Mauritania's Military and the Democratic Obsession

Mauritania's Military and the Democratic Obsession
Mohammad el-Ashab
Al-Hayat - 29/08/08//
http://english. daralhayat. com/opinion/ OPED/08-2008/ Article-20080829 -
0ec63839-c0a8- 10ed-01bf- ee337f66f5db/ story.html

The situation in Mauritania will not return to what it was before
the sixth of August. At the very least, the atmosphere that
prevailed after the August 2005 coup can be conjured up, but the
situation will not settle as what it was in the days which preceded
General Muhammad Ould Abd Al-Aziz's coup.

The difference between the two coups is that the influential general
was not at the forefront of the one which toppled President Maaouya
Ould Taya. The forefront was then occupied by another member of the
military, Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, who was able to ensure an
internal outlet for the experience, one that contained foreign
criticism. However, Muhammad Ould Abd Al-Aziz wagered on leaving
those who oppose his coup a greater margin for movement, at least to
appear like a democracy. Indeed, no parties were banned and no state
of emergency declared, as are common practices during coups.

Such a positive appearance indicates that the High Council of State,
despite the fact that it is made up of members of the military, did
not succeed in excluding those who call for the return of
legitimacy. Perhaps the difference is that the Council wants
legitimacy on the ruins of toppled President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi's
mandate, legitimacy with qualities that will achieve a second coup
led by civilians through ballot boxes, as long as the result will be
the same.

Yet the experiment could have achieved the same goal with a little
self-restraint from both sides, the military and the presidency. At
least, the military institution could have remained neutral, and the
president could have resigned willingly. President Ould Cheikh
Abdallahi was known not to cling to power. Yet leaving power in a
way that would restore his dignity would be better than putting him
under house arrest.

Between the president dismissing influential military leaders, and
the latter, headed by General Muhammad Ould Abd Al-Aziz, toppling
him, there is an emotional moment, the influence of which
politicians and soldiers are usually careful to avoid. Yet when
escalation has been resorted to, the utmost responsibility of the
makers and breakers of solutions in Mauritania becomes to look for a
face-saving way out for the quarreling parties.

Those who oppose the coup are wagering on the return of legitimacy.
Those who call for what can be described as the "rectification
movement" agree on the inevitability of handing power over to
civilians through honest and transparent elections. The difference
between the two is that there are those who want to restore the
dignity of toppled President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, and those who
simply seek to open a new chapter. The fact that the appearance of
contradiction between the two has been maintained can only mean that
the state of paralysis is ongoing and may lead to further
complications. The Mauritanian people insist that they do not want
such complications, at any cost. The country is not ready for the
reign of instability under any circumstances. The Mauritanian people
have found themselves distributing loyalty, without that meaning
that all those who seek the return of legitimacy do so for the good
of the president, or that all those who support the High Council of
State do so to upset potential political rivals.

Perhaps the origin of the problem is that the fledgling democracy in
Nouakchott came at the political initiative of the military
institution, an institution which rid the country of an opposition
that was becoming too influential. If it does not publicly reap the
fruits of such a change, then it must at least maintain its role of
watchful arbiter that must not interfere. The fact of the matter is
that the political elite has consented to maintaining the duality of
this game and is unlikely to get rid of its implications without
paying a price.

Democracy in Mauritania had greater ambitions than it could bear.
Not because it was not up to the ambition, but because all the
different parties saw it as an end in itself, although it was still
learning to take its first steps. What was most dangerous was for
the army alone to be the guardian of democracy's gate. Such a gate
would in that case only let through those who carry the special
pass, distributed only to those loyal to the army.

Like the oil boom that appeared suddenly, and which the people of
Mauritania thought would lead them to progress and prosperity before
officials and companies drown in its stagnant oil wells, thus the
democratic obsession leaped to the forefront, doing away with old
companions and wagers. However, the Mauritanian people, who have
developed their own method of cohabitation and dialogue without
resorting to violence, are always able to get rid of the day's
crisis, as it is never more than a stone on the road. The people of
the desert have the habit of looking far away, to where there are
oases, with nothing limiting their vision but the blue of the sky.