the poor. Free market economy is considered to the most efficient or optimum device to allocate a country's resources, with wealth or income being the only yardstick.Free market economy is often associated with a Capitalistic Economy with means of production being privately owned.

On the other hand, totalitarian economies or Socialistic Economies like the erstwhile USSR, China and North Korea, till date, have an altogether government regulated system. The prices of goods and services are totally administered by the government right from the support price fixed at which the government procures raw agricultural products from the farmers.

Socialistic countries, such as parts of the erstwhile Soviet Republic like Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania are gradually coming out of the Communist shadow and moving towards a free market economy. Capitalistic Economies have the biggest advantage of giving people what they deserve rather than putting everybody in the same plane.

Success of countries practicing free market is only evident with the growth of the USA, the Scandinavian countries, Germany and France as major world powers. Countries such as India and China, by allowing liberalization of its trade to some extent and practicing free market principles brought about more efficiency among its domestic producers and increased its growth rate markedly.

Free market existing with the doctrines of Socialism like limited regulation of prices by the government to protect the poor can be an ideal situation for developing countries like India, China and South East Asian countries to attain growth and prosperity.

http://www.economywatch.com/market-economy/free-market-economy.htm

SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY

Pages from the history of India and the sub-continent

History of Social Relations in India

Caste and gender equations in Indian history

No aspect of Indian history has excited more controversy than India's history of social relations. Western indologists and Western-influenced Indian intellectuals have seized upon caste divisions, untouchability, religious obscurantism, and practices of dowry and sati as distinctive evidence of India's perennial backwardness. For many Indologists, these social ills have literally come to define India - and have become almost the exclusive focus of their writings on India.

During the colonial period, it served the interests of the British (and their European cohorts) to exaggerate the democratic character of their own societies while diminishing any socially redeeming features of society in India (and other colonized nations). Social divisions and inequities were a convenient tool in the arsenal of the colonizers. On the one hand, tremendous tactical gains could be achieved by playing off one community against the other. On the other hand, there were also enormous psychological benefits in creating the impression that India was a land rife with uniquely abhorrent social practices that only an enlightened foreigner could attempt to reform. India's social ills were discussed with a contemptuous cynicism and often with a willful intent to instill a sense of deep shame and inferiority.

Strong elements of such colonial imagery continue to dominate the landscape of Western Indology. A liberal, dynamic West embracing universal human values is posed against an obdurate and unchanging East clinging to odious social values and customs.

It is little wonder, therefore, that India's intellectuals have been unable to either fully understand the historic dynamics and context which gave life to these social practices or find effective solutions for their cure. Many historians and social activists appear to have tacitly accepted the notion that caste divisions in society are a uniquely Indian feature and that Indian society has been largely unchanged since the writing of the

Manusmriti

which provides formal sanction to such social inequities.

But caste-like divisions are neither uniquely Indian nor has Indian society been as socially stagnant as commonly believed. In all non-egalitarian societies where wealth and political power were unequally distributed, some form of social inequity appeared and often meant hereditary privileges for the elite and legally (or socially) sanctioned discrimination against those considered lower down in the social hierarchy.

In fact, caste-like divisions are to be found in the history of most nations - whether in the American continent, or in Africa, Europe or elsewhere in Asia. In some societies, caste-like divisions were relatively simple, in others more complex. For instance, in Eastern Africa some agricultural societies were divided between land-owning and landless tribes (or clans) that eventually took on caste-like characteristics. Priests and warriors enjoyed special privileges in the 15th C. Aztec society of Mexico as did the Samurais (warrior nobles) and priests of medieval Japan. Notions of purity and defilement were also quite similar in Japanese society and members of society who carried out "unclean" tasks were treated as social outcasts - just as in India.

Amongst the most stratified of the ancient civilizations was the Roman Civilization where in addition to state-sanctioned slavery, there were all manner of caste-like inequities coded into law. Even in the Christian era, European feudalism provided all manner of hereditary privileges for the knights and landed barons (somewhat akin to India's Rajputs and Thakurs) and amongst the royalty, arranged marriages and dowry were just as common as in India. Discrimination against the artisans was also commonplace throughout Europe, and as late as the 19th century - artisans in Germany had to go through a separate court system to seek legal redress. They were not permitted to appeal to courts that dealt with the affairs of the nobility and the landed gentry. (For instance, Beethoven wrote numerous letters to German judicial authorities pleading that he not be treated as a second-class citizen - that as Germany's pre-eminent composer he deserved better treatment.)

A common pattern that seems to emerge from a study of several such ancient and medieval societies is that priests and warriors typically formed an elite class in most medieval societies and social privileges varied according to social rank; in settled agriculture based societies, this was usually closely related to ownership of land.

For instance, we find no evidence of caste-like discrimination in societies where land was collectively owned and jointly cultivated, or where goods and services were exchanged within the village on the basis of barter, and there was no premium assigned to any particular type of work. All services and all forms of human labor were valued equally. Such village communes may have once existed throughout India and some appear to have survived until quite recently - especially in the hills, (such as in parts of Himachal and the North East, including Assam and Tripura), but also in Orissa and parts of Central India. In such societies, we also see little evidence of gender discrimination.

In India, caste and gender discrimination appear to become more pronounced with the advent of hereditary and authoritarian ruling dynasties, a powerful state bureaucracy, the growth of selective property rights, and the domination of Brahmins over the rural poor in

agrahara

villages. But this process was neither linear nor always irreversible. As old ruling dynasties were overthrown, previously existing caste equations and caste hierarchies were also challenged and modified.

In many parts of India this process may have taken several centuries to crystallize and caste rigidity may be a much more recent phenomenon than has been commonly portrayed. The impression that caste divisions were always strictly enforced, or that there were no challenges to caste rigidity does not seem to square with a dispassionate examination of the Indian historical record.

It should also be emphasized that caste-distinctions were not the only way, or even the most egregious way in which social inequities manifested themselves in older societies. In ancient Greece and Rome, the institution of slavery was at least as cruel a practice, if not worse. (It is therefore quite ironic how the slave-owning Greek states are revered by Western intellectuals as the world's first "democratic" societies but ancient India is denigrated for it's incomprehensible social ills.)

Levels and degree of caste discrimination in India have varied with time and there has been both upward and downward mobility of castes and social groups. Going by the strictures outlined in the

Manusmriti,

one might conclude that caste distinctions were set in stone, rigidly enforced and the possibilities of caste mobility completely circumscribed. But a closer examination of the historical record suggests otherwise.

Already in the Upanishadic period there were tensions between Brahmins and Kshatriyas, and there are explicit parables in the Upanishadic texts illustrating how an enlightened Kshatriya was able to exceed a Brahmin in spiritual wisdom and philosophical knowledge. In the Mahabharatha, there are references to a Brahmin warrior suggesting that caste categories were not entirely inflexible.

There is also criticism of parasitism amongst Brahmins in some of the texts from the Upanishadic period, and social commentators emphasized how those who reneged on their social obligations were undeserving of their caste privileges.

This is an important point because it suggests that there was an implied social contract that involved both privileges and social obligations. The monarch might have enjoyed immense power and prestige, and exacted numerous rights over the common people, but also had the obligation to defend the people - to protect them from invaders, to dispense justice in an unprejudiced manner and assist in the development and preservation of irrigation facilities and roads. Failure to meet such expectations could and did lead to revolts, and dynasties rose and fell within a matter of few generations.

Challenges to Brahminical hegemony and caste-rigidity

In the Upanishads, there is also recognition that conceptions of god could be quite varied, that Brahminical rituals were not essential to spiritual release, and that individuals might choose different deities or methods of worship. This ecumenical outlook facilitated the growth of alternative viewpoints not only in the realm of religious practice but also on norms of how society ought to be structured.

Social challenges to absolute monarchical rule and the immense power of the priestly class probably led to a crescendo during the Buddhist period when Brahmin hegemony received challenges from several quarters - from radical atheists such as the

Lokayatas,

from Jain agnostics, and heterodox Hindus and Buddhists who wanted to reconstruct society on a less discriminatory and more humane basis.

Although it would be wrong to romanticize the Buddhists as being completely against caste distinctions {since there is evidence that they accepted caste distinctions in society outside their

sanghas

(communes)},

Buddhists along with other social critics undoubtedly played a powerful role in ensuring that caste was not the sole or even the dominant factor in shaping Indian society of that period. This is borne out by how so many ruling clans arose from a non-Kshatriya (and also non-Brahmin) background. The Nandas, the Mauryas, the Kalingas and the Guptas are just some of the more illustrious of India's ruling dynasties that did not arise from a Kshatriya background.

(Of course, once some of these clans established themselves as ruling dynasties, they took on the Kshatriya mantle, and over time, the radical changes that accompanied their ascent to power gave way to social conservatism and a decaying of the radical currents that had contributed to their rise to power).

It is also worth noting that the classical four varna division of Hindu society (as described in the

Manusmriti)

does not appear to have had much practical significance if one were to go by the accounts of the Greek chronicler, Megasthenes. In his accounts of Mauryan India. Megasthenes appears to list a seven fold social order in which he differentiates between the priest and the philosopher (who he ranked much above the priest, and who could have been a Brahmin, Jain or Buddhist) and also gives special attention to court bureaucrats such as record keepers, tax collectors and judicial officials. He also ascribed to the peasantry a higher status than might be inferred from the

Manusmriti

and noted with amazement how the peasantry was left unharmed during battles.

According to Megasthenes, philosophers - whether Brahmins or Jain/Buddhist monks also had obligations in terms of offering advice to the ruler in matters of public policy, agriculture, health and culture. Repeated failure to provide sound counsel could lead to a loss of privileges - even exile or death. Thus, although many Brahmins may have held on to their privileges by being shameless sycophants - others made significant contributions in the realm of science, philosophy and culture. Social mobility was possible since learning was not an exclusive preserve of the Brahmins and both the Buddhist and Jain sanghas admitted people from different social backgrounds and also admitted women. (Jyotsna Kamat points to a Karnataka inscription from 1187 A.D. that suggests that Jain nuns enjoyed the same amount of freedom as their male counterparts.) The more advanced

sanghas

enforced a separate quorum for women to ensure that a largely male gathering may not take decisions that did not meet with the approval of the women members of the

sangha

Over time, it appears that the

sanghas

degenerated, losing their intellectual vitality and egalitarian spirit allowing the Brahmins to gradually consolidate their power and influence in the Gangetic plain. But even as late as the 6th-7th C, Gupta-period inscriptions describing land grants in Bengal appear to corroborate Megasthenes' view of how Indian society was structured. Social rank of senior court administrators (who may have risen from different caste backgrounds) invariably exceeded the rank of ordinary village priests.

(In Orissa, Rajasthan and parts of Central and Southern India, this pattern prevailed till even later. Moreover, as society headed towards caste-ossification, it was the court administrators who after acquiring hereditary caste status, became the most privileged agents in society. In some instances, these administrative castes simply merged with other privileged castes such as Brahmin or Kshatriya, or else they were treated as equivalent, and the historic distinctions between then became blurred or obscured.)

In a sampling of Gupta period land grant decrees, it is intriguing that caste identities are omitted more often than explicitly included. Had caste been as important or dominant a social category, one might expect otherwise. Some of the most important figures appear to be officials involved in tax collection and land measurement. Various ranks of officials are mentioned without any explicit mention of their caste. Villagers are also frequently named without reference to their cast. Only occasionally, there are references to villagers who are also mentioned as being Brahmins. Some of the land grant records indicate that before land grants were made, certain categories of villagers - perhaps those considered more important - were consulted by the higher officials. Although Brahmins are mentioned in the list of those consulted, there are equal references to other categories of villagers such as

kutumbins

and

mahattaras

who may have been village officials or important landholders in the village. {Vishwa Mohan Jha

(see ref. below)

describes the

kutumbins

and

mahattaras

varna/jati

nuetral categories (i.e. caste-independent categories) that included Brahmins and non-Brahmins alike.}

Other references point to consultative committees that included the chief artisan, the chief scribe, the merchant and the guild-president of the town. It also appears that administrative changes led to the creation of new posts, the merger or elimination of older posts, and changes in ranks of various officials over time. An examination of the land grant decrees over a space of three centuries (5th-7th C Bengal) points to such changes and others - such as changes in procedures, or changes in the constitution of consultative committees, perhaps to reflect changing political alliances or changes in the economic status of different groups of townspeople and villagers.

In a land allotment plate from Paschimbagh (Bengal) Brahmins are mentioned as tax payers, and the status of ordinary Brahmins does not seem at all exceptional. For instance, it points to a teacher or a Vedic scholar as being entitled to 10

patakas

of land, but other Brahmins were entitled to only 2

patakas

- a share less than that of a

Kayastha

(record-keeper) or

Vaidya

(medical practitioner). Carpenters, smiths and artisans were also put far above other service communities in terms of their share of land.

The Paschimbagh inscription also describes the grant of plots of land to florists, potters, carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and sweepers for serving a

matha (

monastery

)

indicating that when land was granted for a temple or monastery, priests were not the exclusive beneficiaries of land grants. (Two Bhaumakara charters from Talcher/Dhenkanal in Orissa similiarly refer to donations of land for a Buddhist temple, and allocations for its maintenance.)

A study of land grants from 12th C Rajasthan (Pali) and Karnataka (Kalikatti) suggests that land grants had a limited life tenure even when initially decreed to be for life or for perpetuity. Beneficiaries of land grants were subject to transfers, and grants to a particular beneficiary were transferred to another beneficiary five or ten years later. It also appears that the beneficiaries were selected based on administrative rank rather than any particular caste-affiliation.

It is also not at all apparent that administrative rank was limited by birth. In Orissa, there is explicit evidence to the contrary. Ordinary peasants were able to rise up in the ranks of the military, and it is likely that a similar situation prevailed in the administrative ranks. Mayadhar Mansinha (see ref. below) suggests that a combination of factors such as training, merit and personal determination played a role, (in addition to social standing and political connections) in determining rank and promotions. In Karnataka, there is evidence that some of the chief administrators were women. (See Jyotsna Kamat, ref. provided below)

Brahminical Ascendance

Nevertheless, the seeds for a more privileged role for the Brahmins were also being sown through the process of land grants to Brahmins. In some instances, thousands of Brahmins were granted rights to hitherto uncultivated land. In other cases, Brahmins were appointed as the local representatives of the state authorities in what are described as

agrahara

villages where Brahmins presided over small peasants, who in Bihar were mostly landless sharecoppers or bonded labourers. These

agrahara

villages were typically small villages and sattelites of bigger villages that included members of several castes and bigger land-holders. In Bihar, such

agrahara

villages proliferated and it is quite likely that in such

agraharas

oppressive social relations and some of the most egregious patterns of caste-centred discrimination and exploitation may have developed.

(While early Gupta period records indicate the existence of rural consultative councils that mediated between the rulers and the artisans and peasants, it seems that such consultative councils became less important or were phased out with the growth of the

agraharas.

Thereafter, the Brahmins became the sole intermediaries between the village and the state, and over time, this may have enabled the Brahmins to exercise social and political hegemony over other inhabitants of the village.It also appears that the greatest incidence of the practice of untouchability occurs in conjunction with the growth in the power and authority of the Brahmins in such villages.)

But these developments took time to spread elsewhere in India, first spreading to Bengal and eastern UP, and very gradually elsewhere in India. However, this pattern was not necessarily replicated in identical form throughout India and some parts of India virtually escaped this trend. In

agrahara

villages in other parts of India, Brahmins did take on the role of local administrators and tax collectors, but the status of the small peasantry was not always as miserable as in Bihar. The degree of exploitation and oppression appears to be related to the extent of alienation from land-ownership.

For example, evidence for Brahmin domination in Kalikatti, Southern Karnataka emerges after the 13th C. when villagers were instructed to pay taxes to the Brahmin assignees, leading to constant tensions and disputes, but without dramatic changes in the overall status of the tax-paying villagers.

Although Brahminization was an important factor in leading to caste ossification, it was not necessarily the sole or even the most important factor in the mix. The impact of the Islamic invasions, colonization by the British and ecological changes played an equally crucial if not decisive role in many instances.

For instance, in Orissa, the ossification of the bureaucracy and its conversion into a group of privileged and exclusive castes appears to take place after the 14th-15th C. when we begin to see a general decline in its overseas trade due to the silting up of its rivers. At the same time, we see the growth of Brahminical hegemony in the realm of religion and military defeats at the hands of the Mughal armies led by Raja Man Singh of Jaipur. All these factors may have played a role in destroying the vibrancy of Oriya society and encouraging caste conservatism.

(See the essay on the

History of Orissa

for more on this subject.)

Impact of the Islamic Invasions

Unfortunately, many social historians have studiously ignored the effect of such external factors in the shaping of social relations in India. But we know that the Islamic invasions led to monumental changes in the political and cultural life of the sub-continent and especially so in the Gangetic plain - so it would be exceedingly odd if the invasions had no impact on the social structure of Indian society. While some social analysts have tried to analyze Hindu society during the period of Islamic rule as though it had been untouched by the Islamic invasions and left to stagnate in a cocoon of its own making, others have succumbed to illusory simplifications such as Islam was an egalitarian faith whereas Hinduism had caste divisions.

Because Islam first arose in those parts of the world where settled agriculture was not possible - i.e. in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula - social divisions had not yet emerged in quite the same way that they had in long settled agricultural societies like India. For the warring nomadic tribes of the desert, Islam may have been a tool for the upward mobility of clans that may have earlier survived on petty thievery and by raiding the wealth of settled urban societies (and later for those who joined the ranks of the military in the Islalmic states), the upward mobility of some came at the expense of enormous human rights violations against others. In the hands of expansionist conquerors, Islam became more an instrument of devastation and terror rather than a vehicle for social equality or social justice.

Taken in its entirety, the period of Islamic rule in India cannot be seen as furthering social equity or social harmony in the subcontinent. As a faith-based ideological system Islam could at best guarantee equality before "God" - i.e. equality after death. However, a closer study of the Quran dispels even such notions, for even amongst believers, there is gender discrimination and rank based on the "quality" and "type" of service provided to the Islamic cause. In any case, on earth, the plight of Muslim converts depended more on social realities, on political equations - than on the abstract and remote promise of equality offered by Islam.

During times of heavy political and economic oppression, the only option for the poor was complete and total submission to the will of "God" which in effect meant sacrificing all their autonomy in favor of the clergy, (who rarely challenged political authority), and more often than not, were largely beholden to the rulers who chose to support and promote them. When the clergy did resist political authority, it often tended towards social conservatism and reaction rather than social progress.

By and large, social inequities widened with the onset of Islamic rule in the sub-continent. Land revenue records clearly indicate that with few exceptions (as in Kashmir and Bengal for a time), Islamic rulers taxed the peasantry at significantly higher rates. If the average rate of taxation during the pre-Islamic period varied between 10% to a maximum of 20% - averaging around 15-16%, it had increased to 33% or even more under the Mughals.

