Jets bomb Tiger rebel base, 34 killed in clashes

Jets bomb Tiger rebel base, 34 killed in clashes
http://www.dailytim es.com.pk/ default.asp? page=2008\08\30\story_ 30-8-
2008_pg4_15

COLOMBO: Sri Lankan air force jets bombed a Tamil Tiger rebel base
in the embattled north Friday, and ground battles across the region
killed 34 rebels and one government soldier, the military said.

The fighter jets pounded a training base for Sea Tigers, the naval
wing of the separatist Tamil Tigers, deep in the rebel stronghold of
Kilinochchi, said air force spokesman Wing Commander Janaka
Nanayakkara. He did not provide details of casualties and damages,
but said the pilots had confirmed they had hit the target. Infantry
clashes continued Thursday along the front lines separating
government-controll ed territory and the rebels' de facto state in
the north, military spokesman Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara said.

The worst fighting occurred in the Vavuniya district, where soldiers
killed 14 rebels before capturing the rebel-held Palamoddai village,
he said. Ten rebels and five soldiers were wounded. Scattered
clashes in Kilinochchi killed 12 rebels and one soldier, while seven
rebels died in Welioya and another was killed in Jaffna, he said.

The rebels Friday accused government forces of setting off a
roadside bomb and killing two civilians inside guerrilla-held
territory. A man and a child died when their motorcycle was caught
up in the bomb attack at Nedunkerni in the vast Wanni region on
Thursday evening, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) said
in a statement.

Also Friday, a grenade exploded inside a prison in the volatile
east, injuring seven prisoners, police spokesman Ranjith Gunasekara
said. "There has been an explosion inside Batticaloa prison. Seven
people have been injured and admitted to Batticaloa hospital,"
police spokesman Ranjith Gunasekara said. "All of them are Tamils,
and most of them are suspected of LTTE (rebel) activities." The
elite Special Task Force police paramilitary unit found a second
grenade, he said. agencies

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29-Aug.-2008
Sri Lanka: LTTE's Air Raid on Trincomalee and the Offensive Operations – Update No. 151
Col R Hariharan
http://www.southasi aanalysis. org/notes5/ note469.html

The night raid by two light aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air wing on the Trincomalee naval base on August 26, 2008 may be termed as moderately successful. The two aircraft were similar to the ZLIN piston-engined ones that had raided Katunayake air base on March 27, 2007 and in the subsequent attacks on Palali air base on April 24, 2007 and the Anuradhapura air field on October 22, 2007. As in all the four air raids earlier they evaded both the ground fire and the chase by Sri Lanka air force fighters to return safely to their home base.

There had been discrepancies in the reports on the raid both in the number of casualties and on how the LTTE raid was conducted out. Broadly the raid went somewhat like this. Around 9 PM the LTTE aircraft flew in undetected and managed to sneak into the air space of the high security zone of the naval complex housing the Eastern Naval Headquarters and the Trincomalee dockyard. After dodging the anti aircraft gunfire when they were detected, one aircraft managed to drop two improvised bombs. Though the Eastern Naval Headquarters was not struck, at least four sailors were killed when one of the bombs struck a sailors' billet. Ten to 20 persons (depending upon the source of the report) were reported injured. It seems the intruding aircraft were detected a little late to engage them by fighters. Evading the anti aircraft fire the LTTE aircraft flew off after the strike on the sailors' barracks. As in the earlier cases, one bomb did not explode. In retaliation the air force fighters took off to hunt the raiders but could not succeed in doing so. After that the air force bombed Iranamadu air strip and its assets.

Though the defence spokesman called it an abortive raid, it was not wholly so. The LTTE raiders succeeded at least partially in fulfilling their mission. And they managed to inflict casualty on the security forces while escaping unscathed. Two inquiries are being held
apparently to find out how the LTTE planes managed to infiltrate through the air defence network without detection and carried out the raid.

Though the raid did not create the panic reaction among the public seen last year after the Katunayake raid, it will surely give a psychological lift up to the sagging morale of the LTTE's support network both at home and abroad. So far they had to console themselves
only with the rhetoric of the political commissar Nadesan on the impending LTTE response to the successful Sri Lankan offensive going on now for two years. The raid will also come as a shot in the arm for LTTE's defenders in frontlines who had been having a tough time for the last few months as the offensive gathered momentum. A far as the Sri Lanka public is concerned they appear to be taking it in the stride as one of the necessary evils of pursuing the military option. Thus the LTTE air raids appear to have lost their public threat potential enhanced by the very audacity of their ability to carry out such a raid well away from the LTTE home grounds in Wanni.

