Q & A with Hamas Politburo Member, Muhammad Nazzal

Q & A with Hamas Politburo Member, Muhammad Nazzal
24/08/2008
By Ali El-Saleh in London
http://aawsat. com/english/ news.asp? section=3& id=13835

Q) Does Hamas hope to reestablish ties with Jordan?

A) The meetings in Amman were supposed to lay the foundations for
new relations between the Jordanian government and the Hamas
Movement. It is to be recalled that relations between the two
parties were severed in 1999, and remained cool for approximately a
decade. During that time, attempts were made to activate ties, but
they failed. That state continued until the latest Hamas's members
visit to Amman and meetings with the Jordanian General Intelligence
Department [GID] officials. So it can be said that the visit by a
Hamas delegation to Amman will, God willing, usher in a new stage in
relations free from the tension that marred (relations with Jordan)
over the past few years.

Q) What developments led to this get-together? Which party initiated
first contact?

A) In fact, the initiative came from the Jordanian GID, and was met
with prompt response from Hamas; to be more exact, it can be said
that both parties had a common desire to meet with one another.

Q) Have you reached an agreement or some sort of understanding with
Jordan?

A) I can say that during the meeting some understandings were
reached. We discussed some pending security files in an amicable
atmosphere, and we are currently trying to solve them. We also
discussed political issues relating to the core political position
of Jordan and Hamas in particular. This is because there are common
issues, and the Palestinian issue is for Jordan a domestic issue. We
discussed these political files frankly, openly, and transparently.

Q) In your view, will Khalid Mishal, the Hamas Movement's Political
Bureau chief, visit Jordan in the near future?

A) In fact, nothing can be ruled out. While the talk of Mishal's
visit to Amman was reported by the media, in fact, this issue was
not discussed during the meetings with the GID officials.

Q) Do you expect Hamas to open an office in Amman soon?

A) No, this issue was not discussed. We certainly wish the Hamas
Movement to have some presence in Jordan, but the form and mechanism
of such presence were not discussed with the Jordanians.

Q) Did Jordan set specific conditions? It was reported that Jordan
asked Hamas not to intervene in the affairs of the Islamic groups in
Jordan and not to carry out any security activities, such as
recruiting people, and so on and so forth?

A) Neither party set any conditions. But, as I have said, we
discussed numerous political and security issues and ways of
strengthening bilateral relations, not on the basis of conditions,
but on the basis of what each party clearly wants from the other.

Q) In your opinion, does the Jordanian move toward Hamas have
anything to do with developments in the region?

A) We in the Hamas Movement are not concerned with the motives
behind this shift in Jordan's stand or move toward relations with
Hamas. We viewed this move as a positive development and that we
must respond positively and support it. Frankly speaking, we are not
concerned with discussing the background or motives of the Jordanian
move; the talk of motives and background concerns political
analysts. In political activity, it is said that one must not look
for intentions but results. We want practical and positive results
of relations between Hamas and Jordan.

Q) Does this rapprochement have anything to do with Hamas's
apprehensions and its leaders' search for a safe haven in case
indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel may lead to a peace
agreement between the two countries?

A) This is absolutely not true because we are not looking for havens
for the Hamas Movement. We are looking for accord with all Arab and
Islamic parties, particularly the neighboring countries, notably
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. These countries are neighboring
Israel and relations with them must be of a strategic nature. So we
are looking for accords and points of agreements with these
countries, not for a haven. We do not feel any concern over the
presence of the Hamas Movement in Syria because, based on our
reading of the current political situation, we believe that a Syrian-
Israeli agreement is still not close at hand.

Q) In your view, will relations between Jordan and Hamas have a
negative impact on other countries, like, Egypt for example?

A) Rapprochement in relations with Egypt and Jordan must not be at
the expense of other Arab countries, especially Egypt. We do not
establish relations with one party at the expense of other parties,
but we seek balance in relations among all Arab and Islamic parties.
We are opposed to the policy of axes in the first place, and we are
against the policy of taking sides with one party against another.
We always seek balance in Arab relations whether with Hamas or with
the Fatah Movement and the Palestinian presidency. So our
rapprochement with Jordan must not be at the expense of relations
with Egypt.