(Note that even the Manusmriti limited the tax rate on the peasantry to one-sixth - about 16%)

While all Islamic rulers may not have insisted on the discriminating

jaziya,

many of the earlier invaders insisted upon it, and more than one court chronicler of the Delhi Sultanate describes the violent means taken to suppress peasant rebellions and extract the high taxes from the crushed peasantry. Urban revolts were also not uncommon and the Arab chronicler Ibn Batuta mentions how such rebellions were suppressed with great cruelty. Punishment for those who rebelled could mean loss of adults (particularly young women) and children to slavery, massacres or forced evacuations of entire villages and small towns, pillage and destruction of places of learning, of temples and other symbols of cultural identification, and denial of job opportunities in the courts. In the early centuries of Islamic rule, the distrust of the locals was so intense that virtually all the important administrative positions were kept in the hands of foreigners.

(Romila Thapar has pointed out that prior to the Islamic invasions, Hindu rulers also invaded or pillaged the temples of their rivals, especially since these temples were repositories of great wealth. She has also indicated that the management of some of these rich temples was extremely corrupt. Plunder of temple wealth was definitely a factor in the destruction of such temples during raids and attacks by Islamic invaders and conquerors. However, during the Islamic invasions, this practice accelerated both in frequency and intensity.

It should also be noted that not all temples were storehouses of great wealth or under the management of corrupt Brahminical trusts. The majority of temples had considerable cultural significance for the local populations and many were built and maintained by non-Brahminical cults. For instance, in Bundelkhand, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, there are a sizable number of surviving temples that not only escaped the path of the Islamic invaders, but were obviously left untouched in local battles between rival Hindu kings. There are even scattered remains from the Gupta period. But in the Gangetic plain, virtually nothing from the region's pre-Islamic past has survived. Clearly, there were important political dimensions to the destruction of Northern India's cultural wealth. One might speculate that the political subjugation of a reluctant and possibly even hostile population required the physical elimination of cultural symbols that instilled pride and self-confidence, and thus threatened the authority of the alien rulers.

In any case, the smashing of facial features, genitalia and breasts on sculpted figures has no parallel to earlier practices. There is also little evidence that those defeated in battle were killed or enslaved on the scale of what happened during the Islamic invasions.)

For instance, the Afghanistan region (which once had a sizeable Hindu and Buddhist population) acquired the reputation of being a land where Hindus were slaughtered and hence took the name Hindu-Kush, and references to wanton destruction occur with boastful regularity in the records of the triumphant conquerors. However, in the Gangetic plain the Hindu population was essential in maintaining the tax base for the rulers and therefore, it was only necessary to break the autonomy of the Hindu population and crush their resistance to higher taxation. This was largely achieved through the almost complete destruction of older centres of culture and learning, burning of libraries such as in Nalanda and Vikramshila, the widespread conversion of Buddhists to Islam, and violent acts of reprisal against those who resisted.

One of the most deleterious effects of the Islamic invasions on social relations in India was the practice of slavery, which was introduced on a scale hitherto unseen in the subcontinent. Unlike the societies of the East, slavery appears to have played an important role almost throughout the history of the Western world and the Quran has passages that endorse the practice of slavery. During the Islamic period, in sub-Saharan Africa, slaves labored in the salt mines and copper mines and served as a vital link in the trans-Saharan trade routes acting as porters where camels and donkeys could not go.

Scott Levi (Univ. of Wisconsin) points to judicial documents of medieval Samarqand (and other Central Asian sources) that disclose the presence there of many thousands of Indian slaves throughout the medieval period. A number of Indian sources make it clear that, from the early Ghaznavid raids to the Mughal period, hundreds of thousands (if not millions over the centuries) of men, women and children were marched over to the slave markets in Iran and Central Asia, i.e. beyond the northwest frontier of India, and out of the reach of their familial support systems.

(Although state sanctioned slavery came to an end with the dawn of the Christian era in Europe, a slave-owning replica of ancient Rome arose in the American South, and slaves were employed throughout the Caribbean and South America. The Portuguese were notorious for their slave-markets in India. Even as slavery was banned in Europe, the European trading companies made huge profits from the slave trade. Slavery was not a practice confined to the Islamic parts of the world.)

The practice of slavery probably led to the growth in the custom of

Jauhar

and

Sati

amongst the military castes. Prior to the Islamic invasions, there are very few records to indicate that such practices were widely followed. But the onslaught of the Islamic invaders had led to a complete breakdown in the implementation of war ethics. Whereas in earlier wars, it was required of both sides to protect the peasantry, to leave women, children and the elderly at peace, and there were injunctions against the enslavement of prisoners or of harming those who surrendered in battle - the invaders had few if any compunctions in unleashing all manner of torments on the defeated population. In such an environment, it is not surprising that for the proud Rajput societies, the act of

jauhar,

or mass suicide was a more honorable option.

(It should be noted that such acts of mass or individual suicide are not unknown elsewhere in the world. Sometimes these acts were voluntary (as was usually emphasized in the Indian tradition), at other times they were entirely coerced. Amongst the Vikings, it was customary for a warrior's young concubines to join the funeral pyres of dead Viking warriors. In ancient Nubia (upper Sudan and lower Egypt) there are records of mass suicide upon the death of a warrior king and Nubian burials of warriors indicate practices quite similiar to

Jauhar

Sati .

There are also parallels in the Japanese tradition of

Harakiri'

(suicide for honour) or

Sepukku

amongst the

Samurai -

warrior nobles of Japan. Voluntary suicide of widows (although rare) also took place in China during the reign of the Qing dynasty. There are also records of the Celts and the Romans practicing human sacrifice. Amongst the Aztecs of the 15th C, the custom of human sacrifice of the defeated does not appear to have any voluntary character, and was seen as a legitimate rite in the celebration of a victory in war.

Western feminist indologists who see the practice of Sati as a unique form of gender oppression peculiar to India might note that in the Christian world, the scourge of witch-burning was a far more dangerous threat to the lives of women. The mere charge of being a "witch" could lead to public hanging, and the Salem-witch trials in America were part of a long chain of witch-burnings that took place throughout Christian Europe and carried over into New England)

Nevertheless, Islamic rule in India did not prevail entirely without benefits for specific social classes who chose to collaborate with the invaders.

Trading communities probably benefited from the installation of Islamic rulers whose policies of lower taxes on trade, and state support of local traders and financiers was in their interest. Scott Levi suggests that from the end of the thirteenth century, and throughout much of the Delhi Sultanate period, the Muslim nobility were dependent upon heavily capitalized indigenous banking firms (identified in the Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi as

'Sahs'

and

'Multanis'

). These domestic financiers loaned seeds and other necessary inputs to peasants and village-artisans and manufacturers (such as textile weavers) in return for a share of the produce. The rest they bought in cash, and a part of that cash was then recovered by the state treasuries through taxation.

It should also be noted that, (by and large), Islamic rulers born and raised in India relied less on violence and sheer terror, but sought alliances with sections of the local population, especially with those amongst the Hindu elite who were willing to collaborate. Although some of these alliances were coerced, others led to tangible material benefits for the royal collaborators.

Alliances were forged through marriage, or simply from political convenience. Military alliances with Hindu rulers were crucial in maintaining the power of many Islamic rulers. After Akbar, the Mughals relied heavily on the Jaipur and Bikaner Rajputs, who in return were given rights to a share of the taxes extracted from the Gangetic plain. And although Hindus were numerically discriminated in jobs at the courts, by skillfully playing off different caste communities against one another, the Mughals were able to win over a section of the Hindus in maintaining their position of political preeminence.

Hence, it would be wrong to see the many centuries of Islamic rule in India purely from the prism of religious antagonisms. But it would be equally wrong to see the long period of rule by Islamic-identified rulers (even those that were born in India) as entirely benevolent or benign, or no different from the rule of earlier Hindu kings. Since most were heavier taxers, the distance between the ruling elites and the peasant and artisan masses tended to widen and there were other aspects of Islamic rule (particularly during the rule of the more oppressive Sultanates) that limited social mobility.

For many of the Islamic rulers, the Brahmin dominated

agraharas

were highly suited to efficient tax collection and the might of the Sultanates came down very heavily on social challenges that weakened the ability of the state to collect taxes. The fear of enslavement and the denial of equal access to job opportunities in the Sultanate courts led to Hindu society becoming extremely inward-looking in large parts of the plains. With opportunities for jobs in the administrative ranks shrinking, caste loyalties were in all likelihood strengthened, not weakened. Thus, rather than shake up the caste system as some might expect, Islamic rule (by foreign invaders who distrusted the locals) may have actually helped in its crystallization. Neither is there any evidence that Islamic rule helped end the practice of untouchability.

(In fact, the problems of untouchability and caste-discrimination are especially notable in states like UP and Bihar where Islamic rule held complete sway for five centuries. In Sindh and Western Punjab, where almost the entire population was converted to Islam, it is important to observe that janitorial workers were never converted, and to this date remain a highly oppressed and discriminated group. There is also evidence that Muslims developed their own versions of caste. Romila Thapar points out how foreign-origin Muslims such as Syeds, Sheiks and Ashrafs kept themselves consciously apart from Muslims who came from artisan and peasant backgrounds. Language was another divider. In Bijapur district, the elite Muslims spoke Urdu whereas the ordinary Muslims spoke Kannada. Zarina Bhatty in an essay on

"Social stratification among Muslims"

describes caste differentiation amongst Ashraf and non-Ashraf Muslims and notions of impurity that closely parallel caste cleavages and attitudes in Hindu society. Sandra Mackey in the

Caste/Class System in Iran

describes patterns of social differentiation remarkably similiar to India's. Also see note below)

Over time, Islamic rule in India created a much stronger and more unified elite, which made it more difficult for the ordinary masses to resist regressive social changes, particularly in the realm of philosophical choice, religious pluralism, regional and local autonomy in matters of religion, gender equity, freedom of sexual expression and sexual orientation. For instance, prior to the arrival of Islam, women enjoyed greater freedom of movement and dress. 11th C chronicler of Indian life,

Al-Biruni

expresses puzzlement at how the Hindu men (of Punjab) took the advice of the women "in all consultations and emergencies". But in a matter of few centuries, Islamic notions of gender separation and sexual prudery had infected Hindu households as well. A weaker version of the

Purdah

system and a more conservative dress code became the custom even in Hindu homes, especially so amongst those of the trading community that had frequent contacts with Muslims.

Although in sime passages, the Quran states that their ought to be no compulsion in matters of religion, in other passages, the Quran leaves no doubt that force and coercion are acceptable in furthering Islamic practice. Consequently, the practice of Islam conformed more to the passages advicating force and coercion. In Mali, the Tunisian chronicler Ibn Batuta noted that children who were neglectful in learning the Quran were put in chains until they had it memorized. Regarding India, he commented how newly converted peasants had a very lackadaisical attitude towards attending regular prayers and how the Imams had to cane non-attendees to force attendance. He also describes how he personally led a battle against the reluctance of women to cover their breasts in the Maldives.

In the Indian tradition, moral codes concerning dress were more in keeping with the natural environment. Clothes were light and simple, consistent with the generally hot climate. And in matters of religion, there was greater diversity, and much more personal choice. It was often up to the devotee to visit a temple at a time of his or her choosing. Which deity to worship involved an element of local choice and different

jatis

might worship different deities. Local versions of the epics such as the

Ramayana

and the

Krishna-Leela

were popularized and recent research points to hundreds of different versions in circulation. Unlike in Islam, pilgrimages were undertaken under less pressure and with greater individual volition.

Al-Biruni

also noted how the Hindus were remarkably flexible and willing to change customs and traditions they no longer felt to be relevant or essential.

(Although notions of

Dharma

played an important role in determining the boundaries for social conduct, these varied with time and were also adapted to suit the individual needs and preferences of different regions and localities.)

Pluralism in Indian History

In religions that paid tremendous stress on "revealed truth" (such as Christianity or Islam) there have always been strong tendencies towards dogmatic rigidity. But even at the peak of their influence, India's Brahmins were never quite able to impose any comparable sort of rigid uniformity in the practice of Hinduism on a national (let alone, international) scale. In some localities, the lower castes did without the Brahmins entirely while elsewhere, especially in the South, or in Central India and Orissa - Brahmins often felt obliged to give due deference to dissenting and heterodox cults, and incorporated their belief systems into mainstream Hinduism.

T.K Venkatasubramaniam

(see ref. below)

describes how in Tamil Nadu, Brahmins begin to play an important role in politics and society only after the 7th C., when the Pallavas began to challenge the authority of the previous ruling clans such as the Chera, Chola and Pandya. Because the Pallavas did not rise from an aristocratic background, they used the Brahmins to validate their right to rule through a combination of persuasion and coercion.

At that time, Tamil Nadu was a hotbed of a variety of non-Brahminical traditions, (such as Buddhist, Jain and many others) - hence, a synthesis of these different traditions took place between the 7th and the 11th centuries. Vajrayana Buddhism, Shaivite Tantrism and Hata-Yoga were amongst the trends that became integrated. The Bhakti tradition in which the devotee is held in a higher status than the Brahmin had it's impact as did the ideals of the Siddhis whose supreme ideal was freedom, perfect health and immortality - all to be gained on this earth through magic and yoga. The Kalamukas, Pasupatas and Kapalikas were popular practitioners of Yogic and Tantric cults - the latter helped assimilate the ecstatic tribal cults of earlier times. This was also the period when the androgyne forms of the Hindu gods (the

Ardhanarishwara

) became popularized.

The existence of these numerous cults was partly an expression of the struggle for social equality and freedom from exploitation, but for some, it was also a means for accessing greater social privileges . The Brahmins of Tamil Nadu (along with the rulers) attempted to manage these social tensions through co-option, philosophical accommodation and synthesis.

In Andhra, folk religions played a powerful role in mediating Brahminical influences, and a vibrant example of the deep penetration of folk influences in popular religion is to be seen in the sculpted array of folkloric panels in the temple of Srisailam (sponsored by the Vijayanagar rulers in the 14th-15th C.). In neighbouring Karnataka, the Bhakti ideal and Jain influences put their stamp on prevailing religious practices.

Religion in India thus developed in a much more organic fashion than is commonly realized, and it was never completely divorced from popular inputs. Both male and female deities drew followers, and while goddesses were sometimes displayed in demonic warrior roles, gods were sometimes displayed with feminine qualities. In the Yogini temples, all the deities were women and although today, there are only a handful of surviving Yogini temples, (mostly in Orissa and Madhya Pradesh) it is not unlikely that many more may have been in existence.

(See the essay on the

History of Orissa

for more on Yogini traditions.)

In the 8th-10th C Pratihara era temples, men and women were sculpted in identical heights and proportions - perhaps implying that male domination had not yet fully come to pass. Tantric ideas on sexual liberation found their way into the grand temples not only of Khajuraho and Konarak but also in temples in Rajasthan, the Jabalpur and Raipur regions, in Telengana and elsewhere in the South. Unlike Islam where entry into mosques was curtailed for women, and separate

zenana

areas were constructed, restraints on the entry of women in temples were not commonplace. Contrary to the suppression of female sexuality in the Semitic religious streams, temple architecture from the 11th-13th C appears to revel in the eroticism of both genders - and there are even displays of same-gender interaction.

In this relatively liberal atmosphere, philosophy continued to flourish and while some tendencies drifted towards religious idealism, others emphasized the rational and worldly. The slow but steady record of scientific progress up to the 12th-13th C points to the toleration that atheist, agnostic and rational currents may have enjoyed in Indian society in contrast to the violence meted out towards "heretics" and disbelievers in medieval Europe and the Middle East. Religion in India developed in a relatively secular atmosphere where all manner of religious variations coexisted with the abstract and all-inclusive monotheism articulated in the Upanishads and later emulated in the various Bhakti streams of worship.

At the grassroots level, these relatively more liberal tendencies had their impact on the practice of Islam as well. Sufism, the worship of

pirs

(saints), the practice of the

Urs

were attempts at forging some sort of a compromise.

(Romila Thapar points to peasant and artisan Muslims of Bijapur who continued to celebrate Hindu festivals. To this day, Muslim peasants of Northern Karnataka celebrate Islamic festivals with folk dances that have Hindu origins - quite unlike the orthodox practice of these festivals where singing and dancing might be frowned upon. Such hybrid Muslim communities exist elsewhere in India too.)

But in the Madrasahs, (with few exceptions) conservatism and orthodoxy were the norm; attempts at providing a secular education never really took off, and over time this had a distinctly illiberal effect on how social relations matured in the sub-continent.

The Sikh Renaissance

Just prior to British rule, Mughal rule had virtually collapsed and power had gone into the hands of Sikh rulers in the North and the Maratha kings in much of Central and Southern India. The Sikhs had been at the forefront of powerful social reforms as they fought against the intolerable burden of high taxes imposed by the Mughals. Gender equality received particular attention from the early Sikh Gurus as did caste discrimination. During the time of Guru Gobind Singh - women not only participated as warriors but they also led some of the battles, and 40% of the spiritual leadership came from the ranks of women.

However once the Sikhs became rulers, the egalitarian currents in the Sikh tradition became successively dissipated. Upper caste converts to Sikhism retained their caste identification, and

Gurudwaras

became divided between those for the upper and lower castes. Nevertheless, the peasantry did win some concessions and the

Gurudwaras

institutionalized charitable practices on a scale unmatched in previous eras. Overall, the century that preceded colonization was a period of growing social ferment in India, but as British colonial rule tightened, it was to put a great damper on the pace of social reforms.

The British Colonial Era

Although some versions of Indian history ascribe to the early colonial administrators a penchant for social reform, it should be noted that the colonial "reformers" were at best aligning themselves with active indigenous reform currents. They were not usually the initiators or great crusaders for social reform as is frequently portrayed.

In any case, after 1857, the cynical strategy of divide and conquer not only impacted relations between Hindus and Muslims, but also aggravated caste tensions. But even independently of conscious attempts by British administrators to inflame caste tensions, the ruination of the Indian economy alone led to a disastrous degradation in social relations. (See

The Colonial Legacy

for more on this subject)

The Zamindari system particularly disenfranchised the peasantry whose status dropped dramatically in comparison to those castes who were able to find a foothold in the new administration, or find some employment in the new colonial cities. The enormous burden of high taxes led to unprecedented levels of indebtedness and the privileging of the money-lending castes. The economic devastation caused by the Mahalwari system of taxation in the Awadh region led to higher levels of gender discrimination, and an increase in coercion in matters related to dowry. Differential access to modern education and jobs in the colonial administration increased the distance between the favored castes - and the Indian masses.

(The favored castes naturally included Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Banias, but also other important administrative castes such as Kayasthas. Large land owning castes such as Mehtas and Reddis were also favored, as were Marathas, Jatts and other castes who had risen during the decline of Mughal rule.)