Otherwise, the air raid would be classified as a small scale raid daringly carried out. But in comparison with the scale of the happenings in the battlefronts of the north, the air raid does not have the potential to cause significant impact on the ongoing operations. Except for tasking a special commando force to seek and destroy the LTTE's secret hangars in Wanni as the operation progresses, no other special action would probably be taken at the
battlefront. The LTTE operational planners probably know this limitation. The pressure on them must be mounting as the security forces advance had been causing exodus of civilians in thousands from battle zones. So they probably carried out the air raid for want of any other manageable operational task that could create some impact immediately.

At the same time, operationally the raid gives some interesting insights –

The ability of the LTTE air wing to penetrate the airspace in high security zones remains undiminished, despite the counter measures taken so far. As discussed in my earlier articles on the subject, light aircraft with small radar signatures, flying below the horizon can escape early radar detection. This is more so if they follow a flight path hugging the coastline contours to escape early detection.
To overcome this weakness the anti aircraft defence network should include integrated ground observer posts along likely air ingress routes. This is a very time tested civil defence method against air raids in vogue for over seventy years! However, to be successful it needs committed people with well rehearsed procedure for identification and reporting.
On detection, the anti aircraft guns need to put maximum number of shots in the air in the fastest time to get a hit. In a night raid visual firing is fraught with serious limitations as the city lights in the horizon confuse the vision. This will again require a lot of practice firing.
In the past also the fighters had never been able to chase and kill the raiding aircraft. This is not surprising. Rarely will the fighters be able to respond in time unless they are positioned in operational readiness platforms (ORP) on the runway at the airfield. The mute point is, do such occasional raids by light aircraft merit tedious ORP status involving expensive hi-tech fighters designed for not only air combat but also ground support operations in counter insurgency? Only the security chiefs can answer this question.
It is surprising that despite the large number of modern surveillance and early warning devices available to monitor the intruding aircraft from take off to reaching target area, the LTTE pilots had always managed to prevent detection till the last moment when they gain height. Perhaps the security forces would do well to study the successful tactics of these "amateur fighter pilots" a little more seriously to eliminate the air threat.
There has been high rate of failure of the improvised bombs of the LTTE. This would show the LTTE has not been able to refine both the aerodynamics of the bomb design and the use of appropriate fuses to reduce the strike failure rate.

I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative
echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards. Looking at the well planned operations so far, the security forces would have already catered for such a possibility in their contingency plans.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo. com)

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LTTE Woos Tamil Nadu
M. Mayilvaganan
August 29, 2008
http://www.idsa. in/publications/ stratcomments/ MMayilvaganan290 808.htm

LTTE Political Head P. Nadesan’s recent call to Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi to “turn into a supporter of LTTE struggle” in an interview to ‘Kumudam,’ a Tamil weekly, is an example of the outfit’s efforts to woo Tamil Nadu and Karunanidhi in particular. It also underscores the importance of Tamil Nadu for the LTTE at a time of its most pressing crisis. Of late, the Tigers seem to have increased their dependence on, and activities in, Tamil Nadu, which they consider to be a rear base. Though the LTTE have supporters within Tamil Nadu’s political sphere, by wooing the DMK chief and Chief Minister Karunanidhi they hope to put pressure on the Indian government to alter its present pro-Rajapaksa approach. However, two key questions remain. Will the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister take up the Sri Lankan Tamil cause and exert pressure on the Centre to alter its present Sri Lanka policy? And, is Tamil Nadu a rear base for the LTTE?

The LTTE have reached a critical stage in their history, with the military situation looking graver than ever before. Sri Lankan forces have pinned them down to Mullaitivu and Killinochchi in the North and are threatening their very survival. The LTTE are at best trying to prevent a further loss of strength and military hardware. Consequently, as a tactical move, they have begun to show keenness in attracting the attention of India and that of Tamil Nadu in particular to earn respite from their present acute difficulties. Hence, the appeal to Karunanidhi—consider ed a leader of world Tamils—to come forward to assist them “in their struggle to establish a Tamil Eelam state.”

The appeal seems to be a conscious effort to reach out to Karunanidhi in particular and Tamil Nadu political leaders in general and win back their sympathy and support. Incidentally, it was not so long ago that Velupillai Prabhakaran made it a point in his November 27, 2007 `Heroes Day' address to express `gratitude' to the leaders and people of Tamil Nadu for their `support' to the cause of Tamil Eelam and requested them to continue their support and help the LTTE in the `freedom struggle'. The former leader of the political wing S.P. Tamilselvan too paid his gratitude to Karunanidhi for expressing grief over the demise of Anton Balasingham – the outfit's former ideologue and chief negotiator.