Q) In your meetings with the Jordanians, did you discuss Hamas's
relations with the Palestinian Authority and Fatah? In other words,
is Jordan intending on bringing the two parties closer together?

A) In fact, all political files were discussed, including Hamas's
relations with the Palestinian presidency and the Fatah Movement. We
explained our viewpoint that the intransigent party is the other
party, and that there is a US veto which President Mahmud Abbas
appears to be unable to bypass. Therefore, all attempts at
rapprochement, dialogue, and reconciliation between the two parties
come up against a US Brick wall. This is what we told the brothers
in Jordan.

Q) Did Jordan react positively to this?

A) The Jordanian party realizes the difficulty of intra-Palestinian
dialogue under the US veto. This is why we did not place any role
for Jordan regarding this issue on the agenda of our meetings,
though we welcome any Jordanian or Arab role in bringing about
rapprochement between Hamas and the Fatah Movement. We know that the
regional and Arab parties realize that these attempts would come up
against a US brick wall. So in my view, these parties will not try
to get involved in any intra-Palestinian reconciliation process
unless there is a green light, specifically from the US
Administration.

Q) Is this the same US brick wall you came up against and which led
to your deportation from Jordan along with Khalid Mishal and Musa
Abu-Marzuq in 1999? Wasn't there US pressure at the time to deport
you from Amman?

A) Certainly there was US pressure, but I think there was also
Israeli and Palestinian Arafatist (the late President Yasser Arafat)
pressure, as well as Jordanian considerations. All these factors
combined played a part in harming our relations with Jordan and led
to what happened in 1999. But we have to understand that the world
has changed and that the situation cannot remain the same. There is
nothing impossible in politics, and states, political parties,
groups, and movements all look for their interests. So Jordan found
that its interest does not lie in continued rupture of relations
with Hamas, but in openness to Hamas and to other groups. This stand
serves Jordan's political interest. Openness to Hamas is a positive
Jordanian step forward which we must appreciate, develop, encourage,
and push forward. We must not question or have any suspicion about
Jordan's move, as this would only bring us back to square one. We
are required to look forward and to read the Jordanian political
step as a positive adjustment to the changes and circumstances that
the region is going through.

Q) When did contact with Jordan begin and when did you agree to
meet?

A) The first meeting took place on 21 July and the second meeting
took place on Wednesday, 13 August.

Q) Did the shift that led to this rapprochement begin with Jordan or
Hamas?

A) In my opinion, the question is not a shift in the Jordanian or in
Hamas's stand; it is an accurate and enlightened reading of the
changes our region is going through. These changes impel all parties
to look for equations that strengthen their position and achieve
their interests. So I do not think this development should be
reduced into a question of which party shifted its stance or which
party initiated this step. This issue must be considered in a
comprehensive way and from all angles. Regional developments require
that all parties deal with them flexibly and wisely.

Q) Since rapprochement between Jordan and Hamas and their finding of
a common ground between them has been possible, isn't it more
appropriate for Hamas to find a common ground with the Fatah
Movement and the Palestinian presidency?

A) This rapprochement with Jordan will inevitably impel the other
party to read the issue differently. In my view, when a party makes
a mistake in exercising policy, this mistake could be the result of
this party's erroneous assessment of the realities on the ground. It
could also be the result of lack of political will. I think that the
Palestinian presidency and the Fatah Movement were erroneous in
reading the situation when Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip.
They believed that Hamas 's control of Gaza would be a predicament
for Hamas and that Hamas would sooner or later fall down along with
the authority it established in the Gaza Strip. This reading of the
situation proved wrong, for Hamas has remained steadfast one and a
half years since its control of Gaza. If the [Palestinian]
presidency and the Fatah Movement now read the situation
differently, what remains has to do with political will. The
Palestinian presidency and the Fatah Movement do not have the
political will to hold a real and serious dialogue with the Hamas
Movement, or to hold a comprehensive Palestinian national dialogue.
I am speaking frankly of the official Palestinian will, which is
contingent upon US-Israeli will. There is no US-Israeli will for a
serious dialogue between Hamas and Fatah that would result in
rapprochement or agreement between them. So if we ask why
rapprochement has been brought about between Hamas and Jordan and
not between the friends who stand in the same trench -- the comrades
in the Fatah and Hamas movement -- I think this has to do with
political will.