It was also the British who resurrected the

Manusmriti

and used it to frame the "Hindu Civil Code". Prior to colonization, the

Manusmriti

was nothing more than an obscure text, long-forgotten and rarely used to determine what was acceptable social practice. (See Madhu Keshwar - ref. provided below) The

Manusmriti

came in very handy in social control. Because the numerical presence of the Britishers in India was not substantial, the Britishers had to rule largely by proxy. It was important that their agents did not face resistance or rebellion, even in the social realm. Owing to it's repressive and highly divisive character, the

Manusmriti

helped in preventing both individual and collective resistance to local authorities, who were typically upper caste and often Brahmin. That the

Manusmriti

represented an archaic and outdated social code didn't matter. It fit in very well with the British colonial project.

It was also convenient in providing ideological cover for repressive legal steps the British wanted to take anyway. For instance it didn't hurt that the

Manusmriti

advocated laws that legitimized gender discrimination or attacked same-gender relationships. Such attitudes were then equally prevalent in Europe and it made it easier to disenfranchise women in matters of inheritance or introduce legal injunctions against same-gender sexual relations (as was the case in Britain during the 18th C.).

Changes in Caste Equations

Historians who have attempted to draw a straight line between the

Manusmriti

and post-independence India are clearly unfamiliar with those patterns of Indian history that contradict such a linear view. While some of the social evils of modern India may have ancient roots, many others have a fairly recent history. And even those that may have ancient precedence were modulated and modified as a result of numerous struggles for social equality that have taken place throughout Indian history.

For example, after independence one could find temples built in the late 18th or 19th century that restricted entry to dalits and menstruating women. But it is not at all clear if such strictures were widespread prior to colonization. Research indicates that during the Pratihara period, caste categories were relatively flexible and popular temples were constructed by those considered low-caste. Temple construction was often a way of gaining social respect and upward mobility.

Restrictions on temple entry most likely reached a peak during the British period partly because only the upper castes had the means to build temples, and also because the control of existing temples passed into the hands of trusts who were hand-picked by the British, and were given free license (possibly even encouraged) to promote discriminatory practices. The iron hand of the colonial state made it much more difficult to challenge such reactionary tendencies.

See Nicholas B. Dirks, "The original caste: power, history and hierarchy in South Asia", in McKim Marriott, ed. "India through Hindu Categories" (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990:59-78)

"Under colonialism, caste was appropriated, and in many respects reinvented, by the British"

(p.61) "Paradoxically, colonialism seems to have created much of what is now accepted as Indian 'tradition', including an autonomous caste structure with the Brahman clearly at the head" (p.63) "

Caste, as it is still portrayed in much current anthropological literature, is a colonial construction, reminiscent only in some ways of the social forms that preceded colonial intervention" (p.74)

Economic factors were also crucial in determining caste rank and caste relationships. In periods of intense economic exploitation, caste discrimination intensified, and the reverse took place in periods of economic expansion. For instance, most historians are in agreement that the Gupta period was a period of rising prosperity and also a period of increasing social mobility. Improvements in agricultural productivity led to concomitant improvements in the social rank of the cultivators.

Similiarly, (though much later) there is evidence for the rise in status of the

telis

- cooking oil manufacturers and traders whose earlier low caste status did not fit with their growing economic importance, and were thus granted a higher caste rank. Besides, all through Indian history, phony lineages for non-Kshatriya rulers were constructed to create the aura of continuity and legitimacy. Hence, the mere existence of a document like the Manusmriti should not cause serious social scientists to jump to broad conclusions without greater scrutiny and dispassionate analysis of the Indian historical record.

It is also important not to judge an older society by modern standards. Social relations cannot be entirely separated from how productive activities are carried out and what the level of available technology makes socially possible. In today's world, the widespread availability of printed matter, of computers and other means to store and develop knowledge systems makes the older systems of learning and skill-preservation largely redundant. But in older times, the artisans guild system helped in the development and preservation of specialized knowledge and perfection of important manufacturing skills. In India, artisans guilds were closely correlated to

jati

or caste. It was not only the Brahmins and upper castes who favored hereditary continuity, but skilled carpenters, weavers, metalworkers, painters and numerous categories of other artisans also saw certain benefits in maintaining their

jati

identities. While the artisan castes often fought for greater social equality - the complete breakdown of caste identities was never a serious option except for those at the very bottom of the caste totem pole.

The caste system survived not just because it was enforced by the legal writ of an elite class, but as much because it served a social purpose in an era in which it was difficult if not impossible to organize the educational and productive activities of society in a more flexible and democratic way.

Other forms of social discrimination

In addition, societies that may not have overtly practised a caste system (such as Europe in the Christian era) may have yet prevented egalitarian social interaction and free social mobility through other means. The virtual annihilation and isolation of Native American communities by Christian invaders and immigrants is a striking and tragic example of systematic social exclusion.

While slavery in America was a thoroughly cruel and demeaning practice, the abolition of slavery did not end injustices against African Americans or other non-European immigrants. For instance, until the passing of the civil rights act - discrimination against African Americans and other nationalities such as Chinese, Indian and Mexican were enshrined in law. Inter-racial marriages were banned in many states and the mere charge of taking an interest in a Caucasian woman could lead to the lynching of Afro-American men in the South. Early Chinese and Indian immigrants were paid substantially less than the prevailing wages, were not allowed to bring wives and family members into the country, and prevented from owning property. Even workers guilds and trade unions discriminated against non-European immigrant workers.

(The evidence from the richest of the world's capitalist countries suggests that both overt and covert forms of social inequality continues to this day. For instance, many elected Presidents in the US (including Clinton, Bush and Reagan) can trace their lineage to the British royal family, implying that the old ruling classes continue to enjoy special access to power. In Britain, hereditary privileges are enshrined in the constitution for the monarchy, as well as other members of the nobility. The House of Lords is another vestige of the old system that privileges certain elites. The 'old-boys' network, exclusive college sororities and fraternities are another way in which the elite are usually able to arrange privileged and differential access to jobs and business opportunities.

At the other end of the social spectrum, African Americans in the US remain a highly discriminated group. Although comprising less than 10% of the US population, they make up almost fifty percent of prisoners on death row and a similarly high percentage of jail inmates. Numerous studies have pointed to highly discriminatory practices in how African Americans are arrested (much more frequently), charged (with much lower thresholds of incriminating evidence) and sentenced (to much longer prison terms) relative to Caucasian Americans. In California, there are more African Americans in jails than in universities. The unemployment rate amongst African Americans in some US cities is as high as 50% whereas the average rate of unemployment is less than 5% in the country as a whole.)

Discrimination in the Modern World

While in India, caste continues to be an important category leading to grave social inequities, national origin and race have become important factors in how inequality is propagated in much of the modern world. Racial and national discrimination was at the core of how colonial rulers justified their exploitation of the colonies. The colonial system was unique in how human exploitation reached a level of intensity unseen in human history and enabled the creation of exploitative patterns across vast oceans and geographical territories. The legacy of this economic devastation lives on in how negative social practices from older eras continue to survive not only in India but in much of Africa and other colonized nations.

The legacy of colonialism also shows up in how there is no equal work for equal pay across nations. Even accounting for differences in purchasing power, the income and ability to consume for a doctor, engineer, skilled industrial worker or service worker in the US, Europe or Japan is often five to ten times greater than say in India or Bangladesh or Kenya or Indonesia.

While it is undeniable that the task of democratization of Indian society is incomplete, that caste and gender discrimination continue to cause grave harm, that Adivasis and Dalits still face all manner of trials and tribulations, and that all such social inequities need to be fought with continued vigour - India's social evils cannot be analyzed or eliminated in isolation of other necessary changes. It is important that the process of how social relations become shaped in a certain way be better understood. While battles for social equality need widespread support, their ultimate success may be determined as much by how India's economy develops.

All through human history, property-less classes have suffered social discrimination of one kind or another. Economic disparities remain a serious contributor to social inequities today. Any social system that is based on unequal access to economic assets - (whether they be land, raw materials, industrial or commercial wealth) will inevitably lead to some form of social discrimination and inequity. Victims of older forms of discrimination will either continue to be victimized, or simply become victims of new forms of discrimination.

For that reason, the challenge for countries like India is not only to fight against all instances of social discrimination, but to also struggle for greater economic equality - not only within India, but also in terms of India's equality with the rest of the world.

References:

1. Vishwa Mohan Jha:

Settlement, Society and Polity in Early Medieval Rural India (

Social Science Probings

vol. 11/12)

2. T. K Venkatasubramaniam:

Politics, Culture and 'Caste' in early Tamilkam (Social Science Probings vol. 11/12)

R. C. Dutt:

A History of Civilization in Ancient India

Hetukar Jha

, Social Structures of Indian Villages, A study of rural Bihar

Mayadhar Mansinha,

History of Oriya Literature (Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi)

Bulletins of the

Indian Historical Review

(Indian Council of Historical Research)

Vinod Kumar:

India as Al-beruni saw it

Madhu Kishwar:

Manusmriti to Madhusmriti

9.Scott Levi:

Hindus Beyond the Hindu Kush: Indians in the Central Asian Slave Trade,

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society; '

The Indian Merchant Diaspora in Early Modern Central Asia and Iran

', Iranian Studies

(32, 4)

9b.

Chacha Na'ma

Futuh-I Bulda'n

(Translations/Excerpts from Arabic/Persian texts chronicling the invasion and conquest of Sindh)

9c.

The destruction of forts and temples, massacres of defeated armies, looting of temple wealth and the taking of slaves is described in numerous Persian/Arabic chronicles of the Delhi Sultanate; for instance, see

Taju-l Ma-asir

and

Tabakat-i-Nasiri

10.

Jyotsna Kamat:

Social Life in Medieval Karnataka

11. Zarina Bhatty:

"Social stratification among Muslims in India" - (from the book "Caste - its twentieth century avatar" by M N Srinivas, Viking, New Delhi, 1996, pp 249-253)

12. Sandra Mackey:

The Caste/Class system in Iran (from The Iranians - Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation), Dutton Books published by the Penguin Groups, New York, 1996 pp. 34-35

13. K. Damodaran:

Indian Thought, A Critical Survey (Advent of Islam and Later Feudalism)

Notes:

Caste Divisions amongst Muslims:

That caste-divisions existed amongst Muslims is borne out by this report of the 1901 Census for the Province Of Bengal:

"The Mohammedans themselves recognize two main social divisions, (1) Ashraf or Sharaf and (2) Ajlaf; Ashraf means 'noble ' and includes all undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from high caste Hindus. All other Mahomedans including the occupational groups and all converts of lower ranks, are known by the contemptuous terms, Ajlaf , 'wretches' or 'mean people': they are also called Kamina or Itar, 'base' or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, 'worthless'. In some places a third class, called Arzal or 'lowest of all', is added. With them no other Mohammedan would associate, and they are forbidden to enter the mosque to use the public burial ground.

Within these groups there are castes with social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the Hindus." Ashraf

or better class Mohammedans are listed as

Saiads (Sayeeds), Sheikhs, Pathans, Moghuls, Malliks, Mirzas; Ajlaf

or lower class Mohammedans include a variety of cultivating and artisan castes such as

Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir, Dhobi, Hajjam, Madaria, Dai,

etc. The

Arzal

or degraded class is listed as including

Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugia

and

Mchlar.]

Ambedkar in his essay on

"Pakistan and the Malaise, Social Stagnation"

states while quoting the above Census data:

"Similar facts from other Provinces of India could be gathered from their respective Census Reports and those who are curious may refer to them. But the facts for Bengal are enough to show that the Mohammedans observe not only caste but also untouchability."

Also see:

Islam and the sub-continent - appraising its impact

Forced Conversions to Islam

For an analysis of the Quran, see:

http://europenews.dk/en/node/18163

Adivasi Contributions to Indian Culture and Civilization

Buddhist Ethics and Social Criticism

Also see topics in

Indian History

for other related essays

Back to main index for

South Asian History

http://india_resource.tripod.com/social.htm

Hindutva Nothing But Brahminic Sanathana Dharma

(Paper submitted by PALA to All India League of Revolutionary Culture [AILRC], Aug 1994 – published as a booklet in 'Conference Against Brahminic Terrorism',Thanjavur,Tamilnadu, feb- 2003 )

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The history of India is being explained to us through various perspectives. When the brahminical, gandhian and revisionist (blemished with braminism) shades of those perspectives reveal themselves, or when they are unmasked, we confront the cruel and treacherous face of Brahminism hitherto unseen. To those who fail to see this and remain indifferent, the Hindu communalists have upon themselves the task of 'educating' them.

During the freedom movement, the CPI, which should have acted as a vanguard in the struggle against British imperialism and feudalism, compromised on both these fronts. It also glossed over the question of caste, a socio-economic oppressive system interwoven with the class oppression-the backbone of oriental despotism. It faithfully followed Gandhi and his moderate Hindu nationalism like a pet dog.

Dr.Ambedkar and Periyar EVR carried through the ideological struggle against Brahminism. Though they fought Brahminism in certain spheres of ideology, they went in for a class compromise and got institutionised in that process. That was the limitation destined by history to the bourgeois world outlook – an inescapable compromise with Brahminism, a close ally of imperialism.

Now, it is the second round of the game. After pauperising the country with their own policies, the ruling classes now accede to the pressure of re-colonisation by the imperialists, and shame lessly justify it as the only solution to the crisis. The Hindu fascists, representatives of the same comprador- feudal combine, put forth hindutva as their ideology and indulge in a deceptive patriotic sloganeering, projecting themselves as the only alternative.

Simultaneously, parties like BSP, which despise even the concept of class struggle and maintain a discreet silence over the issue of fighting imperialism and feudalism, are 'thundering' against Brahminism. They make no secret of their ultimate goal of sharing their crumb in the citadels of ruling class power. But that does not prevent them from gaining influence among the oppressed castes. We can also observe the emergence of a variety of forces, which demand more power to the state or separate statehood, alongside the existing armed national liberation struggles. Not to speak of the Sikh and Islamic nationalism.

The revolutionary and democratic forces who are steadfast in their struggle against Hindu communalism, do not clearly demarcate their ideology and organization – viz. Brahminism combined with, fascism with the result, the offensive looses its sharpness, gets scattered and misses the target.

Hence the ideology – Brahminism or the so called Hindu religion – on the basis of which the Hindu communal fascists justify their oppression in the spheres of caste, nationality, language and gender, should be challenged. Likewise, when Brahminism attempts to revive and present itself as an alternative to the prevailing crisis, it does not remain to be an obsolete ideology justifying Varna dharma, but turns into a fascist ideology, wielded by a fascist clique. The significance of the struggle against Brahminism increases further, as it is a struggle against fascism in today's context.

HINDUISM – NOT A RELIGION

Hinduism is not a religion; it is an ideology that upholds the institution of socio – economic oppression. The reasons for the emergence of various religions of the world and the social purposes they attempted to serve have no relevance whatsoever with that of Hinduism.

To quote Marx,

"Religion distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world, just as it is a spirit of spiritler situation. It is the opium of the people."

Applying Marxism, we can look into the historical and social conditions which gave birth to the emergence of the three great religions of the world.

Christianity was born out of the distress of the slaves and their craving for liberation- it attempted to 'liberate' the slaves; it symbolised the freedom of the slaves.

The emergence of slave kingdoms leading to the violent crushing of primitive communes, the resultant yearing of its people for the 'commune democracy' and the compassion of Buddha for the oppressed castes and his concern to relieve them out of their distress gave birth to Buddhism. In other words, it rose against brahminical tyranny and deception.

Islam emerged as a unifying force amongst various warring tribes, and it promised equal treatment to all those who believed in monotheism (Allah) and recognized Mohammed as the last Prophet.

Thus, all the three major religious were born in the interest of the oppressed. Later, they got turned into instruments (of oppression) in the hands of the ruling classes.

But it was only the 'Hindu religion' that was created as an instrument of oppression in the hands of exploiting classes. Its principles as well as methods continue to be racism, tyranny, exploitation and deceit. Varna and casteism, which fortify endogamy, are its basis, and Brahminism is its ideology.

Hinduism not only denies the right to property and education etc. to the majority of the population, it denies them the basic religious right – the right to worship. Unlike other religions it exclude the majority of the population (belonging to lower varnas, castes and also women) from the basic aim of any religion – i.e., 'Salvation'.

The essence and soul of Hinduism is the caste system; what are the remaining basic religious aspects, if caste is done away with? Hundreds of mutually hostile gods, thousands forms of worship and dozens of philosophies. It does not posses a common principle on any of the basic issue that matters to any other religion – like theistic philosophy, forms of worship and moral principles – except of course, the chatur varna system. (But this 'diversity' is cunningly used today, by the Brahminic scholars as a proof to their democratic credentials.)

Religion is normally considered as part of superstructure. It is always claimed by the Hindu religious feaders that Hinduism is not a mere religion, but a 'way of life'. Islam has also codified the ways of life. But Hinduism basically codifies the social system. It lays down well defined laws on the organization and functioning of the social, economic, political and cultural relations of the Varna – caste system. That is, it decides production as well as other relations. So, Hinduism is part of both superstructure and the base.

Ambedkar was right when he said that "…it (Hinduism) has not got the impulse to serve and that is because by its nature it is unhuman and unmoral. It is a misnomer to call it religion. Its philosophy is opposed to the very thing for which a religion stands."

-Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar writings and speeches. Vol.3.p.92.

Periyar EVR emphasized the same, pointing out the malevolent and immoral character of the Brahminic gods, saints and their preachings including Manusmriti.

HINDUISM – A HISTORIC FRAUD

Historically there existed no religion called Hinduism and this fact does not require any new proof neither it represented the whole of society or a majority of it. It was only called as the 'Sanatan dharma' by its creators and defenders i.e., the Brahmins. Hinduism means nothing but Brahmanism and it was defined so only by Brahmins – not by us. They have never used the term 'Hindu' in any of their scriptures.

In fact, the twice born (Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaisya) did not have any dispute over the doctrines of Varna and karma, but, they were divided among themselves into six religions like saivism and vaishnavism; When the Brahminic authority floundered with the rise of Buddhism, Aajeevakam and Jainism, various Brahmin sanatanists tried to redefine the philosophical basis of varna and caste, in order to defend it. Sankara was one of them, who were instrumental in achieving some sort of unity amongst those six religions, defeating enemies through deceit and oppression.

The 'Hinduism' of the Vedic age was different from the one of the Upanishadic period; likewise, the 'Hinduism' of Bhagavat Gita varies much from that of the upanishadic period; Shankara's 'Hinduism' is different from the present day 'Hinduism'. Idol worship' Temple worship and the doctrine against cow-slaughter were appropriated and developed by Brahminism in its struggle against Buddhism.