The LTTE’s pressing desire to re-establish links with Tamil Nadu and to cultivate the DMK chief is geared towards ensuring their immediate survival, rather than a reflection of the hidden agenda of creating a pan-Tamil Eelam. What they are looking for right now are essential items, military supplies, medical facilities and safe houses in Tamil Nadu.

Notably, while MDMK chief V. Gopalswamy, PMK head Ramadass and Dalit Panthers of India’s Thirumavalavan are hailed as selfless contributors to the Tamil Eelam cause, Karunanidhi is admired at this point of time because, unlike others, he is firmly entrenched in the seat of power both in Tamil Nadu and at the Centre. Moreover, the LTTE has no option but to warm up to the DMK chief even though he is viewed as being opportunistic— supporting the Tamil cause when needed and being non-committal otherwise—by the Sri Lankan Tamils and Tigers. Though the sudden increase in arrests of LTTE cadres and supporters in Tamil Nadu in recent weeks is a perturbing factor for the Tigers, they are making concerted efforts to reach out to Tamil Nadu.

In the absence of major casualties among Tamils in Sri Lanka as a result of the Sri Lankan military offensive, the Tigers could potentially seize upon the influx of Tamil refugees and the fishermen issue to advance their objective. In fact, the LTTE is trying hard, albeit unsuccessfully, to achieve a shift in the political and public opinion in Tamil Nadu against the Sri Lankan Government by firing on Indian fisherman and transferring the blame on to the Sri Lankan Navy. At the same time, the case filed in the Chennai High Court by AIADMK chief Jayalalitha demanding that the Government of India retrieve Kachchativu could serve as a boon for the Tigers since the issue can create tensions between India and Sri Lanka. Any strain in India’s relations with Sri Lanka will be favourable for the Tigers. While popular support for the AIADMK’s effort may not have shored up appreciably, the Tigers think that the issue has the potential to push the Tamil Nadu government into taking a more hard line approach on Kachchativu given the prevailing competitive politics between the two Dravidian parties. Nevertheless, the LTTE’s first preference is to woo Karunanidhi and by extension the central government in New Delhi. This seems to be the present goal of the LTTE.

However, the DMK government does not seem to be very enthusiastic in taking up the Sri Lankan Tamil cause at present given the political situation in the State and the forthcoming parliamentary election. Moreover, though the DMK government is sympathetic and concerned about the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the party’s past history on the issue and the compulsions of coalition politics have considerably influenced the Karunanidhi government to adopt a low profile on the Sri Lankan issue. Equally owing to the above reasons the Tamil Nadu government had been very stern with the LTTE and their supporters in the state, as they do not wish to provide an opportunity to opposition parties in the State to take on the government when Congress is at the helm in the Centre.

But is the LTTE in a mood to abandon its efforts to win support from Tamil Nadu in the days to come? The stakes are high for the Tigers, with the Sri Lankan forces steadily moving into their stronghold. They may well be able to galvanise Tamil Nadu on the fishermen issue and utilize the space thus gained for regaining their eroding strength. The Tigers are well aware of the dynamics of Tamil Nadu politics and the compulsions that the Dravidian parties face on the Sri Lankan issue since Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. However, the series of debacles on the war front has compelled them to turn towards Tamil Nadu despite strict vigilance and the apprehension of their supporters. In fact, it seems that the Tigers are well aware of the critical importance of support from Tamil Nadu than ever before. Thus, the Tigers will continue to woo Tamil Nadu and Chief Minister Karunanidhi in the coming days.

Similarly, the Tigers’ ingress into Tamil Nadu and their activities like smuggling are unlikely to reduce in the near future. In fact, the LTTE appears to be willing to take risks in increasing its activities in Tamil Nadu. It has been reported that out of ten LTTE cadres who sneak into the State five or six go unnoticed because of several factors. First, the LTTE is aware of the lacuna that the Indian security agencies have in surveillance along the Palk Strait in detecting the intrusion of Tigers in the guise of fisherman. Two, the LTTE wants to make use of local organised smuggling groups in Tamil Nadu who are eager to make money from this activity. Three, the shallow sea at Nagapattinam, Karaikal and Ramanathapuram facilitates safe embarkation and the evasion of the Coast Guard.

Tamil Nadu will thus continue to serve as a rear base for the LTTE till the organised smuggling groups and the support provided by fringe Tamil nationalist political groups in the state are dealt with. But this seems unlikely in the present context given the prevailing passive support for the LTTE’s struggle and the criminal-political nexus in the state.

Dr. M. Mayilvaganan is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.