Q) I gather from your argument that steps made to bring about an
agreement between Hamas and Fatah would be futile in the absence of
a political will?

A) I think the intra-Palestinian dialogue will be postponed until
after the US presidential elections. The parties that want to
unleash intra-Palestinian dialogue are waiting for the results of
the US elections, because under the current US Administration there
is a veto which the parties cannot bypass. So what is at issue is
not an intra-Palestinian dialogue, but awaiting the results of the
US elections, and whether (Democratic candidate) Barack Obama will
be able to defeat (Republican candidate) John McCain. It would then
be possible to bank on a Democratic administration to unleash a
national Palestinian dialogue. This is the reading or the situation
that the other party is waiting for.

Q) So you think that the talk of sending Egyptian invitations to the
Palestinian groups to hold bilateral talks in preparation for a
comprehensive dialogue is in this context?

A) First of all, Cairo has not addressed an invitation for an intra-
Palestinian dialogue. It sent a paper containing a host of questions
to learn the views of the Palestinian groups of the mechanism
through which the Palestinian split can be addressed. Egypt is
currently awaiting the response of these groups and on the basis of
which it will decide whether or not to continue its efforts to
unleash a national Palestinian dialogue. So it can be said that what
is happening in this respect is no more than marking time, because
Egypt will not take any step before the results of the US elections
appear. So the Palestinians are being made busy discussing the issue
of dialogue, but no real, serious steps have been taken to begin a
dialogue. I do not think that the climate is now favorable for
unleashing an intra-Palestinian dialogue.

Q) Have you conveyed his viewpoint to the Egyptian authorities?

A) Yes. We sent a message to the Egyptian authorities in reply to
theirs expressing our viewpoint on Palestinian dialogue and the
basis on which it may start.

Q) Let us go back to the issue of Jordan; while in Amman did you
meet with other political figures?

A) No. Our meetings were confined to the GID director and a number
of senior GID officers.

Q) Why?

A) Because we did not have enough time, and because we went to Amman
to discuss a specific issue.

Q) Egypt has accused Hamas of stalling in reaching a deal regarding
the Israeli captive soldier Gilad Shalit before getting Israeli
guarantees that it will not attack Hamas leaders in Gaza, is this
true?

A) This is absolutely not true. These are false and unfair
accusations. We are eager to release Shalit because his release
would mean the release of hundreds of Palestinian POWs. I do not
think Hamas has an interest in keeping Shalit. However, Hamas does
not want to release him for a cheap price as the Israelis want. We
are clear in our stated position that we will not respond positively
to any pressure to release Shalit in a deal that is not honorable.
We are looking for an honorable deal that will achieve the objective
for which we took him prisoner. So we reject any accusations that we
hamper a deal. It is regrettable to hear statements condemning the
Hamas Movement and acquitting Israel, which is the intransigent
party that hampers a deal by setting impossible conditions that no
honest Palestinian movement could accept.

Q) Do you think we will see an end to the Shalit and the POW issue
soon?

A) I think solving this issue needs time because I believe that the
Israeli leaders are not yet ready to pay the price for releasing
Shalit. So unless some dramatic change occurs in the Israeli stand,
his release will not come about in the near future.

Q) Are the reports that Hamas is looking for a new mediator instead
of Egypt true?

A) We are not looking for a substitute to Egypt. Egypt remains the
mediator, but other parties have contacted Hamas and asked to
intercede. We said that the issue needs the agreement of all the
parties concerned. We also said that we will not stand in the way of
any party the wants to exert efforts to help release the POWs. The
field is open to all to make moves, but we will not look for a new
mediator other than Egypt.

Q) Are the parties that asked to intercede in this issue Arab or
European?

A) Arab and foreign parties have offered to intervene and they
expressed readiness to exert efforts in this respect.

Q) Was Qatar one of these parties?

A) I do not wish to elaborate further regarding these parties.