Brahminic Hinduism has always adapted itself to the political and economic realities and to defend itself from the onslaught of other religions.

It has adapted without much fuss, even conceded to upgrade the status of certain individuals and groups in the Varna hierarchy.

But it would not budge an inch in the matters of defending Varna dharma as a system and its own supremacy in the Pyramid. The attitude of Brahminism towards religious conversions is also worth mentioning here. While opposing conversions, in order to retain the oppressed castes in their fold , they argue that varna and caste s division did not exist in Vedic or Upanishadic age .Thus they absolve themselves of the crime , but shamelessly continue to enforce caste in all religious matters .

The Shankaracharya of Kanchi was quite frank when he thanked the British for introducing the 'Legal Hindu Religion' and saving the Sanatanists from the danger of becoming minority 'in the own land'

"Had they [ the British ] not given us the name " Hindu " we could have divided ourselves into various religion – like Saivites, Vaishnavites, Sakthas, Muruga Bhakts and as devotees of Ellai Amma – in every town . Is there a common God for Saivites and Vaishnavites? No, Siva is not the God of Vaishnavites; the militant Saivites say that Vishnu is not a God at all, but only a devotee of Lord Shiva. Can anyone consider these two as belonging to a single religion? The British gave a common name – HINDU, and we are saved. The name that they christened saved us."

– Sri Chandrasekarendra Saraswathi, Kanchi Paramacharya, Voice of God Volume 1, Page: 266. [Tamil Edn]

Hence, recognising Hinduism as a religion amounts to subscribing to a historic falsity and it also amounts to appeasing the Hindu Fascists.

IT IS NOT MERELY THE CHATUR VARNA

The essence of Brahminic Hindu religion is not only the Chatur Varna and caste system. It also includes Aryan Racism and oppression of various nationalities and languages.

Social estates based on simple occupational divisions have existed even in Europe, but they were not decided by birth, as in the case of Varna and caste system.

The Chatur Varna as an oppressive social system was formed after subjugating Dravidian and Kirata races placing them in the lower Varna , as slaves – otherwise called Dasas and Dasyues. The impelling ideology was racism found among the Rigvedic Aryans. Even after the Aryan-Dravidian-Kirata intermixture, this had not changed. It was a story of native tribes getting humiliated by the colonizers owing to their colour and birth.

The development of productive forces and emergence of slave and feudal societies led to the emergence of new castes. While the Aryans adapted the advanced culture and production techniques to other tribes, especially Dravidians, they tried to maintain their own identity and their own racial purity through Varna system. While the ideological basis for the emergence of Chatur Varna and the caste system was Aryan racism, the material basis was the absence of private ownership in land. In other words it was collective social slavery based on Asiatic form of ownership.

The 'Aryan pride' of the Brahmins does not end with the Vedic age. It transcends time and arouses sangh parivar to dream of an 'Akand Bharat'. Bharat has nothing to do with Sakunthala. It was the name of an Aryan tribe in the Saptha Sindhu. This particular tribe emerged victorious in its war against Dasyus and Kiratas (the native tribes), drove them out and the chieftain of the Bharatha tribe 'Sudhas' established his kingdom. The Rig Veda dwells at length about these wars and victories. Hence the official name of our country Bharath is discreetly chosen alternative word for "Aryavarta".

Of course it is true that wars and aggressions of one primitive ethnic tribe against the other and the eventual elimination or oppression of the defeated is not uncommon in the history of mankind. Likewise the intermixture of different ethnic tribes (in India, Aryan-Dravidian-Kirata) is also quite common throughout history.

But the uncommon and unique aspect of Indian history is that the Aryan racism and brutality against the native tribes and their subsequent enslavement were treated as a virtue and were accorded religious sanction. With Brahmins at the helm, the racial chauvinism continued over the centuries, the manifestations of which are to be seen in the puranas as Deva-Asura conflicts.

The intermixture of ethnic tribes and the inclusion of 'black' gods (only to uphold Brahminism) in the "Hindu" pantheon, will not absolve Brahminism of its racial chauvinism. The victories of the Devas over Asuras were celebrated. They were-and are still- depicted as the victory of good over evil.

Brahmins have never recognised or respected the mother tongue of various nationalities and tribes. Their 'own' language was Sanskrit, the language of gods (Deva Basha). They have even fought and won a legal battle with the erstwhile DMK government to guard the status of Sanskrit as Deva Basha. They maintain a separate cultural identity, the important ingredient of which is 'Aryan-Dvija-Sanskrit' pride, which cuts across all national 'barriers'. Sanskrit served as the 'national' language in their attempts to establish and safeguard the Brahminical order. All other nations, people and the languages were condemned as mlecha, untouchables and impure.

The racist and puritans approach of Brahminism alone was responsible for propounding the system of untouchability (Avarna), which is the oldest, worst and the most horrible discrimination of man comparable only to apartheid. It denies all basic human rights to nearly one third of the entire society and it is a shame on the society. But for a few fanatics, even hardcore Hindu religious leaders could not defend it and try to acquit 'Hinduism' from the responsibility of its creation. But all Hindu fascists and communalists in their heart of hearts do not conceal their desire to safeguard it along with Varna and caste system. The religious rights of the Sanatanists to practice untouchability are also protected by the constitution. So whoever wants to fight caste and untouchability, should also direct his attack against Brahminic Hindu religion.

HINDU – HINDI – INDIA

While referring to the partition, the emergence of Muslim nationalism and the Non-Brahmin movement of South India, the congress easily finds a scapegoat in British Imperialism and escapes from its responsibility by simply branding them as 'agents'. Again the CPI and CPM faithfully follow this line. No body denies the fact that the imperialists played a 'Divide and Rule' tactics to frustrate the freedom movement. But the seeds of divisions were already present, and they were sown by the Brahminic Hindu nationalists.

The basic claim of Hindu nationalists had been 'Akand Bharat'. When it spoke about restoring 'our glorious ancient tradition' it was referring to the Vedic age with a Brahminic and Aryan pride. The ideological and emotional involvement towards 'Akand Bharat' existed only among the Brahmins. (None of the kings who rules even very large tracts of the present day India had such a 'vision'). In other words they infused an ideological and emotional content (patriotism based on Hindu nationalism) to the geographical area that was brought under the British sword. Brahminic culture did not- and does not- identify itself with any particular nationality. It always claims and upholds the Brahminical divine life of Rishis and Saints of Gangetic and Himalayan region which again reveals its 'Racial pride'.

When the European intellectuals started showing interest in the Sanskrit literature, it resulted in stirring up the Aryan pride amongst the Brahmins. Modern education, bureaucratic assignments and involvement in political movements gave rise to their dream of Akand Bharat.

The Gujarati, Marwari and Bania traders and usurers were a strong ally of Brahmins in advocating the concept of Akand Bharat, as their class interest perfectly syncronising with it. They have moved out of their own land and were settled in various parts of the country even before the entry of British East India Company. If Brahmins already possessed a unique cultural identity, the Banias and Marwaris did not hesitate to their ethnic identity and coalesce with the Brahminic Hindu culture, in their own class interest. They even renounced their own languages in favour of Hindi.

When the comprador bourgeoisie emerged from among this section of traders and usurers, they supported the congress and Hindu Maha Sabha. Atleast they were sure that the Hindu Rashtra of Hindu Maha Sabha, Ram Rajya of Gandhi and the term 'ancient Indian civilisation' used by Nehru meant the same i.e., Brahminic Hindu nationalism.

Brahminic nationalism satisfied craves of the comprador bourgeoisie for an all India market. In other words, the Brahminic nationalism received new class content. Thus the Indian (Brahminic) nationalism was against the rights of nationalities, right from its birth.

True to its tradition of recognising the vanquisher as Kshatriya, on the assurance for the perpetuation of caste system, Brahmin nationalists struck a deal with the imperialists. The historic characteristics of Brahminism and class interest of the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal lords perfectly mixed together in the new social context.

The coalition continues. While Brahmins dominate the political and cultural life of the country, Marwaris and Banias dominate the economic and commercial life of it. They have together formed a united front to exploit and oppress the rest of the people. The Gujarati, Marwari and Bania traders and compradors are the chief patrons of BJP throughout India. The NRIs among this section play a vital role in filling up the coffers of RSS today.

The concept of 'one nation-one people' stands for a strong centre i.e., total suppression of rights of the nationalities: Akand Bharat reflects the expansionist desire of the Indian ruling class.

The dream of 'Akand Bharat' is kept alive in the 'National Anthem' with its reference to Sindh province. The constitution on its part confers sanction also to the areas to be annexed in future by the Indian union.

HINDI –A PROXY TO SANSKRIT

The questions of nationalities as well as the languages were never solved democratically in India. The ruling classes repeatedly try to impose Hindi and oppose the struggle for national self-determination. The relationship of Brahminic Hindu nationalism with the Hindi is organic and integral, hence irrefutable. Hindi nationalism or 'Nationalist Hindi' encroaches in to the rights of other nationalities and suppresses them; at the same time it denigrates the people of the oppressed castes and classes belonging to the 'Hindi belt'.

It was not without reason that the 'Brahminic nationalists' chose Hindi as the official language instead of Sanskrit, their darling. Sanskrit was a dead language and the chance of its immediate resurrection was also very remote. The inevitable choice was Hindustani- much closer to Sanskrit then any other Indian language.

But it had to be cleansed of the Persian and Arabic words for obvious reasons. The Brahminical contempt for the people's languages was not reserved only to the non-Hindi speaking people. Words belonging to Mahati, Maithili, Rajasthani, Brijbasha, Chattisghari and Bhojpuri (people's languages which were very much alive and which also belonged to the Hindustani family) were also systematically removed in the cleansing process, to be substituted with the Sanskrit words. Thus Hindi was duly sanitised (Sanskritised) before it was allowed to enter in to the portals of higher education.

Article-151 of the constitution while envisaging the future development of Hindi lay down in clear terms that, attempts to improve Hindi should primarily depend upon Sanskrit. Golwalkar was candid when he said that, only Sanskrit was competent to be the national language of India, while Hindi was only an interim arrangement. On its part congress went to the extent of even opposing the formation of linguistic states.

Both political and religious leaders repeatedly emphasis that Hindi particularly Sanskrit alone can serve as the uniting force of the country and urge the people to study Sanskrit. Large amount of government money is spent to promote Hindi education and Sanskrit research. They insist that our country's best traditions and values should be drawn from the Vedas, Upanishads and Puranas – hence the study of Sanskrit should be encouraged. Thus the Hindu communal (Brahminic) bias in favour of Hindi is borne out by historical facts. Hence it would be absurd, if we are to be accused of giving communal colour to a people's language i.e., Hindi.

Of course, the above facts do not attribute any communal motive to Hindi speaking people. Still we cannot gloss over the following questions:

What induced the Punjabi Hindus to register their mother tongue as Hindi in the census records?
Can we say that the anti-Urdu sentiments in UP does not have communal undertone?
Should the people of the non-Hindi nationalities unconditionally believe in the democratic credentials of the 'Hindi' proletariat, in spite of the fact that no voice of protest worth mentioning has ever been raised from the 'Hindi belt' against the imposition of Hindi on others?

The answers to these questions are understandable. The ruling class has considerably succeeded in influencing the people of the 'Hindi belt' with its 'Hindu-Hindi nationalism'. Further the fact that the Brahminical – Hindu nationalists could go ahead with their plan of 'Sanskritisation of Hindi' without any protest is also much distressing. Of course there was a lone voice of protest. Rahul Sankruthyayan proposed the formation of three different linguistic states for the people speaking Panchali, Kauthali and Kauravi; but the CPI termed his proposal as backward and feudal. It went ahead and supported the ruling class attempt to create a 'Hindi heartland'.

The source of the concept of Hindi- Hindu – Hindustan is Brahminic Hinduism. Its genesis explains the truth. Its roots can never be amputated unless the contempt inherent in the 'Brahminic Hindu religion' towards any national identity is exposed.

A VOICE OF PROTEST BEFORE 1947

The concept that "the tradition of Indian nationalism, cherished by the people of our country through the ages and enriched by their struggle against imperialism" is basically wrong. There was only a multiplicity of Indian culture and traditions of various nationalities. Questions are raised as to how one could determine the essence of the 'nationalistic spirit' of Bhagat singh and other such revolutionaries. Their understanding of India as a 'nation' was limited to the geographical boundary enslaved by the British – i.e., British India. In other words, the content of their 'Indian nationalism' was only an anti-thesis of British colonialism.

But even before 1947, voices of protest against Brahmin nationalism were raised from Tamilnadu, which has a centuries old tradition of fighting against Brahminism and Sanskrit. Though not placed in an integrated form, it was forcefully put forth by Periyar EVR. After a long drawn struggle inside the congress, he resigned from it to continue his struggle against Brahminism and Brahmin nationalism from outside. Though he was stubborn in fighting against Brahminism, his struggles were not targeted against feudalism and its political power or imperialism. He chose to compromise with them.

The Non-Brahmin movement of south India, especially Tamilnadu was a reaction to the Brahminic domination in British bureaucracy and various other factors. Its anti-Brahminism ended at the point of sharing the power and it was also pro-imperialist and reformist. But all these facts will not justify Brahmin nationalism and its undemocratic and comprador characteristics.

THE ALTERNATIVE TRADITION

We recognise the right to self-determination of every nationality including the right to secede; that does not mean that we stand for the secession of every nationality; on our part we only strive to unite the proletariat of all the nationalities against the common enemy.

But while rejecting Brahminic nationalism as fake and undemocratic, we are left with the question of finding our own tradition.

Since Brahminic nationalism and Brahminic Hinduism is an amalgam of Chatur Varna. We should inherit the best traditions of the struggles against all these oppressions-Casteism, Aryan racism and linguistic and national oppression.

Various schools of philosophies-materialist, anti-Brahmin and atheist, from charvaka to Buddha and siddhas of Tamilnadu- who valiantly fought against the Brahminic and Vedic authority.
The struggles of the native tribes against Aryan racism and Brahminic deceit; in other words the struggle of Asuras against Suras (Devas).
Victims of Brahminic tyranny like Ekalavya, Sambuka and Nandha and the reformers who challenged the Brahminic Hindu religion.
Struggles for democratic right of various nationalities, including the struggle against imposition of Hindi and Sanskrit.
All anti-feudal, anti-imperialist struggles and

The struggles of the international proletariat, oppressed nations and the struggles against racism and apartheid.

We should inherit the best of all these traditions and wield them as a weapon in our struggle for a new democratic India.

As mentioned earlier, Asuras are not mere mythological entities, but the native tribes of our country who relentlessly fought against the Brahminic authority. In other words, they were the 'terrorists' and 'extremists' of those times, hated and feared by the Brahminic authority. They can appropriately be treated as a symbol in our struggle against Brahminism.

It will be apt to recall the attempts of Periyar EVR (of course with its own shortcomings) in this regard. His movement turned the permanent villains of the puranas, in to heroes and staged plays like "Hiranya Kasipu- the incomparable hero" and "Ravanakavya" against Ramayana. The "Ravana Leela" against Ram Leela was also held on these lines.

We should unearth and bring to light all our traditions hitherto unknown or misinterpreted by the ruling classes, propagate them and create an alternative historic consciousness which will naturally inspire the people in their struggle against Brahminism.

ATTACK HINDUISM THAT SANCTIFIES CASTE OPPRESSION

Caste should not be seen as a mere obstacle blocking class unity. It is a separate socio-economic oppressive system existing in the base. Class struggle and caste struggle are not to be fought side by side or alongside. Caste struggle is part of class struggle. Sometimes the caste aspect takes the primary form, while the class aspect becomes primary in certain other situations. Hence both the prepositions of 'class struggle a pre-condition to class struggle' and 'giving up of caste struggle in the interest of class struggle' are wrong. Both the class and caste struggles should be carried out simultaneously, so that one compliments the other and helps the development of the revolutionary movement.

Struggle against caste oppression or untouchability are not to be treated as mere local issues to be settled with a particular land lord or a community. Its scope should be extended to fight Brahminic Hindu religion that sanctifies caste system. Only the "class unity" achieved on these lines will help removing the 'caste consciousness' among the people and effect the fall of Brahminic Hindu religion.

HINDUISM IN ITSELF IS COMMUNAL

In the struggle against Hindu communalism the focus is mainly made opposing the anti-muslim propaganda. Historic distortions and communalization – of secular issues by the sangh parivar and the class interest behind its politics should definitely be exposed.

But due importance should be given to wipe out the social base it has created among the oppressed castes in the name of 'Hindu unity". A mere reference to the upper caste nature of its leadership is not enough. The fact 'communal' towards to its 'own' members should be highlighted.

HURTING RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS OR UPHOLDING SELF-RESPECT

Fears are repeatedly expressed that attack against Hinduism would result in the religious sentiments of the common people. We should clarify ourselves. There has never been a common religious consciousness among Hindus. It is divided on caste lines. In other words even the gods are divided on caste lines and this is the only religion where the gods have repeatedly punished or killed their own devotees for the crime of violating Varna dharma. But now Sangh Parivar is attempting to create a 'common hindu identity' and a 'common religious consciousness' by focusing the same gods who stood to defend Varna dharma.

As stated earlier, the gods of the scheduled castes and oppressed castes are quiet different from that of the Brahminic Hindu gods; the forms of worship and rituals also vary. Likewise, the nature of the religious consciousness amongst the oppressed castes is by and large proto-materialist and tribal.

This does not mean that we are closing our eyes to the fact that over a period of time – owing to various historical reasons-some of the oppressed castes have been deceived in to accepting the Brahminic gods like Ram, Krishna, Shiva etc., this only increases our responsibility to expose the misdeeds of such 'gods' amongst the oppressed castes or else they may fall prey to the ploy of Sangh Parivar, which uses these 'gods' as common symbols of Hindu resurgence.

As for the people born in upper castes – but not castiest – who may have a general religious sentiment towards such Brahminic gods then we have no other way but to convince them of the Varna caste chauvinism of their gods and religion.

Further our propaganda against Brahminic Hinduism is not atheistic in nature. We are only putting bare before the people, the history of Brahminic Hinduism which has hurt the self-respect of the oppressed castes. So the question of hurting the religious sentiments and the fear of getting isolated from the people, are totally unfounded; especially when such campaigns go hand in hand with the class struggle. The experiences of Dr.Ambedkar and Periyar EVR in this respect are only positive not to mention of our own experiences in 'burning Ram', 'entry in to the sanctum sanctorum of Srirangam temple' and the 'Tamil people music festival'.

HINDU COMMUNALISM OR BRAHMINIC HINDU COMMUNALISM

By referring to Hinduism as Brahminic Hinduism and Hindu communalism does it infer that we are excluding the non-Brahmin upper castes belonging to the upper varnas? No, the terms are only meant to expose the essence of Hinduism i.e., Brahminical caste hierarchy. As explained earlier it is not a new terminology, but the one used by the Brahmins themselves earlier in history. While all upper castes perpetuate caste oppression it was the Brahmins who formulated, upheld and sanctified the ideology that justifies this oppression. In other words, Brahminism plays the role of giving the ideological leadership to the Varna-caste system. It is analogous to our usage of proletarian leadership or proletarian ideology.

Further, can we justify the usage of the term 'hindu', which practically results in the inclusion of the Dalits and the oppressed castes who are in no way responsible for whipping up the communal frenzy and who are always at the receiving and of the caste oppression?

HINDU LAW AND UNTOUCHABILITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

While insisting upon a uniform civil code, the sangh parivar poses itself to be secular and democratic. It does not open its mouth about the discrimination prevalent in the Hindu law and the constitution.

The Hindu law accepts Manu Smriti and certain other Brahminic Dharma Sastras as its basis. Laws relating to marriage, renunciation (sanyas) and adoption are based on these Dharma Sastras.

While untouchability in social life is legally treated as a crime, it is justified as a religious right of the Brahmins in matters of Hindu religion. When this matter came before the Supreme Court it has upheld this 'religious right'. In a judgement relating to Ayodhya, the Supreme Court has endorsed Ram as a constitutional entity. On our part we must expose and struggle against the Hindu law and the constitutional provision which recognises untouchability as a Hindu religious right.

CONCLUSION

Hence all the struggles against Hindu communalism should be sharpened as struggles against Brahminism and Fascism.

http://superhindus.wordpress.com/hindutva-nothing-but-brahminic-sanathana-dharma/

Wednesday, August 5, 2009

Who is ruling; India? And how?

World's only unique system of oppression is making the slaves enjoy their slavery

During our transition from marxism to Ambedkarism in the 1980s we had written three important books —

Class-Caste Struggle: Emerging Third Force

(1980),

Who is Ruling India?

(1982) and

The Dilemma of Class & Caste in India

(1984). In the last one we had reproduced the whole text of

manuwadi

marxist leader E.M.S. Namboodiripad's scurrilous attack on us. Since then we had completely abandoned the Indian version of

manuwadi

marxism which the ruling Brahminical Social Order (BSO) used to convert itself into the country's ruling class.

Brahminism, the super fine ideology of the Indian ruling class (15%), has no permanent party but only permanent interests. The latest evidence is the way the BSO kicked out its own

Brahmana Jati Party

(BJP) and brought the country's more cunning original Brahminical party of Congress to power in the recent parliament election (DV Edit June 1, 2009: "

Mere 2% anti-Advani upper caste vote swing from BJP brought about spectacular Cong. victory

").

Fear of identifying the ruling class:

In this leader we are further clarifying our thoughts on the Indian ruling class and how we arrived at the conclusion that the Brahmins (3%) indeed are the rulers with the Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and the

shudra

landed castes in tow. Our almost 30 years of experience as the Editor of

Dalit Voice

has reinforced our thoughts and led us to this conclusion.

Ashok Rudra, called a marxist economist of the Vishwa Bharati University, Shantiniketan, in his booklet,

Intelligentsia as a Ruling Class

, more or less says the same thing — of course without identifying the ruling class.

Nobody has the courage to identify the ruling class for fear of facing threat to their very survival.

Brahmins very often question us how such a micro-minority population can be the rulers and point out the fact that the political class, often mistaken to be the country's real ruling class, has hardly any Brahmin. This is true. The Prime Minister or most of the state chief ministers are not Brahmins.

Political power is no power:

But political power is no power in India. Politicians are a puppet in the hands of the ruling class. The best example to prove this point is the mere 3% American Jews who do not hold any political power in USA. But it is the Jews as the king-makers who hold the real power in the US with the entire financial sector and media power in their pocket. This is also true in England, France and Germany, all Christian countries, which live under the mercy of Jews.

The Khatri Sikh Manmohan Singh may be today's Prime Minister but being a World Bank nominee he automatically becomes the darling of the Brahminical rulers. In fact he is a better Brahmin than the best.

The ruling class need not necessarily hold the political power but it still rules with its power to manipulate the "public opinion" which is the case in India.

In the case of US and Europe, the Jews hold the reins mainly because of their financial and media power.

The European ruling Christians had a long- lasting religious war with the Jews throughout history, but lately they simply surrendered to Jews. Even the Pope dare not go against the Jews. President Barack Obama is challenged by the entire Jewish diaspora, led by the Zionist Israel. Look how Iran was made to tremble just because it elected Ahmedinejad as the President, hated by the entire zionists. Such is the power of the micro-minority Jews.

Unparalleled example of India:

But in India the ruling Brahminical micro-minority of 3% enjoys such a powerful sway over the country, even to the extent of a total mind control over the entire masses of people because of its legendary religious power since thousands of years.

Brahminism is an ideology, considered religious and sacred, that declares that the Brahmins are the highest people by birth and birthright,

Bhoodevatas

(gods on earth), that the Vedas are the source of authority, and that the rites and rituals that make up the

Varnashrama Dharma

are sacred and must be followed.

In Christian US and Europe, the Jews do not have such a religious control on the country and its peoples but in India Brahminical people being the custodians of their artificially manufactured Hindu religion, enjoy the highest ritual status, becoming the virtual

Bhoodevatas

, gods on earth — a status which no section of the population enjoys in any part of the world except India.

Shudras & BCs as oppressors:

That is how the Brahminical people constitute the Intelligentsia because they control not only the country's principal religion (Hindu) but also all its gods, scriptures — and finally the very value system.

Dr. Ambedkar has said all these things long, long back and hence there is no point in repeating the argument that the Brahminical people constitute the ruling class of India.

A powerful section within the Dalit community, however, has been arguing that it is not the Brahmins who are kicking, killing, burning, raping and destroying the little property of the Dalits in the rural side but the landed

shudra

and Backward Castes. They cite the example of the Khairlanji massacre of Dalits in Maharashtra and ever so many places. There is good lot of truth in this argument. Brahminical journalists have invested a lot in making the Dalits believe this argument.

It is a fact that all over India it is the

shudra

, the BC or OBCs who are culprits in anti-Dalit pogrom. We know it. But what is important is not the

action

of looting and killing the Dalits. But the

thought

, the inspiration behind the

action

Caste hatred is the real villain:

As the mosquito bites you, one hand instantly acts to slap the mosquito and kills it or drive it away. Who gave the order to the hand to attack the mosquito? It is the brain. The order to attack the mosquito came from the brain. Therefore, the brain that orders the attack is more important than the hand which simply obeyed the order.

Some urchins throw a stone at a running dog. But even such a brainless animal does not chase the stone or growl at the stone. It gets angry and chases the fellow who threw the stone. Even the dog has that much of brain to identify the culprit.

Here the culprit is not the stone but the boy who threw the stone. Who gave the poisonous thought to the

shudras

and OBCs to kick or kill the Dalit? The

Bhoodevata

philosophy.

In all anti-Dalit atrocities the crime is committed by the

shudra

or BCs. There is no dispute on this. But the culprit behind the curtain is the Brahminical thought of caste hatred daily injected into the veins of the

shudras

and BCs who consider themselves superior.

Culprits behind anti-Muslim riots:

This is also true in the case of all anti-Muslim riots. In the Babri Masjid demolition, the Dalits played a major role. In the Gujarat Genocide (2002), Dalits led the anti-Muslim violence. We know it. But it is the Brahminical thought that made the innocent Dalits to attack and kill Muslims against whom Dalits have no grouse as both are blood brothers.

Marathas hate Brahmins:

In Maharashtra, the Marathas (Shiv Dharma) are furious with Brahmins and have launched a powerful campaign against Brahmins. But in Khairlanji the same Marathas and their cousins Kunbis and other OBCs killed the Dalits.

The Marathas and Kunbis hate Brahmins for riding them and yet they also hate the Dalits who are the worst victims of Brahminism. Who is managing this two-way action of the Marathas and Kunbis? The Brahminical hand behind the curtain.

This is the case in all anti-Dalit and anti-Muslim war and violence where the principal villain is the Brahmin whose value system has brainwashed the

shudras

and BCs to hate the Dalits and Muslims.

The violence against Dalits on one side and Muslims on the other keep the society permanently divided. Brahminism thrives through divide and rule.

Because Brahminism has its monopoly media it can manufacture any spurious argument and sell it as supreme truth. Besides, anybody selling this spurious product is given award and reward plus publicity in the mass media which is the sole Brahminical monopoly. Anything that comes in the media is considered supreme truth. Because, a belief system has been so systematically developed and nurtured that we are made to believe anything the

manuwadi

media says.

Belief system:

And that is how a section of the gullible Dalits are "convinced" that Brahmins are good but the

shudras

and BCs are the criminals.

The solution to this anti-Dalit caste atrocities and also anti-Muslim riots is not merely punishing the

shudras

and BCs. Yes this is also a must. But the more important and ever lasting solution is the destruction of the very caste system (Hinduism) for which the

Bhoodevatas

are not ready. They want merely the anti-Dalit war and violence must end by punishing the

shudras

and BCs but keeping in tact the Brahminical Social Order which is the cause of action.

Quite a number of

Bhoodevatas

have criticised us for calling the Brahminical people as the country's ruling class. Their defence is there are hardly any Brahmin in the Union Cabinet or the state cabinet. They say the power to rule has percolated from the Brahmins downwards to the landed

shudras

and Backward Castes. Yes. They are right.

It is the thought that rules — not the person:

Those who pinpoint this are depending upon a concept of "ruling class" which has the power to confuse those who are willing to be confused.

A ruling class need not necessarily rule —at least not directly. The process and the power of ruling a society comes from a thought. It is the thought that rules — not the person who sits on the chair.

Whoever that sits in the chair is guided by this very same

thought,

propounded and promulgated by the Brahmin.

Whether it is the legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, the defence forces — they all constitute the sate. The people who function at the different levels of the above limbs of the state may not necessarily be the Brahmin but they are all guided by the supreme Brahminical

thought

Who can become the temple priest:

That is how even to this day the state continues to uphold the principle that a born Brahmin alone must be the temple

archaka

(priest). The

archaka

post may be the lowest and the least paid. Yes. The position and pecuniary benefit is not that matters. There are any number of people ready to hold this post for a lesser salary.

The Supreme Court itself decided that a born Brahmin alone can be the temple

archaka

and none else. Such a decision is being blindly obeyed because it implies that the person of Brahmin alone is holy, sacred and divine.

The

tirtha

(sacred water) can come only from the

shankha

(conch). What comes out from other things is just water —not

tirtha

Ruling class need not rule:

The rural kulaks and industrial tycoons do constitute a part of the ruling class. But it is subordinate to the Brahmin because his person alone is holy, sacred and divine.

In other words the ruling class cannot be defined by the act of ruling. It is the thought that rules. Not the person who holds the power. This was so throughout the Indian history. Even during the 800 to 1,000 years of Muslim rule it was the Brahmins who have been the Prime Ministers and the real rulers.

The ruling class need not necessarily rule but its

thought

serves the interests of that class as against the interests of the other non-ruling classes.

Dr. Ambedkar verdict:

In other words the govt. has to serve the interests of the ruling class. If it does not, that govt. will be removed.

How does the ruling class rule? How does the ruling class see that its interests are promoted and protected?

This question can be easily understood when it concerns the interests of Muslims (15%), Christians (2.5%), Sikhs (2.5%). And particularly the Dalits (20%) and Tribals (10%). Even the Backward Castes (35%). Almost 85% of the country's toiling masses have been complaining ever since "independence" of consistent and continuous discrimination, if not total neglect.

All of them have invariably pointed their accusing finger at the Brahminical rulers. Dr. Ambedkar was the most prominent among the leaders of this underclass which singled out the Brahminical class as the only cause of their plight and persecution.

That is how the Indian state has been openly hostile to the interests of the Dalits, tribals, OBCs, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. Over 85% of the population.

The state is hostile because the ruling class wants it to be so. The Brahminical interests will be served only if the state is against the interests of the

Bahujan Samaj

Media keeps out Dalits:

The composition of the country's media — print and electronic — will help us understand which is India's ruling class. A survey was made in the capital city of Delhi (DV Edit April 1, 2008: "

Media monopoly helps upper castes to rule India by suppressing truth

". & p. 5: "

Brahmins hold 49% top jobs in national media

") and the finding was that the capital's journalistic fraternity is totally Brahminical with hardly any representation from Dalits. There may be here and there some Muslims but they are chosen only after finding out their loyalty to the ruling class.

Ruling class is the Intelligentsia:

Ashok Rudra in his treatise refers to the Indian ruling class. He says the country's Intelligentsia is the ruling class and he defines this class as those "persons who earn their living by the sale of mental labour". This class does not include businessmen. He lists five categories of people:

(1) White collar employees, (2) employees in govt. services, (3) teachers, lawyers, judges (4) artists, journalists, writers), (5) professional politicians.

Mischief of middle class:

It is this five classes often described in the media as the "middle class" which is the euphemism used to hide the "ruling class".

Meira Kumar as pet dog:

Are there no members of the SC/ST/BC or Muslim/Christian/Sikh in this "middle class"? Yes there are. They will be admitted to this exclusive club of closed coterie only after testing their value system. Once they are found to toe the Brahminical line they will be not only admitted but paraded as a pet dog. Presently Meira Kumar, a Dalit, is on the parade. Farukh Abdullah was hailed as a secular Muslim.

The ruling class, therefore, need not be necessarily Brahminical. Underdogs ready to eat the Brahminical shit will be its honoured members. That is how an OBC oil crushing lowly

jati

fellow, Narendra Modi, is being projected as the future PM for his sterling quality of killing 2,500 Muslims in the "Gujarat Genocide – 2002".

In other words, the ruling class need not necessarily be Brahmin. Bum-lickers are most welcome to join this exclusive club as

chamchas

and

chaprasis

to carry out the job of disciplining the SC/ST/BCs and Muslim/Christian/Sikhs.

What is important is your ideology. Your value system. Not necessarily the caste. To that extent the caste rigidity is relaxed. But not the Brahminical ideology. The thought is not compromised. Underdogs who subscribe to this thought are admitted — of course closely watched.

A member of the Brahminical ruling class need not be rich. But he must have the ability to propagate the ruling class thought.

Why Paswan is loved:

What is important is the Brahminical

thought

and the one who upholds this thought need not be a Brahmin. Ram Vilas Paswan, an Untouchable, is the blue-eyed boy of the Brahmins because he is a volatile votary of the Brahminical thought.

Women's Bill:

Women's Reservation Bill is a good example to prove the power of the ruling Brahminical class which wants 1/3 seats in parliament to be reserved for women so that it can fill up parliament with their women.

But SC/ST/BCs and Muslims say that women's reservation is fine but their women must have the quota within the quota. In a democracy every section has the right to be represented. It is their democratic right but the rulers have denounced the opponents as anti-women and the media is painting them as women-haters. All those who depend on this

manuwadi

media is made to believe their version. Rulers believe what they want to believe and also make others believe. This is the power of the ruling class.

Education goes to dogs:

There is not a single media except the

Dalit Voice

which has denounced the proposed women's Bill as anti-woman.

Take the education field, which is the most important sector to shape the

thoughts

of the youths. It is here that we find a total domination of the Brahminical class. Its interest is in the higher education to prepare their kids for overseas jobs and

kushy

living. So much so the entire primary and elementary education has gone to dogs.

Dismissal from

Indian Express

Dangerous values are injected into the veins of the youth through textbooks which are prepared by the Brahminical writers. Education, journalism, TV, cinema, theatre, painting, culture etc. are all dominated by this class. These are the principal

thought

-manufacturing sectors which are closely guarded. We were dismissed from the

Indian Express

only because we challenged the Brahminical thought which none dare do.

Money corruption:

India today is considered one among the most corrupt countries in the world. Money corruption is not the only variety of corruptions. Rather, money corruption is the last of the four varieties of corruption: (1) Money corruption, (2) moral corruption, (3) caste corruption, (4) intellectual corruption.

The last, intellectual corruption, is the worst form of corruption and this field is the total monopoly of the Brahminical rulers.

Money corruption is the last and the least harmful varieties of corruption.

Since the rulers themselves are corrupt, every other section in the society has also become corrupt. And that is how the money corruption — the most visible form of corruption — has become so rampant. Supreme Court judges themselves are being mentioned by fellow judges. When the Hindu temples could be the fountain head of corruption every other form of corruption is effectively sealed and safeguarded.

In other words, it is the

thought

that has to be clean and sublime. It is the

thought

which manufactures and shapes an ideology. When the

thought

itself is corrupt and the media promotes; it, as a country India is simply sinking. (

India As a Failed State

, DSA-2004).

Corrupt fellows hailed:

The beauty of the Indian society is that it is not happy with an incorruptible person. He becomes an unfit and avoided, if not cursed. His own wife, parents and the family feels the fellow is useless. They say he is unhelpful. Only the corrupt is not only popular but very much liked by the society. Because he adjusts himself to any occasion and any person. That is how the corrupt; person, whether a minister, judge, bureaucrat or any official is extremely popular. It is the incorruptible, simple living person who is called useless and spurned by the society.

Why the Indian society has come to lionise Khetan Parekh, Harshad Mehta etc. because they corrupted the entire system and the Brahminical rulers carried them on their head as if they are our model.

Kerala CM hated:

Who can save such a society which praises and parades persons who are killers like Narendra Modi, Harshad Mehta. Achutanandan, the most popular CM of Kerala, a man of character, incorruptible, becomes the most hated person in the marxist party.

Brahminical thought not only grows out of corruption but breeds only corruption — particularly intellectual corruption which is the fountain head of all other three varieties of corruption.

That is how in the recent parliament election money power was so openly used to win and none bothered about it. Even MPs with criminal past are co-opted because they are all products of Brahminism.

That is how the our property, posts and wealth are all concentrated in the hands of a micro-minority 15% of the country's 1,200 million population.

Role of media:

All this socialist shibboleth,

Aam Admi

Andolan

are bullshit. Brahminical rulers are ruling us only with the help of their Brahminical media.

The communists are the essential part of this conspiracy to keep the country in the Brahminical hands.

Caste-wise census, income statistics are all prohibited because that would reveal which castes have prospered at whose cost.

Poverty yardstick:

The rulers have ruled that "economic yardstick" (poverty) should be the sole criterion for backwardness and not the time-tested "caste". Because if caste is taken as the yardstick, over 65% of the SC/ST/BCs and socially backward Muslims and Christians will come under the "Backward list" and if the funds are diverted to their welfare they will gain and challenge the Brahminical hegemony. Right from the Brahminical judiciary, media and the govt. all of them have fallen in line with this Brahminical

thought

Did we not say that it is the thought that rules and not the person in authority?

Half the people of India live below the poverty line. And they are entertained and made dumb and deaf by preaching them Hindu

thoughts

papa, punya, punar janma

(rebirth), fate — all dangerous thoughts which again make them pour their little savings into the coffers of the temples. The proverbial Indian poverty in fact enriches the rulers and helps them remain as rulers.

The manufacturers of Brahminical ideology (

thought

) are all flourishing because they help the rulers to keep the 2/3 of the country's havenots as slaves.

Cricket to entertain the masses:

They are entertained by the cricket fever which is yet another ruling class poison to keep the masses enthralled.

Education system is chaotic. India is shortly becoming the world's largest country of illiterates. Who cares?

How to keep the SC/ST/BCs and Muslim and Christian poor, powerless and enslaved is the sole guiding rule of the "intelligentsia" who are the country's ruling class. It is this ruling class which provides the leadership to the country.

Ruling class never identified:

This intelligentsia constitutes the Brahminical class — though no writer or speaker has the courage to

identify

and name this country's principal contradiction — except the

Dalit Voice

That is how we get a daily dosage of hate mails and even threats. For what? For

identifying

the enemy oppressor. The Brahminical advice to us is: "You go on writing all your muck without

identifying

the oppressor" so that the ruling Brahminical class goes on sucking the blood uninterrupted without being

identified

, without being named.

They have introduced several provisions in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to punish and finish those who identify the enemy.

Parashuram slaughters Kshatriyas:

The Kshatriyas, now called Thakurs, immediately "below" the Brahmin in the

Chaturvarna

order (the other name for the caste system), were literally slaughtered in thousands by the Brahmin killer god, Parasurama. The Chitpavan Brahmins, who produced Nathuram Godse, the killer of M.K. Gandhi, proudly displayed the huge cutout of their god at their recent

jati

conference at Pune.

Kshatriya surrender:

Kerala is called the

Parasurama Shristi

. The Brahmin-Kshatriya rivalry and hatred was so bitter and deep. But soon they surrendered to Brahmins and since then acted as the bodyguards of the

Bhoodevatas

. The Vaishya (Banias) has the third-ranking poverty-stricken

varna

. In Bihar, the Banias are classified under the Backward Castes. It is only M.K. Gandhi who lifted his

jatwalas

and made them moneybags on the condition they will forever remain loyal to the

Bhoodevatas

. Today, the Banias earn billions and feed the

Bhoodevatas

. Perfect understanding.

That is how the Brahmins co-opted the Kshatriyas and Vaishyas.

Shudras won over:

The

shudras,

forming the fourth

varna

of the Hindu

Chaturvarna,

have been blood enemies of the

Bhoodevatas

. The anti-Brahmin movement that waged during the British rule and immediately after the "independence" was led by the landed

shudra

castes like the Marathas, Jats, Reddis, Patels, Nairs, Vokkaligas, Mudaliars, Naidus etc. But soon they were also co-opted and that is how the mere 3%

Bhoodevatas

consolidated their position by enlarging their strength to 15% of the country's population and became the ruling class of India.

Goodbye to land reform:

The

shudras

are essentially the landed gentry. They were co-opted to the ruling class by not implementing the land reform. In the rural area land is power. The

shudra

power is allowed to reign supreme and thereby co-opted to the BSO.

This 15% ruling class has all the wealth, education, ritual status, beauty, caste superiority, personality, landed property. And that is how it became the country's ruling class — guided and supervised by the 3% Brahminical micro-minority intelligentsia — frustrating every socio-economic-cultural "reforms" launched since "independence".

Swiss Bank account-holders:

Of course there are exceptions to the rule. But please note it is the exception that proves the rule. Take the case of the people having secret accounts in the Swiss banks. Or the latest list of multi-billionaires published in the

Times of India

. Are there anybody from the SC/ST/BCs? Or even Muslim or Christian? There may be one or two but they are the exceptions that only prove the rule. The rule is the 15% Brahminical Social Order is the ruling class. Manmohan Singh or even his grand father will have no courage to touch the Swiss bank hidden money.

How the Kshatriyas and Vaishyas were co-opted? The

Bhoodevatas

used social, economic, political and even psychological weapons to annex them into their fold. Today all the three are together and united. Once the three most powerful

dwija varnas

came together, annexing the "unthinking"

shudras

was no problem.

Gods on earth:

That is how the Brahminical people became the unquestioned leaders — not only politically but also economically. What gave the solid strength to their leadership is their supreme ritual status as the

Bhoodevatas

, meaning the gods on earth.

Whether it is the Congress, BJP or even the communist parties the

Bhoodevatas

shall be the guiding spirit. Their unwritten law extends to every sphere — media, education, commerce and industry, judiciary — and even sports which in Hindu India means only cricket — the only "game" that suits the

idli sambar

grass-eaters.

Even if there is a revolution in India, it can be led only by a

Bhoodevata

. That is how E.M.S. Namboodiripad became the country's greatest marxist and finally presided over the death of marxism.

"Mahatma" shot dead:

Budha, Guru Ravidas, Mahatma Phule, Babasaheb Ambedkar, Sri Narayana Guru, Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy and many more worked to destroy this ruling class and its Hindu caste system. And in the process they only got destroyed. The Muslims realised the supreme truth belatedly and sought a separate homeland. The

Bhoodevatas

used the "Gandhi weapon" to fight the Muslims and as soon as the Mahatma succeeded he was shot dead by a Chitpavan Brahmin (

Why Godse Killed Gandhi?

, DSA-1997).

As this is written we are in total darkness. The country itself is sinking, surrounded by deadly enemies all around.

Even the thinking

Bhoodevatas

themselves are not getting sound sleep in the night. Anything and everything they touch is turning into charcoal.

We the oppressed over 85% are helpless. But here we have a unique country — the only one in the world — where the rulers themselves are deeply worried. Feeling insecure. Suspecting their own shadows.

The country is neither living nor dead. It is brain dead. Its name is "Hindu India".

http://ugghani.blogspot.com/2009/08/who-is-ruling-india-and-how.html

Antithesis of Caste and Class - An Orthodox Marxist Hypothesis

[From Liberation, April 1994.]

The Debate

India has been witness to a great social turmoil in recent years where the twin entities of caste and religion have played a major catalytic role. It all came to the fore after VP Singh-led Janata Dal government decided to implement the Mandal Commission recommendations on reservation of jobs to Other Backward Classes in 1990. Although Janata Dal came to power on a plank of anti-Congressism with a tacit support from BJP, the alliance soon ran into rough weather. And interestingly, the two became protagonists of two major socio-political movements in contemporary history of India. Pitted against each other, the movements were popularly known as Mandal and Mandir movements. Janata Dal, in the beginning, enjoyed a much larger support base in its crusade against corruption (Bofors). Its championing of Mandal to the exclusion of everything else, however, vastly eroded its support base and led to a whole chain of political crisis which eventually reduced it to a marginal force in Indian politics.

Mandal, if one were to believe the rhetoric of VP Singh and his cohorts, would usher in an unparalleled social revolution in India against the forces of statusquoism and obscurantism, the forces who were politically represented by Congress(I) and BJP.

In an ironic twist of history, Mandal recommendations were implemented by Congress(I) government taking, in the process, much wind out of the Janata Dal sails.

The crusader in VP Singh dies hard and now it is reduced to the ridiculous demand of a dalit President or a backward Prime Minister, irrespective of his/her ideological-political predilection. Then there is the gimmick of staying away from Delhi till a backward gets employment on the basis of reservation quota. The revolution thus has degenerated into cosmetic reforms and the movement into tokenism.

As regards reservation proper Janata Dal is now left with the options of opposing the creamy layer verdict and to pressurise for 10 per cent reservation quota for upper castes on economic criterion — a promise that V P Singh made to diffuse the anti-Mandal agitation. Neither of the options, however, can be pursued with any zeal for obvious reasons.

Political eclipse of Mr.VP Singh and his Janata Dal signalled the rise of Mulayam Singh and Kanshi Ram. Mulayam Singh claims himself to be the natural representative of backwards as compared to VP Singh, the outsider, and invoking Lohia he has couched his politics in a socialist phraseology with a greater force of inheritance and sincerity of purpose. Kanshi Ram, the rising star of dalit politics, on the other hand, invokes the legacy of Ambedkar. Armed with a radical dalit posture and anti-communist phobia he seems to be desperate to outsmart Ambedkar himself.

These dramatic events have exerted tremendous impact on Indian left and communist movement. While Mandal greatly eroded the communist base among backward peasantry in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, BSP virtually swept away the traditional dalit support of left parties in Uttar Pradesh. Under the circumstances a polemics has surfaced within the left and communist circles that calls for a new approach to the caste phenomenon in Indian society and, particularly in the backdrop of soviet debacle, to redefine the "orthodox" concept of class. Recent desertion of first-ranking leaders of CPI to Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, PWG Naxalites swelling the ranks of BSP in Andhra Pradesh and defection of some IPF MLAs to Janata Dal in Bihar bring out the gravity and the complexity of the situation.

Here I have before me a book titled Caste and Class Dynamics — Radical Ambedkarite Praxis written by one Dr. Thomas Matthew. The author makes interesting observations about the interrelations between caste and class. I shall try to unravel the puzzle of caste and class relationship in course of my critical analysis of the ideas presented in this book.

The author's avowed aim is to achieve a synthesis of Marxism and Ambedkarism, which according to the author is "the only hope of the teeming millions of India". He takes up this stupendous job in a situation when "Marxian practice, at least the major versions, ended up in historic debacles at the world level" but "Ambedkarite praxis seems to move past its teething troubles in India". Still the synthesis is explained as "absorbing Ambedkarism in the Marxian framework" and not the opposite as one would have normally suspected from the above-mentioned contextual reference. The author's Marxist antecedents are revealed in his acknowledgement of gratitude to Mr.K. Venu "without whose pioneering leadership in attacking Marxist fundamentalism and the concept of 'revolutionary authority' of leadership, it would not have been possible for me to question many Marxist dogmas". More of it later.

Ambedkar Re-examined

To proceed. The first part of the book deals with Ambedkar's struggle against Gandhi and Gandhism. This struggle of great historical importance is narrated in Ambedkar's book Congress, Gandhi and the Untouchables, an old copy of whose original edition the author could manage from a Delhi library. This fact is important as the author claims that there have been attempts at modifying and diluting its contents in subsequent editions.

The author claims that Dr. Ambedkar's analysis and formulations on the ruling classes, Congress and Gandhism were quite different from the official Ambedkarite perceptions. Moreover, "his evaluation about the western parliamentary system and approving references to the Paris Commune and the soviet system exploded all theories that Ambedkar was anti-communist".

As it comes out, Gandhian approach was basically to undertake some reforms within Hinduism through what is called "constructive work" to secure the support of untouchables behind the savarna leadership of Congress in the freedom struggle. Ambedkar, on the other hand, strove for a radical restructuring of Hinduism to do away with caste system itself and to provide a political platform to the rising dalit aspirations. These two contradictory approaches of Gandhi and Ambedkar defined their relationship with each other, with other communities like Muslims and with the British Government.

Commenting on Gandhi's economic philosophy Ambedkar wrote, "there was nothing new in the Gandhian analysis of economic ills as attributable to machinery and the civilisation built upon it. These were old and worn out arguments, a repetition of Rousseau, Pushkin and Tolstoy. His economics was hopelessly fallacious because the evils produced by the mechanised production system and civilisation are not due to machinery as such... They are due to the wrong social organisation which has made private property and pursuit of personal gain a matter of absolute sanctity... The remedy therefore is not to condemn machinery and civilisation but to alter the organisation of society so that the benefits will not be usurped by the few but accrue to all."

In his conflict with Gandhi, Ambedkar undoubtedly emerges as the foremost exponent of a radical socio-economic programme in the freedom struggle.

From Harijans to dalits — there lies the whole course of transformation in the self-perception of untouchables and none but Ambedkar had been the moving spirit behind this transformation. He was perhaps the first dalit leader, who combined with a fair degree of success the social awakening of dalits with their political assertion.

Ambedkar's other major contribution was drafting the Constitution of independent India. He shared Nehru's vision of a modern India and in a certain sense exhibited a greater insight than Nehru. In contrast to Nehru's emphasis on discovery of India, he declared, "In believing that we are a nation we are chasing a great delusion. We can only attempt to become a nation-in the-making."

He opted for a constitutional state socialism, stood for a strong centre, and advocated an economic programme comprising nationalisation of land and its distribution among peasants for collective cultivation and nationalisation of key industries. He believed that such an economic programme backed by state welfare measures positively discriminated in favour of depressed classes will lead to the 'annihilation of caste', his ultimate goal.

His crusade for social liberation of dalits remained central to him and he parted company with Nehru when Nehru gave in to the conservative pressure on Hindu Code Bill! This further convinced Ambedkar that casteism was basic to Hinduism and dalits have no option but to break out of its fold.

And thus he embraced Buddhism which he interpreted in a modernistic sense hoping to herald a new socio-cultural awakening among dalits. In the realm of political action he envisaged the formation of the Republican Party as an independent democratic party of the oppressed classes.

Thus, Ambedkar's crusade reached its crescendo. Unfortunately for him only his community of Mahars joined him in conversion to Buddhism and after his death his political movement represented by the Republican Party of India got splintered and appropriated by the Congress.

In class terms Ambedkar represented the petty bourgeois stratum of dalits that included the small-medium peasantry. Their particular socio-economic conditions were the basic roots of Ambedkar's radicalism and also the source of his limitations. In given conditions he could only strive for a full-scale development of capitalism and a strong capitalist welfare state which shall be instrumental in breaking the age-old social immobility and inertia. His approving references to some aspects of communist practice and invoking socialist jargons only reveal his radical bourgeois democratic essence. This is not an indictment of Ambedkar. On the contrary, it places him high above many historical figures of his times who stood for a conservative path of capitalist development preserving the "Brahminical-Bania alliances" to use Ambedkar's own phrase.

Ambedkar's vacillations, compromises and ultimate recourse to a religious praxis too emanate from the same socio-economic conditions of his existence. The inherent limitations of a dalit petty bourgeois to chart out an alternative strategy of freedom movement forced him sometimes to enter into compromises with Gandhi and Congress and at other times to pin hopes on British. The alternative strategy could have been chalked out only by communists who represented the Indian urban and rural proletariat — a good majority of whom came from dalits. A close political alliance with radical bourgeois democrats of all hues must have been an inalienable part of the alternative strategy. Communist Party of India failed to undertake this responsibility. But that is another story.

Coming back to our author, he is found slipping into the quagmire of idealism while explaining the roots of Ambedkar's vacillations and compromises. Listen to him: "It was the sincerity of purpose, the human weakness and 'forget and forgive' characteristic of the dalits, the oppressed, as opposed to the cunning and calculating nature of the Brahminical classes" that made Ambedkar adjust with Congress over and over again.

The author laments that "Ambedkarism remained within the confines of bourgeois democratic consciousness" for 'it could not transcend the limit set by its peasant roots".

To transcend the limits which Ambedkar failed to do our distinguished author embarks on an adventurous theoretical journey. He starts with a queer analysis.

"Ambedkarism was not rooted in a class with total upward mobility permitting complete merger of the class or even individuals and small groups within the bourgeois system. It represented a peasant society in the process of partial proletarianisation and partial dispossession with an upper crust eagerness for upward mobility being frustrated. It was this phenomenon which destroyed all the efforts at alignment between the untouchables and the ruling bourgeoisie. This was why Dr. Ambedkar was repulsed from the ruling classes after each and every encounter with them. It provides the great potential of Ambedkarism to grow out of limits of bourgeois society."

Having thus established the potential, the author then takes at face value Ambedkar's certain approving references on Marx, Paris Commune and Soviet system. Combined with Ambedkar's denunciation of twin enemies of Brahminism and capitalism and his advocacy of "Socialist programme", all this is taken to symbolise Ambedkar's journey towards communism. Even conversion to Buddhism is interpreted as an answer to the problems raised by Marxism in general and by its concrete application in India in particular. His religio-political praxis becomes a precursor to the Cultural Revolution and democratic resurgence within Marxist ideology and movement. "In some sense Ambedkar's Buddhist resurrection presaged Mao's Cultural Revolution". This is how our author lays the foundation of synthesis of Marxism and Ambedkarism and in later chapters accomplishes this feat with a great finesse.

In Search of A Pan-Dalit Unity

The author finds to his dismay that "immediately after Ambedkar's exit the five-year plans were launched and 'socialism' was adopted by the Congress. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission was set up on reservation for the backward classes. Around the same time, Nehru's Government organised the 2500th of Mahaparinirvana of Buddha at Delhi... Cooperation with Soviet Union also increased." A strange explanation is added thereafter: "Indian ruling classes dispensed with Ambedkar after making up with Stalin."

While analysing the post-Ambedkar scenario, the author rightly observes the process of upward mobility of various backward communities.

"In Kerala a numerically strong shudra community has been upgraded as a savarna group, particularly because the Brahmin-Kayastha-Bania population is very insignificant. The Nair community, which was considered a pollutant by the 'gods', is almost the 'God on Earth' now... Another untouchable community, Ezhawas, has made much headway in socio-economic and political terms."

What is true for Kerala is also true for other parts of India in varying degrees. Land reforms and various other measures of socio-economic upliftment coupled with different varieties of anti-Brahminical mass movements led to this upward mobility of several major backward communities. In Hindi belt, the credit goes chiefly to the Lohiaite socialist movement.

Every major socio-political upheaval in society is invariably accompanied by broadbasing of the social composition of the ruling classes. Post-British India could not have persisted with the old social alliance of British rule and hence the upward mobility of certain backward communities and appropriation of its privileged members within the ruling classes was an inevitable process. Apart from sharpening backward-forward polarisation in certain states, the process brought in its wake growing class-caste differentiation among and within hitherto backward communities. A notable development was the accentuation of conflict between dalits who were mostly agrarian labourers and intermediate castes of well-to-do peasantry who benefited most from the policies of agrarian development.

The author, however, ascribes the whole phenomenon of assimillation certain dalit castes, groups and individuals within the ruling system to the "manipulative" skills of cunning Brahminical ruling classes. By dalit castes the author implies the whole spectrum of untouchables and shudracastes — in official parlance Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes — and engages himself in search of a theoretical praxis that encompasses a pan-dalit unity. He finds it in Bahujan Samaj Party.

"The republican movement foundered on the question of a united front. The party was conceived as a movement of the Deprived Classes to become the ruling class, the political aim of Dr. Ambedkar. But this would not have been possible without alliance with the political forces representing the oppressed sections. Dr. Ambedkar could not give this direction and the party also could not evolve the strategy. If at all they aligned with others it was with the Brahminical ruling class parties. The alternative strategy was to visualise the party framework itself as a coalition of all the oppressed and exploited classes and communities. This, the Bahujan Samaj Party has done. The BSP thus becomes a major theoretical advance in Ambedkarite praxis. The BSP vision is a broader platform covering the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, backward communities and the minorities. It is the most powerful theoretical answer to the Indian ruling class politics of divide and rule."

Well, how far BSP can build and sustain this pan-dalit unity of author's choice in the face of growing social differentiation is yet to be seen; but to present a pragmatic hotchpotch as a major theoretical advance over Ambedkar is the height of theoretical absurdity. By accusing Ambedkar of failing to give the direction of alliance with the political forces of oppressed sections and rather clinging with the Brahminical ruling class parties, the author is both guilty of ahistorical analysis of Ambedkar as well as distortion of facts.

The author who had just eulogised BSP with the "most powerful theoretical answer etc." in a perfect theoretical acrobatics immediately switches over to Janata Dal crediting it with the adoption of "same (BSP) platform" while putting forward "Mandal-Masjid plank". More so, the Janata offensive that came from above created much more furore than the Kanshi Ram crusade at grassroots. Moreover, "BSP's partisanism hardly had any friends outside the dalit fraternity (emphasis added). It was a spectacular political feat that the Janata leadership was made to adopt specific and definite social justice plank that represented the common interests of all the oppressed communities. It was the militant socialist tradition of the North Indian belt which spearheaded this ideological coup de grace."

Mandal Mania

Almost assuming the role of Janata Dal's spokesperson the author lists various achievements of Janata Dal's social justice plank. AwardingBharat Ratna to Ambedkar; organising his birth centenary celebrations; proportional plan allocation for rural areas, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; considerable relief to bonded labour, contract labour and agricultural workers; (proposed) relief for organised sector workers; (proposed) right to work as a fundamental right; major relief to peasants; (proposed) massive literacy programme, some breathing space to oppressed nationalities; determined offensive against communal forces on Babri Masjid issue, etc. Bihar Government of Janata Dal comes in for a particular praise because of its extending reservations to judiciary and implementing the principle of proportional allocation of plan funds to Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes. According to the author, "The Mandal agenda came on the heels of all these measures. The political slogans and the orientation became a real threat to the forces of status quo. "And hence the conspiracy by the ruling classes to dethrone and destroy the Janata Dal". Now the question whether the Mandal agenda came on the heels of aforesaid measures or at the cost of a radical socio-economic programme — particularly to sidetrack the promised right to work as fundamental right remains far from settled. Whether these political slogans and orientations were a real threat to the forces of status quo or a device to strike a balance in the power structure corresponding to the growing socio-economic and political clout of certain backward castes — this question too remains open to scrutiny. Adoption of Mandal recommendation by Congress Government only goes to substantiate the latter postulate. Janata Dal is only distinguished by its opposition to the creamy layer concept, exposing in the process its real essence.

Our author, however, regards Mandal as the central theme that polarised not only the Indian society but the communist movement as well.

"All these (Naxalite) movements rooted among dalits have supported Mandal reservation as a democratic measure whereas all the traditional communists rooted in the urban working class have opposed Mandal". "The traditional communist parties wavered and the CPI(M) leadership and even the Indian People's Front, a Naxalite organisation, veered round to the 'economic criterion' principle of the Congress and the BJP."

This is a clear case of twisting the facts to suit one's theoretical framework. CPI went whole hog with Janata Dal on Mandal issue and even went on record opposing the creamy layer verdict and the so-called economic criterion. CPI(M) never opposed Mandal recommendations and the economic criterion it talked of was in relation to stratification within backward communities and thus it welcomed the creamy layer verdict. Indian People's Front never veered round to the so-called economic criterion. On the contrary, it took VP Singh to task for his advocacy of 10 per cent reservation for economically backwards among upper castes. It firmly held that social and educational backwardness alone can be the criterion for reservation.

Our Party did welcome the creamy layer verdict because any measure that articulates class differentiation among powerful backward communities can only be supported by Marxists. We know that conditions had matured for the restructuring of power structure and VP Singh only played a catalytic role in that. Thus we refused to endorse Mandal as a harbinger of any social revolution and went on exposing the hypocrisy of Janata Dal, a bourgeois-landlord formation, and zealously guarded our Party's ideological-political and organisational independence.

Our Party stuck to its position despite a powerful backlash of backwardism, despite Janata Dal's concentrated onslaught against us in Bihar and despite the price we had to pay in the form of defection of some MLAs to Janata Dal. With the Mandal euphoria over our Party is back to the course of rapid advance in Bihar while CPI which had tied itself to Janata Dal's apron strings faces virtual decimation of its traditional mass base, the threat of disintegration and total loss of orientation.

The author is full of praise for PWG "which called for an Andhra Bandh to protest against the judiciary's highhandedness in the matter... and Janata Dal leaders addressed public meetings supported by the PWG on the Mandal issue." The other Naxalite group that received compliments from the author is of course MCC which is credited with leading the "dalit resistance against upper caste tyranny in Bihar". We also find the mention of Satyashodhak Communist Party which, with Marx-Phule-Ambedkar as its philosophical guide, supposedly offers "an ideological challenge to the parliamentary communist movement".

The author thus reaches the final stage of his project synthesis and there he seems to have lost all the balance. Look at this gem: "While dalit songs of revolt reverberated in the heavens, the fire and fury of the (Dalit) Panthers, Naxalites and Militants (Khalistanis and Kashmiris) got a theoretical outline. It was this emerging unity of theory and practice that Ram Vilas Paswan tried to capture through Dalit Sena and Ambedkar Centenary Celebrations."

From Ambedkar to Kanshi Ram to Ram Vilas Paswan! It's really a fantastic journey!

Caste-Class Antithesis

The author presents certain novel ideas about caste. "While Marx saw caste as the decisive impediment to India's power and progress, they (Indian Marxists) took caste as a matter of superstructure... Caste being a production relation does not belong to the superstructure, but to the socio-economic base. The biggest theoretical failure of Indian Marxists has been their refusal to recognise caste as part of the substructure of the society." Now, in Marxist discourse, one has definitely heard of an economic base over which all superstructure lies but never of a socio-economic base. The author himself seems perplexed over relating caste to the social as well as economic base. The dichotomy is explained in the following way:

"Here one has to distinguish between caste as an institution of permanent division of means of production and profession and caste as an attitude of untouchability and discrimination. Caste contains both these aspects, the former belonging to the base and the latter to the superstructure."

In fact, egalitarian societies got split into class societies with the rise of economic surplus and since then history of all existing societies has been the history of class struggle. In pre-capitalist societies, however, inequalities generated by the surplus were adjusted through a social stratification known as social estates. Internal cohesion among existing clans blocked the class formation in a classical sense, and moreover, socio-political formations based on extra-economic coercion perpetuated the system of social estates. In India the stratification did assume a greater permanence owing to the divine sanction accorded to the caste system and more importantly due to the coexistence of a despotic central power with the self-sufficient village communities.

Classes are rooted in the mode of production and their respective economic conditions of existence put them in hostile conflict with each other and this accelerates the process of class differentiation in society. Social estates or castes, however, regulate the mode of distribution and thus block the formation of classes as a 'pure' category. Class struggle permeates each and every social and political movement and thus assumes a variety of complicated forms.

Modern capitalist society accelerates this process of class differentiation and for the first time conditions are created for the self-perception of classes and open class battles. In India too the advent of capitalism and large-scale manufacturing for the first time brought a breach between caste and occupation and there arose a new class of industrial proletariat. The first generation of the proletariat despatched to plantations, mining, textile, jute etc. overwhelmingly belonged to the untouchable and shudra castes and was later joined by the members of upper castes too.

Factories were thus also the social factories which carried the potential for annihilation of caste. The conservative path of development of Indian capitalism did slowdown this process of class differentiation. The parliamentary democracy gave a new lease of life to caste stabilisation as new dominant social classes fought their battles for share in political power by invoking caste equations. And the economism and parliamentarism practised by social democrats corrupted the vision of working class as the class-for-itself. Still, in comparison to the intelligentsia which remained overwhelmingly composed of upper castes, working class is the cauldron of melting caste identities. The new era of globalisation and liberalisation has started disorganising the organised sector of workers and it is once again rising from slumber to resume its historical mission.

So, class is the basic category. In certain historical situations it may express itself in the form of castes, in other situations the two may be interwoven, overlapping and at the same time criss-crossing each other, and in yet another situation castes are disintegrated to crystallise as classes. This is how the antithesis between two proceeds, until the caste as the regulator of mode of distribution stands annihilated.

Our distinguished author, however, feels otherwise. He condemns Indian communists for mechanically applying the European categories in the Indian conditions and questions the very search of industrial proletariat in India. "Indian industrial working class, which they (Marxists) took to represent the proletarian, is not in fact proletarian. It was also a class born with a silver spoon. It largely belonged to the upper echelons of caste hierarchy. It not only had landed property in the villages and towns, but also inherited intellectual property which the masses lacked. They were not the dispossessed proletarians who had nothing to lose but chains. They were a class whose militancy and radicalism was linked with the rich peasant consciousness and ended with the Kulakisation in Rural India."

The author makes a curious distinction between Indian and Western intellectuals. "Western intellectual has nothing other than his mental labour power. In India, knowledge transcends its domain of religion and philosophy and enters the phase of material production and society. Science, knowledge and skill get separated from physical labour and assume dominance in the production... Hence declassing of Indian intellectual becomes a very difficult task." Make a head or tail of all this meaningless talk if you can. Such an unabashed praise of western intellectual, however, does signify the 'declassing' of Mr.Author. Western intellectuals, the possessors of so-called mental labour-power(!), have been essentially bourgeois and petty bourgeois intellectuals engaged in the service of bourgeois society. Open class battles of working class brought a split among them and a section associated itself with the working class. Marx, Lenin and countless others represent that section. Proletarian revolutions, however, encountered, and continue to encounter, a tough resistance from their overwhelming majority.

In contrast, petty-bourgeois intelligentsia in India despite its vacillations and upper caste bias joined progressive democratic and left movements in far greater numbers. The Naxalite movement in particular effected the integration of a large number of petty bourgeois youth with the dalit landless labour.

The author is greatly concerned about educated dalits gravitating towards Brahminism and turning into dalit aristocracy fostered by the bribes and privileges from the state. In explaining this phenomenon he brings in the comparison of Indian dalit vis-a-vis the western proletariat! "While the proletariat fought to regain their mastery over the tools and products of labour which they possessed in the immediate past, the dalits had been dispossessed for generations. The pride, glory and honour were fresh in the memory of the revolutionary proletariat; but the dalit battle was to regain the human personality, which was lost over generations of slavery, untouchability and thralldom. The class was vulnerable enough to fall prey to ruling class stratagems of ideological subversion and cooption." A strange logic! Everything western is good, everything Indian is bad. How come then a whole stratum of labour aristocracy the social base of social democracy arose in the west? How come a dalits in revolutionary struggles played a consistent heroic role in India? A section of labouring people always get co-opted with the system and there is nothing East-West about that. In author's analysis, the whole class of dalits, being "vulnerable enough to fall prey to ruling class stratagems", stands condemned. Ironically, it is to this class that the author accords the leadership to what he prefers to call "Dalit Democratic Revolution".

Dalit Democratic Revolution

For the author, 'dalit' represents all the castes and strata discriminated against by the Brahminical ruling classes. Thus, he emphasises a Dalit Democratic Revolution. Organised sector workers, intelligentsia, professionals belonging to upper castes can only be the wavering and undependable ally.

National bourgeoisie, however, constituting the emerging bourgeois elements of the backward classes and oppressed minority nationalities can of course be consistent ally, more so in the context of increasing globalisation and the growing grip of the Brahminical ruling classes over the centralised state.

Rural proletariat as well as proletarian sections in the unorganised and informal sectors belonging to dalit castes will be the leader. And of course, poor peasants or semi-proletarians as well as peasantry at large coming from dalit and shudra castes will be staunch ally.

The whole revolution has thus been turned upside down. Working class being the undependable ally whereas national bourgeoisie being the consistent ally. This revolution author claims will destroy the Brahminical social order and chart the path of genuine democracy. But the author here clearly evades the mention of social order — capitalist or socialist — that the revolution will establish.

The author thus arrives at the united front of all the backward classes and communities as against "class reductionism" and "working class centrism". This he proclaims, as the biggest breakthrough in the Marxist dogma. Biggest breaking through Marxism indeed!

Coming to the specific economic programme of Dalit Democratic Revolution, the author rejects Ambedkar's programme of land nationalisation and its distribution to cultivators including the landless untouchables with special state assistance. The author argues that "dalits have realised that emancipation lies in ownership of land which means 'power' in rural India" and also "the Ambedkarite prescription of distribution of nationalised land by the state misses the essential element, people's consciousness, that becomes a dynamic material force through direct dalit action for land". He advocates "agrarian revolution through land distribution at the instance of (!) landless and land-poor. Land should be distributed to the agricultural communities on the basis of their proportion in the population. The mode of organisation of production could be left to the democratic decision of the respective communities."

The author opposes the Ambedkar's programme of nationalisation of key industries under the pretext that the state sector is always used in the interest of the ruling classes. He advocates rather privatisation of public sector by distributing public shares equally to the people.

The author fails to understand that it is only the industrial working class through its control over big industries which can undertake any radical agrarian transformation and also control and transform the national bourgeoisie and thus effect the transition from a democratic to socialist revolution. Leadership of working class is thus inbuilt in a new democratic revolution, new only because it shall pass over to socialism and doesn't stop at capitalism. Rural and unorganised proletariat — attached as they are with the lower stage of mode of production can never effect this transition on their own. Their limitations are accepted by the author himself when he talks of land distribution only at the instance of landless and leaves the entire organisation of production to peasant communities themselves. It is just a programme of status quoism in the countryside to keep higher rungs of backward caste peasantry — staunch ally of Dalit Democratic Revolution in good humour.

State sector does serve the ruling classes no doubt, but it also raises the solidarity of working class at the national level and educates them in socialist consciousness in the sense that capitalist owner can be dispensed with and industries can be run by a paid management under working class control. That is why Lenin said that socialism is just a step ahead of state capitalism.

The broad united front, if at all it materialises, will inevitably transfer the leadership to the national bourgeoisie and shall only ensure the domination of kulaks of backward castes over the rural poor. The programme of Dalit Democratic Revolution is actually the maximum limit of the most radical of Janata Dal men and our author has not been able to transcend that limit.

Taking his cue from Ambedkar, the author had embarked upon building a model of revolution "on the grammar of caste society with the dynamics of class struggle". He only succeeded in building a model of reform at the full stop of class struggle with the statics of caste society.

Synthesis Par Excellence

The ambitious project synthesis was based on the one hand on rejection of economism, parliamentarism and the dogma of leadership of the industrial working class in Marxist theory and practice, and on the other on the rise of Ambedkarism from petty bourgeois peasant politics to the consciousness of liberation. In the process, first casualty was Marxism and then the radical economic vision of Ambedkarism on which alone Ambedkar, to a great extent, had based his hopes of dalit liberation.

The end product of the strenuous exercise of his mental labour power spread over 140 pages and priced at Rs. 150 has been the hybrid of K Venu and Ram Vilas Paswan at the level of theory and of Janata Dal and PWG-MCC at the level of practical politics. Many many kudos to the author for laying bare this unholy alliance which we had been hinting at for long.

[VM Selected Works Index Page] [ML Update] [Liberation] [HOME]

http://www.cpiml.org/archive/vm_swork/28antithesis_of_caste_and_class.htm

WHY I AM NOT A HINDU:

A Sudra Critique of Hindutva Philosophy, Culture and Political Economy

by Kancha Ilaiah

Let me make it clear, however, that I am not writing this book to convince suspicious brahminical minds; I am writing this book for those who have open minds. My request to brahmin, baniya and neo-kshatiya intellectuals is this: For about three thousand years you people learnt only how to teach and what to teach others – the Dalitbahujans. Now in your own interest and in the interest of this great country you must learn to listen and to read what we have to say. A people who refuse to listen to new questions and learn new answers will perish and not prosper…

LABOUR AS LIFE

For Dalitbahujans labour is life. For a Dalitbahujan body, labour is as habitual as eating is to the stomach. In fact, every Dalitbahujan body produces more than it consumes. As a result, Dalitbahujan life recreates itself in labour more than it recreates itself through eating and drinking. While labouring, a Dalitbahujan mind does not disengage from thinking but goes on producing ideas that make labour a pleasure. If labour is not pleasure, if Dalitbahujan minds do not derive pleasure out of that labouring process, given the low levels of consumption on which they subsist, Dalitbahujan bodies would have died much earlier than they do. Even if Dalitbahujans were to consider work as a monotonous, tortuous course of life, given the amount of labour that they expend during their lifetimes, death would have invited them much earlier than it does today.

If without giving up such a practice of labouring, and labouring with pleasure, when adequate calories of food are provided, a Dalithahujan body will live longer and more healthily than the non-labouring 'upper' caste/class body.

In the process of labour Dalithahujans engage in a constant intercourse with the land. Their thorough understanding of land and its producitivity, its colour and combination, is solely responsible for increase in productivity. Even before 'knowledge from without' (what we call urban-based, expert knowledge) influenced Dalitbahujan productive skills, they had been experimenting constantly to improve their labour productivity, trying to understand scientifically the relationship between land and seed. They also tried to understand the relationship between the seed and human biological systems. Before cross-breeding was studied in modern laboratories, the Dalitbahujans had cross-bred seed systems. Dalitbahujan women selected and preserved seeds for planting. They maintained huge stores of plant genes. They grafted plants and worked out whole systems of hybridization. All this knowledge was a product of their labour and its creative intercourse with land and nature.

Dalitbahujan labour has creatively interacted with a whole range of non-agrarian plant systems. Dalitbahujans who were engaged in sheep-, goat- and cattle-breeding made tireless investigations of plants and their medicinal values. These investigations were done with an exemplary combination of physical labour and mental acumen. Dalitbahujan knowledge never separated physical labour from mental labour. In India this bifurcation took place in a caste/class form. For Dalitbahujans, physical and mental labour was an integrated whole. If we want to understand the process by which the contradiction between mental and physical labour is resolved as Mao did in the Chinese context, we must return to studying carefully the way the Dalitbahujan societies of India combined mental and physical labour, without a so-called wise man intervening, in the process of labouring to integrate, break open, reintegrate and finally discover new systems.

The Dalitbahujan masses have enormous technological and en~ gineering skills which are not divorced from their labour. One who lifts dead cattle also knows the science of skinning it. They themselves know how to process the skin and make chappals, shoes or ropes. All these tasks involve both mental and physical labour. This work is not like reading the Vedas or teaching in a school. Reading the Vedas or teaching in a school does not require much investment of physical labour or creative thought. Certain types of mental labour may not involve physical labour, but all physical labour involves mental labour. Dalitbahujan society has shown exemplary skill in combining both. Take, for example, the Goudaas who climb the toddy trees and combine in themselves the talent of mind and the training of body. While climbing the tree a Goudaa has to exercise his muscle power. He has also to invent ways of climbing tall trees which do not have branches. While climbing, if he does not focus his mind on every step the result is death. A Brabmin dance teacher, while dancing certainly combines both physical and mental labour but does not encounter a risk in every step. Despite this, why is it that brahminical dance has acquired so much value? Why is it that brahminical dance is given so much space in literature? Why not celebrate the beauty and skill of a Goudaa, which over and above being an art, science and an exercise has productive value. As I have already discussed, the tapping of a toddy tree layer by layer, involves enormous knowledge and engaged application besides physical and mental skill. Tapping the gela in a way that makes the toddy flow, but does not hurt the tree, cannot be done by everybody. It needs training and cultivation of mind. Training in this specialization is much more dangerous and difficult than training in reading the Vedas. All the same a Hindu is told to respect and value the training to read Veda mantras, but not the Goudaa skills of producing something which has market-value and consumption-value.

Hindu Brahminism defied all economic theories, including feminist economic theory, that all market-oriented societies valued labour which produced goods and commodities for market consumption. Feminist economic theory points out that though women's labour in the house contributes to the economy, it does not find social respectability or receive economic compensation. In the brahminical economy Dalitbahujan labour (male or female) even if it is produced for market consumption has no value. On the contrary, the so-called mental labour of the Brahmins and the Banlyas reciting mantras and extracting profit by sitting at the shop desk has been given enormous socioeconomic value. Herein lies the Hindu delegitimization of productive creativity. The brahminical economy even devalued production for the market and privileged its spiritual-mental labour over all other labour processes.

Brahminical scholarship legitimized leisure, mantra, puja, tapasya and soothsaying, though these are not knowledge systems in themselves. Scientific knowledge systems, on the contrary, are available among the Dalitbahujan castes. A pot maker's holistic approach to knowledge which involves collecting the right type of earth, making it into clay, turning it on the wheel, and firing it requires knowledge of local materials and resources, scientific knowledge of the clay and the firing process, besides a sharp understanding of the market. It requires mental skill to use the fingers, while physically turning the wheel, skill to convert that clay into pots, pitchers and jars—small or big—of all kinds. Firing is an equally skill-intensive process. The oven has to be heated to an exact temperature and the pots baked just long enough for them to become durable and yet retain their attractive colour. This whole scheme is a specialized knowledge in itself. Thus, Kamsalies (goldsmiths) have their own scientific knowledge, Kammaris (blacksmiths) theirs, and Shalaas (weavers) theirs. But all these arts and sciences, all these knowledge systems have been delegitimized. Instead of being given social priority and status, mantric mysticism has been given priority. These knowledge systems will get socioeconomic value only when their legitimacy is established.

Hinduism constructed its own account of Dalitbahujan knowledge systems. As discussed earlier, while the Dalitbahujans live labour as life, the Hindus inverted this principle and privileged leisure over labour. The ancient theoretical formation of the thesis leisure as life was propounded by Vatsyayana in the Kamasutra, where he constructs a nagarika (citizen) as one who embodies this notion. This very theory was reinstated at different stages of history whenever brahininical Hinduism was in crisis, or whenever Dalitbahujan organic forces rebelled against Hindu theory and practice. As we saw, the 1990 anti-Mandal Hindutva wave again aimed at reviving the 'leisure as life' theory as against the Mandal movement that aimed at universalizing labour as life' (irrespective of caste, everyone should do both manual labour and work in an office). In other words, it aimed at dalitizing Indian society.

The whole world has overcome the theories of privileging leisure over labour. Whether it is countries like Japan and China or in the West itself, labour has acquired more market value and social status than leisure. Mandalization of the Indian state and society would have integrated us into these universal systems. But Hindu Brahminisrn reacted to this historical transformation and started the counter-revolutionary Hindutva movement by reemphasizing leisure, mantra and moksha as basic principles which will undermine the onward march of Indian society. But a quicker development of Indian society lies in privileging labour over leisure. Only Dalitization of the whole society can achieve this goal…

This of course will require that they [the upper castes] unlearn the many things. The task is much more difficult with the Brahmins /'//'and the Baniyas than it will be with the neo-Kshatriyas. Yet another major area of Dalitization will be to push the Brahmin-Baniyas into productive work, whether it is rural or urban. Both men and women of the so-called upper castes will resist this with all the strength at their command. This is because among them Hinduism has destroyed all positive elements that normally exist in a human being. During the post-colonial period their energies were diverted to manipulate education, employment, production and development subtly. Their minds are poisoned with the notion that productive work is mean and that productive castes are inferior. No ruling class in the world is as dehumanized as the Indian brahminical castes. They can be rehumanized only by pushing them into productive work and by completely diverting their attention from the temple, the office, power-seeking, and so on.

http://www.swaraj.org/shikshantar/resources_ilaiah.htm

India: Dalit weapon of 'caste identity' to defeat Brahminism

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Written by

EditorRupeeNews

on May-13-11 8:42am

From:

pakistanpatriot.com

A portrai of Dalit leader Rettamalai Srinivasan. Image via Wikipedia

Shri VT. Rajsshekar

Bangalore: Look at the big changes.Muslims masses are gradually joining

Dalit

and OBC parties led by Mayawati, Mulayam Singh, Lalu Parsad, Sharad Pawar etc.

Muslim

leadership is dying.

Remember, how Shahabuddin was once called the "Second Jinnah" by the Brahminical media as though Jinnah sahib, the greatest leader, was bad. Remember how some Hindu

MPs

had shouted "Jai Shri Ram" in Indian Parliament soon after the

Babri Masjid demolition

. Muslims of the whole country were shocked at this but the Muslim MPs of Kashmir shouted back saying Allaho Akbar.

This was the turning point. Muslims were being slowly driven to the wall. They had no further space to go. Since the Cashmiri Muslims lost all hopes and were forced to turn violent. The got the support of the Muslims from Azad kashmir, Pakistan itself and also from Afghanistan. Each organisation formed its own independent fighting front and launched armed resistance. The J&K Police, Ikhwan Renegades, and security forces, all muslims, were forced to fight their own brothers. Then the Indian security forces were sent from Delhi. They also met with fierce resistance. After killing many and getting killed in large numbers, they realised athat those whome they were killing were Dalits and shudra sepoys and jawans, whose brothers inside India were themselves vistims of continuous Hindu atrocities.

About the author: Shri

V.T. Rajshekar

, its Editor and founder,

Dalit Voice

, the English fortnightly, has become the country's most powerful "Voice of the Persecuted Nationalities Denied Human Rights".

A veteran journalist, formerly of the Indian Express, powerful and fearless writer, V.T. Rajshekar, had to face the wrath of the ruling class, arrested many times, several jail sentences, passport impounded and subjected to total media boycott.

Published in several Indian languages including Hindi, Dalit Voice has become the sole spokesman for the entire deprived, dehumanised lot of India. Besides the Dalits, it looks after the interests of

Backward Castes

(35%) and the country's three persecuted religious minorities — Muslims 15%, Christians 2.5%, and Sikhs 2.5% — all victims of the Aryan Brahminical racism. Plus the women of all sections including the Hindu women.

In the course of the last 25 years,

has become India's largest circulated journal of the oppressed, fighting against mainstream dailies and periodicals which have totally ignored the plight of the original inhabitants. Hence DV is rightly hailed as a new experiment in Indian journalism.

Only DV has diagnosed the disease of India which is an exception to all other countries in the world. If others have only "classes", India has not only the "class" but the world's most unique institution of caste system, which is the other word for racism. Here lies the success of DV. It goes to all world famous libraries, universities and invited many Afro-American delegations to India.

Its Editor is hailed as India's most original thinker, scholar and also philosopher. As India's most famous Dalit writer, he has authored over 60 world-famous books dealing with the problems of caste, ethnicity, Muslims, Christian, Sikhs, Marxism, Brahminism, Racism, Gandhism, Fascism etc.

Over 100 books have been published by the Dalit Sahitya Akademy, its sister organisation, also headed by the Editor.

His book, Dalit – The Black Untouchables of India, published from the USA (Clarity Press, Inc., Suite 469, 3277 – Roswell Rd NE, Atlanta, GA.30305, ISBN 0-932863-05-1 , 2003 – 2nd print), has gone into several reprints uniting for the first time the Blacks of the world with the Black Untouchables of India.

His most important book, Caste — A Nation Within the Nation, which has gone into second print, is a marvellous thesis offering an ingenious weapon of "caste identity" to defeat Brahminism, the destructive ideology of the ruling class. In the latest Parliament election, the oppressed castes of India used this weapon and defeated the country's Brahminical party (BJP).

DV becomes the future

media of India

where its dailies and periodicals are slowly dying. Because only DV offers a lasting solution as the authentic voice of the country's tallest titan,

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar

, the Father of India.

Shri V.T. Rajshekar,

Editor,

Dalit Voice

#101, Shiv Deep Residency, Shivbagh, Kadri, Mangalore- 575 002

Mobile No: 0-776 044 0596

e-mail: dalitvoice@rediffmail.com mailto:dalitvoice@rediffmail.com

home:

http://www.dalitvoice.org/

Dharma (Part 2): Varnashrama-dharma

Key Points

Varnashrama-dharma – duties performed according to the system of four varnas (social divisions) and four ashrams (stages in life).
Focus is on responsibilities (which naturally fulfil the rights of others).
Four varnas – brahmanas (priests, teachers, and intellectuals), kshatriyas (police, army, and administration), vaishyas (farmers, merchants, and business people), shudras (artisans and workers).
Four ashrams – student life, household life, retirement, and renunciation.

According to Hindu texts,

Varnashrama-dharma

is not a man-made system but refers to natural classifications that appear to various degrees in all human societies. Individuals have different innate tendencies for work and exhibit a variety of personal qualities. There are also natural phases in life, when it is easier and more rewarding to perform certain activities. Hinduism teaches that individuals best realise their potential by taking into account such natural arrangements, and that society should be structured and organised accordingly.

Each

varna

and

ashram

has its own specified

dharma

. What may be desirable for one section of society may be degrading for another. For example, absolute non-violence, which includes refraining from animal sacrifice, is essential for the priestly class but considered wholly unworthy of a

kshatriya

(warrior). Generating wealth and producing children are essential for householders, but intimate contact with money and women is spiritually suicidal for the renunciate. Underlying all these apparent differences is the common goal of advancing in spiritual life based on

sanatana-dharma

. Without the spiritual equality and sense of service inherent in

sanatanadharma

varnashrama-dharma

tends to degrade into the rigid and exploitative caste system.

Useful Analogy

The social body

The social body and its components are likened to the human form.

brahmanas

as the head,

kshatriyas

as the arms,

vaishyas

as the belly (or thighs) and the

shudras

as the legs

Social functions are determined according to this analogy. For example, the brahmanas are the eyes and mouth of society. They provide a spiritual vision for society and teach people accordingly. Just as the arms are raised to defend the body, the kshatriya's main duty is to protect society. The vaishya's main duty is material nourishment, and the shudra supports all other sections of society.
The ashrams are sometimes related to the same metaphor, with the successive stages of student life, household life, retirement and renunciation represented by the legs, belly, arms and head respectively.

Related Practices

All practices relating to the execution of one's familial and social duties according to

varna

and

ashram

. These include many of the rites of passage.

The caste system and its practice, and the issue of untouchability, as addressed by Mahatma Gandhi and other reformers (see

Reform Movements

Related Values/Issues

The notion of a classless society.
Rights and responsibilities.
All types of inequality.
Varnashrama as a basis for categorising diversity in human society.

Personal Reflection

Is it desirable to divide society according to each person's natural tendency for a particular type of work, and form educational, political, trade, or labour associations for co-operative and mutual support?
Do teachers need personal and professional qualifications, or should anyone be able to take the job?
Is a person qualified as a teacher simply because his father and mother were both teachers? Does he generally have a better chance?
Do natural classifications exist and can they be useful? Are they all merely man-made and exploitative?
How does your school apply varnashrama-dharma principles? Are there various year groups, for example? And within each year, are all students required to study the same subjects?

Common Misunderstandings

Caste and varnashrama are synonymous

Mahatma Gandhi, the most famous opponent of caste abuse, actually believed in the original principles of

varnashrama-dharma

. The system of four

varnas

(with subdivisions) was based on mutual support and service, allowing for upward and downward mobility. The caste system, as it has now become, is rigid and hereditary, often motivated by exploitation and a desire to maintain the status-quo. (see

Reform Movements

for more information on Gandhi; also

Social Issues

)

Scriptural Passages

"According to the three

gunas

and the work associated with them, the four divisions of human society are created by Me."

Lord Krishna, in Bhagavad-gita 4.13

Meaning and Purpose

Is the universe naturally hierarchical?
What are my duties as a human being?

Quote

"The distinction between

varna

and caste is well known to anthropologists ... even if it is ignored by some authors ... (who) use the word caste when what they mean is clearly

varna

Dr. D. Killingley

For More Information

see Dharma section starting

as well as

, and

http://hinduism.iskcon.org/concepts/108a.htm

Varna (Hinduism)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

*	This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. (Consider usingmore specific clean up instructions.) Please improve this article if you can. The talk page may contain suggestions. (May 2009)

*	This article needs attention from an expert on the subject. See the talk page for details.WikiProject Hinduism or the Hinduism Portal may be able to help recruit an expert. (February 2007)

An article related to

Hinduism

Auṃ • Brahman • Ishvara

Hindu • History of Hinduism

Practices[show]

[edit]Etymology and origins

Further information:

varṇa (disambiguation)

and

trifunctional hypothesis

Varna is a

Sanskrit

term

varṇa

(वर्ण) is derived from the root

vṛ

, meaning "to cover, to envelop" (compare

vṛtra

). Derived meanings include "kind, sort, character, quality". All these meanings are already present in the

Rigveda

's use of the word.

The meaning "class of men, tribe" in the Rigveda refers to the division between

Aryas

and

Dasa

[6]

The earliest application to the formal division into four social classes appears in the late Rigvedic

Purusha Sukta

(

RV 10

.90.11–12), which has the Brahman, Rajanya (= Kshatriya), Vaishya and Shudra classes made of the head, arms, thighs and feet of the primordial giant,

Purusha

, respectively. Other Vedic texts and the Manusmriti, a law text dating to roughly between 200 BCE and 200 CE follow suit.

The varna classification was first described, almost in passing, in the

Purush Sukta

of the Rgveda 1090.

Rigvedic evidence of such a quadruple division of society has been compared to similar systems, especially with a view to reconstructing hypothetical

Proto-Indo-European society

. Such comparison is at the basis of the

trifunctional hypothesis

presented by

Georges Dumézil

. Dumézil postulates a basic division of society into a

(Brahmins),

(Kshatriyas) and

(Vaishyas), augmented by a class of unfree

serfs

(Shudras), as was done in ancient Iran and Greece as well (where the fourth class is called pan-Hellenes).

[edit]Hindu tradition

The Purusha Sukta in the

Rig-Veda

10:90 refers to the four principal varnas, although the word varna is not used, described in

Manu's code

, viz. Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras. They are compared to the body of the "primordial man" or Purusha: "The Brâhmana was his head, of both his arms was the Râjanya made. His thighs became the Vaishya, his feet became the Sûdra" (

RV 10.90

.12) This model is often cited for its hierarchical ordering of the varnas, however, by the same logic the model also implies the concept of interdependence and interchangeability of the varnas. Furthermore reading this mantra within the entire context of the Purusha Sukta, which also describes the Purusha as the origin of the Sun (from his eye), the Moon (from his mind), the sky (from his head), air (from his navel), horses, cattle, etc. leads one to the conclusion that the entire Sukta is emphasizing the point that all these come from the original Purusha.[

Shri Chaitanya Mahaprabhu

]

Many Hindu yogis and sages have, over the centuries, constantly commented about inheriting social status.

Ramanujacharya

initiated people from all castes into his tradition, and broke taboos by inviting them to his house for food.

(15th century), the powerful

bhakti

Krishna

also denounced inheriting social status. He famously distributed the

Hare Krishna

mantra to all around India, claiming this was the True path to moksha.[

]

Kanakadasa

of the 15th century also denounced inherited social status. He believed that Life in every human being is Divine, and that only the ignorant wrought injustice against their own brethren by this practice.

Basavanna

of the 12th century is said to have denounced inherited social status and tried to unify all communities under the Linga (form of Shiva).[

]

[edit]Dharmaśāstras

The concept of dharma deals mainly with the duties of the different varṇas and

āśhramas

(life cycles).

Manusmriti

is often quoted in reference to the Varna system as an inherited social class system. However, the Hindu rightists usually point out that the

Manusmṛti

is a later work that does not form a part of Hindu Scriptures, so it is of questionable relevance. The rightists content that the

Manusmṛti

has been used by British colonialists, politicians and sociologists to denigrate those of the Hindu faith.

[7]

The

Manusmṛti

claims that by the time it was written in ancient times, Hindu society included another class (untouchables) of people without a position in any of the four Varnas and therefore associated with the lowest of the jobs. The upper classes, who were supposed to maintain ritual and corporal purity, came to regard them as untouchables. The people of this "fifth varna" are now called

Dalits

(

the oppressed

) or

Harijans

; they were formerly known as "untouchables" or "

pariahs

". However, this last addition social strata is not a part of the religion of Hinduism. Hinduism only categorizes occupations into four categories.

[edit]"Twice born"

The first three varnas are seen as "twice born" and they are allowed to study the

Vedas

. In India and Nepal the sub-communities within a varna are called "jat" or "jati" (the varna is also used instead of jat). Traditionally, individuals are allowed to marry only within their jati. People are born into a jati and normally it cannot be changed, though there were some exceptions in Hindu Scriptures. For example, the sage

Vishwamitra

was born as a Kshatriya and by deep

tapas

(meditation) became a venerable Brahmin

rishi

. Good deeds during ones lifetime can allow a low class jati member to ascend to the upper class and study the Vedas as a Brahmin priest.

[edit]Traditional occupations

The occupations of the Vaishya are those connected with trade, the cultivation of the land and the breeding of cattle; while those of a Kshatriya consist in ruling and defending the people, administering justice, and the duties, of the military profession generally and ruling and expounding all

dharma

. Both share with the Brahmin the privilege of reading the Vedas. To the Brahmin belongs the right of teaching and expounding the sacred texts. Shudras were the serfs, and performed agricultural labour.

Manusmriti assigns cattle rearing as Vaisya occupation, however there are sources in available literature that Kshatriyas also owned and reared the cattle and cattle-wealth was mainstay of their households.Emperors of

Kosala

and Prince of Kasi are some of many examples.

[3]

[edit]Tantric view

The

Tantric movement

that developed as a tradition distinct from orthodox Hinduism between the 8th and 11th centuries CE